2.4 Pulse 3
61
on such an appraisal, one can move forwards in a meaningful way and apply analytic
eclecticism where it matters. It will not only show what researchers and practitioners
are missing, but it will also apply eclecticism as a foundation for various theoretical
elements, in order to illuminate issues and perspectives (Meissner 2017), for practical
reasons. In other words, analytic eclecticism provides an approach and perspective
that will help to gain a deeper explanation and understanding of the issues that plague
society.
2.4.2.2 Causation
The central element of PULSE
3 is the role of causation in paradigms and theories.
Here, I will discuss the philosophical views of causes in the environmental and
social sciences, based on the thinking of David Hume and Aristotle borrowed from
the scholarly work of Milja Kurki and, to a certain extent, Richard Ned Lebow, and I
will link these notions of causation to the agent-structure and the material-ideational
axes mentioned above.
For Kurki (2008), positivism views causation in a strict and narrow manner. This
understanding is based on the philosophical works of David Hume (1711–1776),
who based the conception of cause on several assumptions. The first is that scholars
link causal relations to regular patterns of occurrences and the study of the patterns of
regularities. Secondly, causal relations are regularity relations of patterns of observables that rely on constant conjunctions. Thirdly, causal relations are determined by
regularity. This means that, based on certain observed regularities, when one type
of event occurs, then we often assume another type of episode will follow (in a
probabilistic way, at least). Regular determinism is the fountainhead of prediction or
logical deduction. Fourthly, causes refer to moving causes in that they are efficient
causes that push and pull (Kurki 2006, 2008; Lebow 2014).
According to Kurki (2008: 6), ‘These assumptions about the concept of cause are
deeply embedded in the modern philosophy of science and social science…’. This has
led to an empirical and positivist interpretation of causation. In addition, many natural
and social scientists see this explanation as the only acceptable way of conducting
a causal analysis. Because of the dominance of Hume’s conceptualisation of cause
in positivism, there have been repercussions for theory and theory development.
The practical sense that is contained in theoretical assumptions has evaporated, so
to speak, and a narrower approach to cause has taken root (Kurki 2008). The focus
emphasises the instrumentality of causation and not so much its role and involvement
in practice. Here we see how assumptions from a specific paradigm about causation
can shift the attention onto the cause, at the expense of practice.
Enter Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.), whose account of cause and causation was
much broader and deeper than the later account of Hume. The Greek philosopher
developed a typology of causes that does not focus on Hume’s instrumentality of
causes. Aristotle’s classification includes the material, formal, agential or efficient
and final causes. An example of a material cause is the marble, from which a sculptor
shapes a statue. Matter is quite fundamental in any explanation and Aristotle saw
61
on such an appraisal, one can move forwards in a meaningful way and apply analytic
eclecticism where it matters. It will not only show what researchers and practitioners
are missing, but it will also apply eclecticism as a foundation for various theoretical
elements, in order to illuminate issues and perspectives (Meissner 2017), for practical
reasons. In other words, analytic eclecticism provides an approach and perspective
that will help to gain a deeper explanation and understanding of the issues that plague
society.
2.4.2.2 Causation
The central element of PULSE
3 is the role of causation in paradigms and theories.
Here, I will discuss the philosophical views of causes in the environmental and
social sciences, based on the thinking of David Hume and Aristotle borrowed from
the scholarly work of Milja Kurki and, to a certain extent, Richard Ned Lebow, and I
will link these notions of causation to the agent-structure and the material-ideational
axes mentioned above.
For Kurki (2008), positivism views causation in a strict and narrow manner. This
understanding is based on the philosophical works of David Hume (1711–1776),
who based the conception of cause on several assumptions. The first is that scholars
link causal relations to regular patterns of occurrences and the study of the patterns of
regularities. Secondly, causal relations are regularity relations of patterns of observables that rely on constant conjunctions. Thirdly, causal relations are determined by
regularity. This means that, based on certain observed regularities, when one type
of event occurs, then we often assume another type of episode will follow (in a
probabilistic way, at least). Regular determinism is the fountainhead of prediction or
logical deduction. Fourthly, causes refer to moving causes in that they are efficient
causes that push and pull (Kurki 2006, 2008; Lebow 2014).
According to Kurki (2008: 6), ‘These assumptions about the concept of cause are
deeply embedded in the modern philosophy of science and social science…’. This has
led to an empirical and positivist interpretation of causation. In addition, many natural
and social scientists see this explanation as the only acceptable way of conducting
a causal analysis. Because of the dominance of Hume’s conceptualisation of cause
in positivism, there have been repercussions for theory and theory development.
The practical sense that is contained in theoretical assumptions has evaporated, so
to speak, and a narrower approach to cause has taken root (Kurki 2008). The focus
emphasises the instrumentality of causation and not so much its role and involvement
in practice. Here we see how assumptions from a specific paradigm about causation
can shift the attention onto the cause, at the expense of practice.
Enter Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.), whose account of cause and causation was
much broader and deeper than the later account of Hume. The Greek philosopher
developed a typology of causes that does not focus on Hume’s instrumentality of
causes. Aristotle’s classification includes the material, formal, agential or efficient
and final causes. An example of a material cause is the marble, from which a sculptor
shapes a statue. Matter is quite fundamental in any explanation and Aristotle saw