202
3 eThekwini’s Green and Ecological Infrastructure Policy Landscape
readily observe practices other than their unfolding or the processes that we observe
in texts (Adler and Pouliot 2011). ‘Family, authority, institutions, and organizations
are all kept in existence through the recurrent performance of material activities, and
to a large extent they only exist as long as those activities are performed’ (emphasis
added) (Nicolini 2012: 3).
This implies that practices, and particularly their performance, constitute and
move with history (Adler and Pouliot 2011). In this way, actors perform activities
that are not so much based on abstract forces, like interests, preferences and social
norms, but more through practical requirements, habits and personified outlooks
(McCourt 2016). This is not to say that these elements are absent from practices
(Adler and Pouliot 2011). Practices express beliefs and preferences, but they are
not like them, as Reckwitz’s (2010) definition reminds us. Since this is the case,
Kustermans (2016: 175) noted that ‘…the meaning of “practice” is a moving target.
Sometimes it means process. Sometimes it refers to a type of knowledge and related
actions. And sometimes it is used as a quasi-synonym for institution’. Herein, we
see the empirical and normative elements locked up in activities, performances and
work. With regard to the empirical and normative elements, practice theory shows
that practices are open-ended doings and sayings that take place interdependently
within a spatial-temporal dimension (Bueger and Gadinger 2015). Social structures
are temporal outflows of performances, as they could always end, if people decide
not to hold them together (Nicolini 2012). Even so, practices are not the same as
institutions, although performance could provide a case for the establishment of
institutions or supporting organisations (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Whatever the case
may be, practices require activities. Because of this, we identify practices in texts
when researchers use verbs like ‘ordering’, ‘structuring’ and ‘knowing’, instead of
‘order’, ‘structure’ or ‘knowledge’, which are nouns (Bueger and Gadinger 2015)
that indicate the existence of the embodiment of a practice.
The Individual
The practice theory pinpoints the individual’s role and the material things in the
natural environment, as well as in social life. Practices would not be possible without
material resources and individuals (Nicolini 2012). Individuals and their bodies are
not mere instruments of the person because ‘…a practice is the routinized activity
of the body’ (emphasis in the original) (Nicolini 2012: 4). What is more, habits
constitute our behaviour, with the social order inscribing routines into our bodies that,
in turn, manifest themselves through discursive and bodily practices (Nicolini 2012).
Kustermans (2016: 177) identified practices with ‘doings’ or with what actors say and
do, which correspond to their discursive and bodily practices. He goes on to say that
‘practice’ is ‘all of us doing all of our doings, the myriad of human behaviours, which
is forever going on, all at once’ (emphasis in the original). Highlighting discursive
and bodily practices bring to the fore agency as a form of discursive practice, in that
the discourse of social practice is reflexive, since it adds to the constitution of the
social realm and is created by the social (Davies 1990; Kettle 2005).
What this means is that every practice has a discursive element, since the discursive
constitution of practices are practices in themselves. Furthermore, practices involve
3 eThekwini’s Green and Ecological Infrastructure Policy Landscape
readily observe practices other than their unfolding or the processes that we observe
in texts (Adler and Pouliot 2011). ‘Family, authority, institutions, and organizations
are all kept in existence through the recurrent performance of material activities, and
to a large extent they only exist as long as those activities are performed’ (emphasis
added) (Nicolini 2012: 3).
This implies that practices, and particularly their performance, constitute and
move with history (Adler and Pouliot 2011). In this way, actors perform activities
that are not so much based on abstract forces, like interests, preferences and social
norms, but more through practical requirements, habits and personified outlooks
(McCourt 2016). This is not to say that these elements are absent from practices
(Adler and Pouliot 2011). Practices express beliefs and preferences, but they are
not like them, as Reckwitz’s (2010) definition reminds us. Since this is the case,
Kustermans (2016: 175) noted that ‘…the meaning of “practice” is a moving target.
Sometimes it means process. Sometimes it refers to a type of knowledge and related
actions. And sometimes it is used as a quasi-synonym for institution’. Herein, we
see the empirical and normative elements locked up in activities, performances and
work. With regard to the empirical and normative elements, practice theory shows
that practices are open-ended doings and sayings that take place interdependently
within a spatial-temporal dimension (Bueger and Gadinger 2015). Social structures
are temporal outflows of performances, as they could always end, if people decide
not to hold them together (Nicolini 2012). Even so, practices are not the same as
institutions, although performance could provide a case for the establishment of
institutions or supporting organisations (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Whatever the case
may be, practices require activities. Because of this, we identify practices in texts
when researchers use verbs like ‘ordering’, ‘structuring’ and ‘knowing’, instead of
‘order’, ‘structure’ or ‘knowledge’, which are nouns (Bueger and Gadinger 2015)
that indicate the existence of the embodiment of a practice.
The Individual
The practice theory pinpoints the individual’s role and the material things in the
natural environment, as well as in social life. Practices would not be possible without
material resources and individuals (Nicolini 2012). Individuals and their bodies are
not mere instruments of the person because ‘…a practice is the routinized activity
of the body’ (emphasis in the original) (Nicolini 2012: 4). What is more, habits
constitute our behaviour, with the social order inscribing routines into our bodies that,
in turn, manifest themselves through discursive and bodily practices (Nicolini 2012).
Kustermans (2016: 177) identified practices with ‘doings’ or with what actors say and
do, which correspond to their discursive and bodily practices. He goes on to say that
‘practice’ is ‘all of us doing all of our doings, the myriad of human behaviours, which
is forever going on, all at once’ (emphasis in the original). Highlighting discursive
and bodily practices bring to the fore agency as a form of discursive practice, in that
the discourse of social practice is reflexive, since it adds to the constitution of the
social realm and is created by the social (Davies 1990; Kettle 2005).
What this means is that every practice has a discursive element, since the discursive
constitution of practices are practices in themselves. Furthermore, practices involve