References
245
What is more, paradigms and theories contain characteristics that assist the
analyst to create a deeper understanding of what is practically relevant. The relationship between social theory and practice is not only based on determinism or
linear causality, but also on a mutually enhancing relationship, with both of them
forming part of an inseparable whole. In so doing, the municipality could enhance
its knowledge of the implications of green and ecological infrastructures to generate
a more inclusive and normative process, instead of a top-down hegemonic policy
environment that is informed by a single paradigm.
That being said, as I argued in Chap. 2, paradigms and theories are not irrelevant to
practice. Defining theories and paradigms in a specific way might create the impression that these cognitive instruments are irrelevant to practice, especially when they
are conceptualised in an empirical and positivist manner. In our quest to build a firm
foundation for knowledge, based on an exclusive scientific conceptualisation, we put
the theory for practice on shaky ground. Using an empirical scientific meaning of
theory, and focusing on theory’s ‘predictive capability’, we make the development
of practice straightforward by using regulatory cause-and-effect prognostications.
These forecasts are usually in the form of hypotheses and this type of knowledge, on
its own, is insufficient for practical knowledge purposes, since hypothesis-type statements are often devoid of process- and context-specific information. This is because
the verification principle of positivism distinguishes valid knowledge from opinion,
only when we can verify or confirm the truth of statements through hypothesis testing,
which is often in the form of verification. Because of this characteristic, researchers
often ignore the practical knowledge context, since they hold practical knowledge
in the form of experience, which does not lend itself to hypothesis testing, let alone
verification. With a hypothesis in hand, members of the epistemic community expect
practitioners to know which variables they need to adapt to, in order to achieve the
desired results.
The PULSE
3 analysis in Chap. 3 highlights the dominant practical knowledge that
informs practices, as well as the ‘neglected practical knowledge’ that could enhance
the practitioners’ background knowledge. This overlooked practical knowledge is
usually, but not always, in normative form, since this type of knowledge is often
unknown to practitioners and researchers using empirical background knowledge.
PULSE
3 , as a form of reflexive methodology, emphasises the dominant practical knowledge (e.g. paradigms, theories, causal mechanisms and problem-solving
and critical theory types) that informs practice. PULSE
3 highlights how, by whom,
and through which mechanisms, practitioners and researchers inform practices with
the abovementioned practical knowledge types. For instance, whereas paradigms
focus their attention on the worldviews that inform practices and/or methods, theories can, on the other hand, attenuate the role of the context and the actors. For
causal mechanisms, it is about relations and processes, while the problem-solving
and critical perspectives highlight various foundational principles that humans use,
through explanation and understanding, when they are facing problems. Altogether,
these cognitive instruments have one thing in common, namely, how to improve the
human condition.
245
What is more, paradigms and theories contain characteristics that assist the
analyst to create a deeper understanding of what is practically relevant. The relationship between social theory and practice is not only based on determinism or
linear causality, but also on a mutually enhancing relationship, with both of them
forming part of an inseparable whole. In so doing, the municipality could enhance
its knowledge of the implications of green and ecological infrastructures to generate
a more inclusive and normative process, instead of a top-down hegemonic policy
environment that is informed by a single paradigm.
That being said, as I argued in Chap. 2, paradigms and theories are not irrelevant to
practice. Defining theories and paradigms in a specific way might create the impression that these cognitive instruments are irrelevant to practice, especially when they
are conceptualised in an empirical and positivist manner. In our quest to build a firm
foundation for knowledge, based on an exclusive scientific conceptualisation, we put
the theory for practice on shaky ground. Using an empirical scientific meaning of
theory, and focusing on theory’s ‘predictive capability’, we make the development
of practice straightforward by using regulatory cause-and-effect prognostications.
These forecasts are usually in the form of hypotheses and this type of knowledge, on
its own, is insufficient for practical knowledge purposes, since hypothesis-type statements are often devoid of process- and context-specific information. This is because
the verification principle of positivism distinguishes valid knowledge from opinion,
only when we can verify or confirm the truth of statements through hypothesis testing,
which is often in the form of verification. Because of this characteristic, researchers
often ignore the practical knowledge context, since they hold practical knowledge
in the form of experience, which does not lend itself to hypothesis testing, let alone
verification. With a hypothesis in hand, members of the epistemic community expect
practitioners to know which variables they need to adapt to, in order to achieve the
desired results.
The PULSE
3 analysis in Chap. 3 highlights the dominant practical knowledge that
informs practices, as well as the ‘neglected practical knowledge’ that could enhance
the practitioners’ background knowledge. This overlooked practical knowledge is
usually, but not always, in normative form, since this type of knowledge is often
unknown to practitioners and researchers using empirical background knowledge.
PULSE
3 , as a form of reflexive methodology, emphasises the dominant practical knowledge (e.g. paradigms, theories, causal mechanisms and problem-solving
and critical theory types) that informs practice. PULSE
3 highlights how, by whom,
and through which mechanisms, practitioners and researchers inform practices with
the abovementioned practical knowledge types. For instance, whereas paradigms
focus their attention on the worldviews that inform practices and/or methods, theories can, on the other hand, attenuate the role of the context and the actors. For
causal mechanisms, it is about relations and processes, while the problem-solving
and critical perspectives highlight various foundational principles that humans use,
through explanation and understanding, when they are facing problems. Altogether,
these cognitive instruments have one thing in common, namely, how to improve the
human condition.