40
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
argued that Geldenhuys’s ‘work had inspired the policies of the securocrats [military
beaurocrats] and had served as advisory documents to them’. We find one of the
most famous, or dare I say, infamous, connections in Joseph Hanlon’s 1986 publication Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa. Hanlon (1986:
29) is entirely forthright about the cause-and-effect linkage between Geldenhuys’s
published work and the disreputable policy, by calling Geldenhuys ‘a major theoretician of destabilisation, both explaining the concept and showing how it could
be done’. In response to Hanlon’s (1986) claims, Geldenhuys (1989) himself asked
how Hanlon had come upon his insights and whether his work was a ‘blueprint for
destabilisation’?
Geldenhuys (1989:87) ‘simply’ did not know the answer to this question and he
could not find any empirical evidence of Hanlon’s claim, even after he asked him
twice to supply such evidence. One of the unintended consequences of Hanlon’s
(1986) publication is that other authors took Hanlon’s word as ‘gospel’ (Desmond
1987; Brittain 1988; Urdang 1989). Of these authors, only Brittain apologised to
Geldenhuys, in a formal letter, after she realised that references to him as being ‘one
of President [P.W.] Botha’s leading academic consultants on foreign policy’ were
inaccurate. This is an indication that several other researchers accepted Hanlon’s
(1986) observations, which were damaging and offensive to Geldenhuys, as being
factually correct (Geldenhuys 1989).
With respect to ‘science speaking truth to power’, Geldenhuys (1989: 88) noted
that there are ‘risks involved in this type of research’ in that ‘[t]he academic…has
no control over what decision makers will do with his analysis—assuming that they
do take note of it. Second, the…analyst should be aware of the danger of guilt by
perceived association, of being branded an academic accomplice of an illegitimate
regime …’. Geldenhuys (1898: 88) goes on to say that these risks should not deter
academics from ‘applying their minds to the formidable challenges facing South
Africa, both domestically and externally’.
The case of Deon Geldenhuys is also a lesson on the consequences of the oftenpositivistic causal link that scholars create between theory and policy. By critically
investigating matters, as Brittain (1988) did, and by employing a multiple paradigm
and theory lens, we can avoid simplistic cause-and-effect relations like those of
Hanlon. We could, furthermore, produce a deeper understanding of the role that
research plays in policy processes and avoid ascribing too much to the notion that
science speaks truth to power. In this sense, science speaking truth to power means
that our scientific practices must inform our interaction in the public policy domain
(Ntuli and Smith 1999), with the adage exhibiting the use of scientific knowledge in
policy processes. It is possible that many scholars think that this is their central role
in society, and that everything they analyse and report on must speak truth to power,
but this is not always the case, as Molloy (2019) argues in his account of the role of
researchers (p. 28).
In summary, the integration of paradigms has consequences for research products, for their uptake into policy processes and, by default, for the consequences of
actions that are based on policies and the views of the wider epistemic community. As
already mentioned, positivism and postpositivism are supposed to produce dependable prescriptions for action. Bringing other paradigms into the fold could increase
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
argued that Geldenhuys’s ‘work had inspired the policies of the securocrats [military
beaurocrats] and had served as advisory documents to them’. We find one of the
most famous, or dare I say, infamous, connections in Joseph Hanlon’s 1986 publication Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa. Hanlon (1986:
29) is entirely forthright about the cause-and-effect linkage between Geldenhuys’s
published work and the disreputable policy, by calling Geldenhuys ‘a major theoretician of destabilisation, both explaining the concept and showing how it could
be done’. In response to Hanlon’s (1986) claims, Geldenhuys (1989) himself asked
how Hanlon had come upon his insights and whether his work was a ‘blueprint for
destabilisation’?
Geldenhuys (1989:87) ‘simply’ did not know the answer to this question and he
could not find any empirical evidence of Hanlon’s claim, even after he asked him
twice to supply such evidence. One of the unintended consequences of Hanlon’s
(1986) publication is that other authors took Hanlon’s word as ‘gospel’ (Desmond
1987; Brittain 1988; Urdang 1989). Of these authors, only Brittain apologised to
Geldenhuys, in a formal letter, after she realised that references to him as being ‘one
of President [P.W.] Botha’s leading academic consultants on foreign policy’ were
inaccurate. This is an indication that several other researchers accepted Hanlon’s
(1986) observations, which were damaging and offensive to Geldenhuys, as being
factually correct (Geldenhuys 1989).
With respect to ‘science speaking truth to power’, Geldenhuys (1989: 88) noted
that there are ‘risks involved in this type of research’ in that ‘[t]he academic…has
no control over what decision makers will do with his analysis—assuming that they
do take note of it. Second, the…analyst should be aware of the danger of guilt by
perceived association, of being branded an academic accomplice of an illegitimate
regime …’. Geldenhuys (1898: 88) goes on to say that these risks should not deter
academics from ‘applying their minds to the formidable challenges facing South
Africa, both domestically and externally’.
The case of Deon Geldenhuys is also a lesson on the consequences of the oftenpositivistic causal link that scholars create between theory and policy. By critically
investigating matters, as Brittain (1988) did, and by employing a multiple paradigm
and theory lens, we can avoid simplistic cause-and-effect relations like those of
Hanlon. We could, furthermore, produce a deeper understanding of the role that
research plays in policy processes and avoid ascribing too much to the notion that
science speaks truth to power. In this sense, science speaking truth to power means
that our scientific practices must inform our interaction in the public policy domain
(Ntuli and Smith 1999), with the adage exhibiting the use of scientific knowledge in
policy processes. It is possible that many scholars think that this is their central role
in society, and that everything they analyse and report on must speak truth to power,
but this is not always the case, as Molloy (2019) argues in his account of the role of
researchers (p. 28).
In summary, the integration of paradigms has consequences for research products, for their uptake into policy processes and, by default, for the consequences of
actions that are based on policies and the views of the wider epistemic community. As
already mentioned, positivism and postpositivism are supposed to produce dependable prescriptions for action. Bringing other paradigms into the fold could increase