214
3 eThekwini’s Green and Ecological Infrastructure Policy Landscape
policy consequences yield better results than others. If experts have a better knowledge than the general public for forecasting the outcomes of a specific issue, then
an epistocracy could produce better results in governing certain policy processes. In
other words, what makes an epistocracy valuable is not so much the efficiency of
the decision-making process, but more the scientific and professional knowledge of
the epistocrats (Holst 2012). If this is the case, the efficiency of policy decisions will
increase, and the benefits for the rest of society will accrue.
Epistocracies play a compensatory role by correcting the relative unreliability of
arguments, or the agential shortcomings, of authority actors (Viehoff 2016). Because
of this, Pederson (2014) claimed that improving the use and impact of science-based
policies and practices at various levels can enrich the quality and legitimacy of democratic governance systems. He added two specific qualifiers to this statement, namely,
integrity and a trust in science. Society needs to develop and install proper measures to
avoid dogmatism and a tendency towards irrational behaviour, and, at the same time,
it needs to maintain its access to experts and scientific evidence. In this connection,
without the relevant input of scientific facts from the experts, democratic decisions
and public policies could be illegitimate or normatively defective (Pederson 2014).
It is in the science-policy interface domain that epistocracies play a compensatory
role in political processes.
In most forms of an epistocracy, it is possible that the more advantaged demographic groups, who have a superior education, would have more political representation than those that are less advantaged and educated. This is the so-called
demographic objection that is levelled against an epistocracy, which argues, firstly,
that such a form of representation is unjust and unfair. Secondly, it holds that some
people will have more power than others, since epistocracies have the tendency to
help the advantaged and harm the disadvantaged (Brennan 2018). This hints at a
top-down decision-making process, with the experts at the top and society at the
bottom, exemplified in who governs at the top benefits those at the bottom (p. 100).
In this regard, Pederson (2014) noted that, as far as policy decisions that are based
on normative questions are concerned, the wider democratic community should
determine how decision-makers deal with normative questions. This implies that
it has a balancing effect on the overbearing role of epistocrats and makes a compromise between epistocratic decision-making and the normative dimensions that affect
society. This resonates with the notion of theory being both empirical and normative,
where empiricism originates with scientists and normativity emanates from society.
Pederson (2014) went on to say that to listen to the best-qualified scientist for policy
advice does not necessarily guarantee that scientists conduct their research and development for the public good. Experts can suffer from public paralysis, and we cannot
always avoid catastrophic events by listening to epistocrats. Therefore, it is necessary
to filter and translate scientific expertise into policy-making, although science should
not always speak truth to power under all circumstances (pp. 34, 101).
Based on this notion, epistocracies could suffer from several problems, such as a
lack of popular acceptance and actual, or perceived, illegitimacy, which may lead to
instability and resistance, since citizens will likely reject and be sceptical of any form
of selection criteria or competence that determine political participation (Brennan
3 eThekwini’s Green and Ecological Infrastructure Policy Landscape
policy consequences yield better results than others. If experts have a better knowledge than the general public for forecasting the outcomes of a specific issue, then
an epistocracy could produce better results in governing certain policy processes. In
other words, what makes an epistocracy valuable is not so much the efficiency of
the decision-making process, but more the scientific and professional knowledge of
the epistocrats (Holst 2012). If this is the case, the efficiency of policy decisions will
increase, and the benefits for the rest of society will accrue.
Epistocracies play a compensatory role by correcting the relative unreliability of
arguments, or the agential shortcomings, of authority actors (Viehoff 2016). Because
of this, Pederson (2014) claimed that improving the use and impact of science-based
policies and practices at various levels can enrich the quality and legitimacy of democratic governance systems. He added two specific qualifiers to this statement, namely,
integrity and a trust in science. Society needs to develop and install proper measures to
avoid dogmatism and a tendency towards irrational behaviour, and, at the same time,
it needs to maintain its access to experts and scientific evidence. In this connection,
without the relevant input of scientific facts from the experts, democratic decisions
and public policies could be illegitimate or normatively defective (Pederson 2014).
It is in the science-policy interface domain that epistocracies play a compensatory
role in political processes.
In most forms of an epistocracy, it is possible that the more advantaged demographic groups, who have a superior education, would have more political representation than those that are less advantaged and educated. This is the so-called
demographic objection that is levelled against an epistocracy, which argues, firstly,
that such a form of representation is unjust and unfair. Secondly, it holds that some
people will have more power than others, since epistocracies have the tendency to
help the advantaged and harm the disadvantaged (Brennan 2018). This hints at a
top-down decision-making process, with the experts at the top and society at the
bottom, exemplified in who governs at the top benefits those at the bottom (p. 100).
In this regard, Pederson (2014) noted that, as far as policy decisions that are based
on normative questions are concerned, the wider democratic community should
determine how decision-makers deal with normative questions. This implies that
it has a balancing effect on the overbearing role of epistocrats and makes a compromise between epistocratic decision-making and the normative dimensions that affect
society. This resonates with the notion of theory being both empirical and normative,
where empiricism originates with scientists and normativity emanates from society.
Pederson (2014) went on to say that to listen to the best-qualified scientist for policy
advice does not necessarily guarantee that scientists conduct their research and development for the public good. Experts can suffer from public paralysis, and we cannot
always avoid catastrophic events by listening to epistocrats. Therefore, it is necessary
to filter and translate scientific expertise into policy-making, although science should
not always speak truth to power under all circumstances (pp. 34, 101).
Based on this notion, epistocracies could suffer from several problems, such as a
lack of popular acceptance and actual, or perceived, illegitimacy, which may lead to
instability and resistance, since citizens will likely reject and be sceptical of any form
of selection criteria or competence that determine political participation (Brennan