38
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
source of a practitioner’s actions. Through positivism, for instance, we view action
in a structured, linear and regulatory ‘cause-and-effect’ manner (Kurki 2008), while
interpretivism brings to light a deeper understanding of the context and it’s bearing
on policy actions. With positivism as a frame of reference, action comes over as
being well thought through, goal directed and systemic driven, and as such, it is
often described as rational (Satz and Ferejohn 1994). Should a person want to act
rationally, he or she must have specific goals. The nature of these objectives will
determine the likely methods. In turn, researchers evaluate the method by using its
effects to determine the link between the pre-specified goals and human behaviour.
When one takes other paradigms and theories into consideration, the understanding
of the source of an action becomes less neat and tidy, but more comprehensible.
Messiness creeps in when situations are more ambiguous and complex than they are
without these aspects (Eisner 1990; Meissner 2016b). Complexity is not only a theory
(Anderson 1999; Cilliers 2000; Byrne 2002), but we also construct complexity when
we add other paradigms and thinking to our thought processes. Complexity is defined
according to how much it surrounds us (Meissner 2017). However, we should not
view complexity as a parsimonious theory with the least assumptions and variables,
but as a perspective that has the greatest explanatory power (more on this later).
Whatever the case may be, looking at issues through multiple paradigms and
theories changes our conceptualisation and underpins our actions. This is because
we are unable to constantly specify goals, which are at times difficult to articulate,
due to the inherent dynamism of our multiple physical and social environments.
Intuition, for instance, can play a part in our actions. In such contexts, paradigms
other than, and together with, positivism can paint a more realistic and finely nuanced
picture of a policy environment and of how a practitioner operates (Eisner 1990).
What one paradigm ignores, another paradigm highlights.
In this respect, Rueschemeyer (2009: 116) argued that: ‘To the positivist view, the
effect of emotion on beliefs is mysterious’. He also states that emotions do interfere
with cognition and, because of this capability, we cannot dismiss them as a mere
nuisance when conducting research; we must take them into consideration during
our investigations. Coicaud (2014) also reached this conclusion in his study on the
role of emotions and passions in international politics. It is in these situations that
paradigms, such as interpretivism and critical theory, bear fruit, by placing emotions
central to what is, and what ought to be, questioned. In this sense, Rueschemeyer
(2009: 114) contextualised the role of emotions in practice and science when he
said that: ‘Emotions engender wishful thinking and, when passionate, blind us to
many features of the situation and to the consequences of rush actions… Emotions
may define and “protect” the unthinkable; but a passionate search for the truth is
driven by emotions as well’. This implies that emotions can play a significant role in
research, as well as in the cognition of the actors, and that they can influence research
endeavours (Rueschemeyer 2009) and practical situations.
Therefore, emotions play an important role in the recognition of, or resistance to,
alternative paradigms. Either way, the participatory paradigm (Lincoln et al. 2011,
2018; Meissner 2017), could help to realise that subjective knowledge also has merit
in the policy process (p. 40).
Précédent

- 52/299

Suivant