4.4 Group-Think
241
group-think is a term coined by Janis in 1982, who attributed it to ‘flawed decisionmaking that values consensus over the best result’ (Buchanan and O’Connell 2006:
40). According to Janis (1982), a group-think highlights the danger of conformity
in group decision-making and the absence of vigorous debate (Waddell and Sohal
1998). A danger that could arise is bad decisions, along with cognitive inconsistency,
improper assimilation of new data and information linked to old epistemological
beliefs, a reliance on heuristics due to cognitive limitations and the framing of information (Mercer 2005) in a systematic manner. The wellspring of these attributes
is the objective and rational framing of the green and ecological infrastructure
concepts, and how these inform and promote the policies and programmes around
such enterprises, which is also evident in the criticism of Respondents 4 and 11.
However, what is hegemonic is an objective and rational epistemology that is akin to a
‘grey epistemology’, which is outlined in Chap. 1 by Finewood (2016) and Cousins
(2017).
Should objectivity and rationality frame the green and ecological infrastructure
approaches, it could impede democratic processes, and it could exclude marginalised
groups, such as those living in informal settlements and traditionally governed areas.
The criticism that has been levelled against eThekwini’s green and ecological infrastructure initiatives is that the involved communities, such as those at the Buffelsdraai
Landfill and Inanda Mountain, are acting as a labour reserve and that they do not
play a meaningful role in the development of the initiatives (Van Klaveren 2019) and
in epistemologically normative development. Respondent 8 referred to a community
initiative in Amanzimtoti where the involvement of communities has had a positive
influence on storm-water drainage systems. However, he did not elaborate on how
the communities got involved, so I cannot draw any definite conclusion about this.
Furthermore, the presence of postpositivism, which is manifested as problemsolving theories in the interviews, indicates that not all the framings around eThekwini’s green and ecological infrastructure landscape lend themselves to absolute
objective rationality. There is also a measure of uncertainty, which is a further indication of a space that could promote democratic processes, which Cousins speaks
of.
4.4.1 Ecological Dominance
Having looked at the empirical framing of the concepts, and following Finewood
(2016) concept of a group-think, I would like to describe the prevailing ontology
that informs the ecological dominance of the policy landscape. According to Jessop
(2000: 328–329):
The idea of ecological dominance emerged in work on plant and animal ecosystems, where
it refers to the capacity of one species to exert an overriding influence on others in a given
ecological community… I do want to suggest that the notion of “ecological dominance”
can be usefully extended to social systems once allowance is made for their specificities
as communicatively or discursively mediated systems, and for the capacity of social forces
241
group-think is a term coined by Janis in 1982, who attributed it to ‘flawed decisionmaking that values consensus over the best result’ (Buchanan and O’Connell 2006:
40). According to Janis (1982), a group-think highlights the danger of conformity
in group decision-making and the absence of vigorous debate (Waddell and Sohal
1998). A danger that could arise is bad decisions, along with cognitive inconsistency,
improper assimilation of new data and information linked to old epistemological
beliefs, a reliance on heuristics due to cognitive limitations and the framing of information (Mercer 2005) in a systematic manner. The wellspring of these attributes
is the objective and rational framing of the green and ecological infrastructure
concepts, and how these inform and promote the policies and programmes around
such enterprises, which is also evident in the criticism of Respondents 4 and 11.
However, what is hegemonic is an objective and rational epistemology that is akin to a
‘grey epistemology’, which is outlined in Chap. 1 by Finewood (2016) and Cousins
(2017).
Should objectivity and rationality frame the green and ecological infrastructure
approaches, it could impede democratic processes, and it could exclude marginalised
groups, such as those living in informal settlements and traditionally governed areas.
The criticism that has been levelled against eThekwini’s green and ecological infrastructure initiatives is that the involved communities, such as those at the Buffelsdraai
Landfill and Inanda Mountain, are acting as a labour reserve and that they do not
play a meaningful role in the development of the initiatives (Van Klaveren 2019) and
in epistemologically normative development. Respondent 8 referred to a community
initiative in Amanzimtoti where the involvement of communities has had a positive
influence on storm-water drainage systems. However, he did not elaborate on how
the communities got involved, so I cannot draw any definite conclusion about this.
Furthermore, the presence of postpositivism, which is manifested as problemsolving theories in the interviews, indicates that not all the framings around eThekwini’s green and ecological infrastructure landscape lend themselves to absolute
objective rationality. There is also a measure of uncertainty, which is a further indication of a space that could promote democratic processes, which Cousins speaks
of.
4.4.1 Ecological Dominance
Having looked at the empirical framing of the concepts, and following Finewood
(2016) concept of a group-think, I would like to describe the prevailing ontology
that informs the ecological dominance of the policy landscape. According to Jessop
(2000: 328–329):
The idea of ecological dominance emerged in work on plant and animal ecosystems, where
it refers to the capacity of one species to exert an overriding influence on others in a given
ecological community… I do want to suggest that the notion of “ecological dominance”
can be usefully extended to social systems once allowance is made for their specificities
as communicatively or discursively mediated systems, and for the capacity of social forces