36
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
But no scientific method will ever be able to ask all the right questions about how we should
manage resources for sustainable development, let alone find the answers. The results are
always open to interpretation. All actors, and particularly those stakeholders with a direct
social or economic involvement and interest, have a uniquely different perspective on what
is a problem and what constitutes improvement in [a]…system.
Although Pretty (1994) applied his argument to sustainable development and its
associated problems, it is safe to say that his reasoning covers a variety of issues
or areas. Since paradigms and theories influence practice, only one paradigm is
legitimate (Lake 2011; Meissner 2017), nor is not only one theory the foundation for a
complete explanation and understanding of social reality (Meissner 2017). Regarding
comprehension, Cilliers (2005) argued, ‘that different intellectual traditions have
different understandings of what the nature and status of meaningful knowledge is’.
Cox (1981) says that theory is ‘always for someone and for some purpose’. In the
context of legitimacy and comprehension, Selby (2018: 333) interpreted what Robert
Cox said almost forty years ago, by mentioning the following about paradigms,
theories and impactful research:
They are always oriented to certain audiences or interlocutors (“users” and “beneficiaries”
in the contemporary jargon); they always serve or at least complement specific functions,
interests and values; and they are also, it may be added, always situated—that is, practised by
individuals and their collaborators in ways which are inevitably affected by social locations,
statuses, networks and biases.
This suggests that seemingly epistemologically objective research has certain
aims in mind that are not always geared towards uncovering wholesome ‘truth’.
To explain Selby’s (2018) argument, let us consider emotions and the situatedness
that is linked to positivism. Our emotions and situatedness within certain contexts
have a bearing on how we conduct research. From a political science perspective,
research can have a political function for an individual or group. Eisner (1990)
takes this further when he eloquently wrote about understanding reality and truth,
based on positivism: ‘the truth is ultimately a mirage that cannot be attained because
the [political] worlds we know are made by us’. Selby (2014: 949) reasoned that
positivists believe they are producing an objective truth through empiricism, which
is constituted by their function, interest and values. The latter two aspects stand
central in the analyses of political and international relations (p. 106, 138). However,
this belief is somewhat skewed due to ‘the positivist fallacy that social relations are
just as mechanistic as those that are the focus of the natural sciences’. Objective truth
appears to be a contradiction in terms, not only scientifically, but also politically.
2.3.3 Configurations
Paradigms and theories function together in various configurations (Hayes and James
2014). Since not only one paradigm is legitimate, and because there are multiple
paradigm and theory arrangements in practice, we can shift the way we think about
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
But no scientific method will ever be able to ask all the right questions about how we should
manage resources for sustainable development, let alone find the answers. The results are
always open to interpretation. All actors, and particularly those stakeholders with a direct
social or economic involvement and interest, have a uniquely different perspective on what
is a problem and what constitutes improvement in [a]…system.
Although Pretty (1994) applied his argument to sustainable development and its
associated problems, it is safe to say that his reasoning covers a variety of issues
or areas. Since paradigms and theories influence practice, only one paradigm is
legitimate (Lake 2011; Meissner 2017), nor is not only one theory the foundation for a
complete explanation and understanding of social reality (Meissner 2017). Regarding
comprehension, Cilliers (2005) argued, ‘that different intellectual traditions have
different understandings of what the nature and status of meaningful knowledge is’.
Cox (1981) says that theory is ‘always for someone and for some purpose’. In the
context of legitimacy and comprehension, Selby (2018: 333) interpreted what Robert
Cox said almost forty years ago, by mentioning the following about paradigms,
theories and impactful research:
They are always oriented to certain audiences or interlocutors (“users” and “beneficiaries”
in the contemporary jargon); they always serve or at least complement specific functions,
interests and values; and they are also, it may be added, always situated—that is, practised by
individuals and their collaborators in ways which are inevitably affected by social locations,
statuses, networks and biases.
This suggests that seemingly epistemologically objective research has certain
aims in mind that are not always geared towards uncovering wholesome ‘truth’.
To explain Selby’s (2018) argument, let us consider emotions and the situatedness
that is linked to positivism. Our emotions and situatedness within certain contexts
have a bearing on how we conduct research. From a political science perspective,
research can have a political function for an individual or group. Eisner (1990)
takes this further when he eloquently wrote about understanding reality and truth,
based on positivism: ‘the truth is ultimately a mirage that cannot be attained because
the [political] worlds we know are made by us’. Selby (2014: 949) reasoned that
positivists believe they are producing an objective truth through empiricism, which
is constituted by their function, interest and values. The latter two aspects stand
central in the analyses of political and international relations (p. 106, 138). However,
this belief is somewhat skewed due to ‘the positivist fallacy that social relations are
just as mechanistic as those that are the focus of the natural sciences’. Objective truth
appears to be a contradiction in terms, not only scientifically, but also politically.
2.3.3 Configurations
Paradigms and theories function together in various configurations (Hayes and James
2014). Since not only one paradigm is legitimate, and because there are multiple
paradigm and theory arrangements in practice, we can shift the way we think about