64
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
AIMS
As we are unable to say with certainty that a specific structure of rule, for
instance, catchment management agencies, will bring about positive changes in water
resources management, how can we harness the eclectic notion of cause and causal
relations as a PULSE
3 component? The Agential, Ideational, Material and Structural
typology (AIMS) is a starting point (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Although scholars
devised this causal mechanism typology in IR to analyse world politics, it is suitable for other levels on which political activity occurs (Meissner et al. 2018). Causal
mechanisms are not a specific level of analysis, but they are components of the philosophy of the natural and social sciences (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Meissner et al.
2018) and, as such, they are linked to scientific disciplines and not to the levels of
analysis.
At any level, causal mechanisms are processes that are characterised by the interaction and relation of a system’s parts, structure and environment (Hedström and
Ylikoski 2010; Meissner et al. 2018) and that ‘…uncover the underlying social
processes that connect inputs and outcomes’ (Falleti and Lynch 2009: 19). In this
sense, one can talk of ‘complex combinations of causal conditions’ (Jager 2016:
282). Kurki (2008: 233-234) spoke of:
‘complexes of causes’ after arguing that we should not ‘…seek…to define mechanisms in a
fixed way [but] rather as a vague metaphor… In the light of the Aristotelian plural conception
of ontology and causal powers, it could be argued that mechanisms are usefully thought
of as the particular kinds of, often relatively stable, interactions that take place between
certain types of causal forces. Mechanism explanations, then, can be seen as accounts of
the processes of interaction between different elements that bring about given events or
processes. On such a definition we can refer to various causal interactions or processes as
mechanisms: from market mechanisms (not seen as a logically necessary system but made
up of various socially embedded and positioned agents and structures coming together in
certain ways) to mechanisms of discursive reproduction (for example, variously socially
positioned and shaped strategies of media representations).’
Kurki (2008: 234) views this description as ‘…an open definition for an already
vague term, but it also allows us to separate causes from mechanisms’. This implies
that mechanisms do not define causes…’ but give credence to the ‘…accounts of the
interaction of causes…’ through the notion of ‘causal processes’.
Whatever the case may be, when returning to the AIMS typology and speaking
of agential causes, I refer to the mechanisms or processes that are brought on by the
actions of the actors (Kurki 2008; Meissner 2017, 2018), such as building a water
infrastructure and purifying the water. Ideational causal mechanisms include perceptions, anticipation and ideologies, or the cognitive aspects that result in processes and
action. Material mechanisms include the resources needed to implement activities,
such as money, technology and human resources, while structural causal processes
include policies, strategies and the rule of law (Kurki 2008; Sil and Katzenstein
2010; Meissner 2017, 2018). We should not assume that structural causal mechanisms are the opposite of agential causal processes, because ‘structures are often
revealed through agency’ (Selby 2018: 339).
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
AIMS
As we are unable to say with certainty that a specific structure of rule, for
instance, catchment management agencies, will bring about positive changes in water
resources management, how can we harness the eclectic notion of cause and causal
relations as a PULSE
3 component? The Agential, Ideational, Material and Structural
typology (AIMS) is a starting point (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Although scholars
devised this causal mechanism typology in IR to analyse world politics, it is suitable for other levels on which political activity occurs (Meissner et al. 2018). Causal
mechanisms are not a specific level of analysis, but they are components of the philosophy of the natural and social sciences (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Meissner et al.
2018) and, as such, they are linked to scientific disciplines and not to the levels of
analysis.
At any level, causal mechanisms are processes that are characterised by the interaction and relation of a system’s parts, structure and environment (Hedström and
Ylikoski 2010; Meissner et al. 2018) and that ‘…uncover the underlying social
processes that connect inputs and outcomes’ (Falleti and Lynch 2009: 19). In this
sense, one can talk of ‘complex combinations of causal conditions’ (Jager 2016:
282). Kurki (2008: 233-234) spoke of:
‘complexes of causes’ after arguing that we should not ‘…seek…to define mechanisms in a
fixed way [but] rather as a vague metaphor… In the light of the Aristotelian plural conception
of ontology and causal powers, it could be argued that mechanisms are usefully thought
of as the particular kinds of, often relatively stable, interactions that take place between
certain types of causal forces. Mechanism explanations, then, can be seen as accounts of
the processes of interaction between different elements that bring about given events or
processes. On such a definition we can refer to various causal interactions or processes as
mechanisms: from market mechanisms (not seen as a logically necessary system but made
up of various socially embedded and positioned agents and structures coming together in
certain ways) to mechanisms of discursive reproduction (for example, variously socially
positioned and shaped strategies of media representations).’
Kurki (2008: 234) views this description as ‘…an open definition for an already
vague term, but it also allows us to separate causes from mechanisms’. This implies
that mechanisms do not define causes…’ but give credence to the ‘…accounts of the
interaction of causes…’ through the notion of ‘causal processes’.
Whatever the case may be, when returning to the AIMS typology and speaking
of agential causes, I refer to the mechanisms or processes that are brought on by the
actions of the actors (Kurki 2008; Meissner 2017, 2018), such as building a water
infrastructure and purifying the water. Ideational causal mechanisms include perceptions, anticipation and ideologies, or the cognitive aspects that result in processes and
action. Material mechanisms include the resources needed to implement activities,
such as money, technology and human resources, while structural causal processes
include policies, strategies and the rule of law (Kurki 2008; Sil and Katzenstein
2010; Meissner 2017, 2018). We should not assume that structural causal mechanisms are the opposite of agential causal processes, because ‘structures are often
revealed through agency’ (Selby 2018: 339).