3.4 Analysis
149
interview in 2018, the organisation was trying to set up a water fund in Cape Town.
It was also discussing the establishment of such a fund (Respondent 9) with the
eThekwini Municipality (p. 124). As mentioned earlier, eThekwini plans to establish
the water fund with TNC, which will allow the Municipality to ‘protect important
water source areas outside of its municipal boundary’ (p. 98).
According to Respondent 9, ‘One of the Nature Conservancy’s big agendas is
water security and investing in [ecological infrastructures] for water security. In the
work we are doing with the Nature Conservancy, we have engaged and partnered
with eThekwini Water and Sanitation, because it is also involved in the UEIP. There
are also other departments working in that space’.
Water funds are governance and financing mechanisms that have the purpose of
linking downstream users with upstream landowners, in order to generate sustainable streams of finance through that relationship. If it is industrial or agricultural
entities that benefit from a sustainable and secure water supply downstream, they
may choose to contribute financial resources to the fund. The mechanisms linked to
this philosophy enable decisions to be made on where to invest that money in the
ecological infrastructure and how to maximise the benefits for water security. Water
funds have also been established elsewhere in Africa, like Kenya (Respondent 9).
The planned water fund in eThekwini speaks to the self-regulating market feature
of liberal institutionalism and indicates an intrinsic and inextricable link between
liberal institutionalism, environmental change and environmental politics. These
linkages show that liberal institutionalism is not only responsible for the environmental consequences we are witnessing, but that they can also change the social
relations with the natural environment (McCarthy and Prudham 2004); in this case,
it would be for the ecological infrastructure to improve water security. At the time of
the interview, eThekwini was planning to establish the water fund with TNC and to
link it to water security, which shows that the local government pays serious political
and ideological attention on the social regulation (McCarthy and Prudham 2004) of
ecological infrastructures that are linked to water security. These concerns are manifested through the advancement of the self-regulating market that is constituted by
the fund.
The water fund is also a feature of the RIPE a ‘…standard regulatory approach—
found especially within liberal institutionalism, neorealism and, more recently,
systematic constructivism…’ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 5). The organising question that is fundamental to RIPE is ‘who governs, and how is…order regulated?’
(Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 5) (see Table 2.1). The actors that are central to a
RIPE epistemology and ontology are its structures, institutions or élites (Hobson and
Seabrooke 2007), such as transnational corporations (Meissner and Ramasar 2015)
and, in this case, TNC and eThekwini. The theory places little importance on actor
identity and has a tendency to view ‘…actors’ preferences as being aligned with
their material self-interest’ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 13). Systematic constructivism, which discusses how actors and norm entrepreneurs diffuse their identities,
view RIPE and its material self-interest manifestation as an internalised obligation,
rather than a source of everyday actors (Seabrooke and Sending 2006; Hobson and
Seabrooke 2007), such as the Amakhosi and Durban’s wider public. This obligation
149
interview in 2018, the organisation was trying to set up a water fund in Cape Town.
It was also discussing the establishment of such a fund (Respondent 9) with the
eThekwini Municipality (p. 124). As mentioned earlier, eThekwini plans to establish
the water fund with TNC, which will allow the Municipality to ‘protect important
water source areas outside of its municipal boundary’ (p. 98).
According to Respondent 9, ‘One of the Nature Conservancy’s big agendas is
water security and investing in [ecological infrastructures] for water security. In the
work we are doing with the Nature Conservancy, we have engaged and partnered
with eThekwini Water and Sanitation, because it is also involved in the UEIP. There
are also other departments working in that space’.
Water funds are governance and financing mechanisms that have the purpose of
linking downstream users with upstream landowners, in order to generate sustainable streams of finance through that relationship. If it is industrial or agricultural
entities that benefit from a sustainable and secure water supply downstream, they
may choose to contribute financial resources to the fund. The mechanisms linked to
this philosophy enable decisions to be made on where to invest that money in the
ecological infrastructure and how to maximise the benefits for water security. Water
funds have also been established elsewhere in Africa, like Kenya (Respondent 9).
The planned water fund in eThekwini speaks to the self-regulating market feature
of liberal institutionalism and indicates an intrinsic and inextricable link between
liberal institutionalism, environmental change and environmental politics. These
linkages show that liberal institutionalism is not only responsible for the environmental consequences we are witnessing, but that they can also change the social
relations with the natural environment (McCarthy and Prudham 2004); in this case,
it would be for the ecological infrastructure to improve water security. At the time of
the interview, eThekwini was planning to establish the water fund with TNC and to
link it to water security, which shows that the local government pays serious political
and ideological attention on the social regulation (McCarthy and Prudham 2004) of
ecological infrastructures that are linked to water security. These concerns are manifested through the advancement of the self-regulating market that is constituted by
the fund.
The water fund is also a feature of the RIPE a ‘…standard regulatory approach—
found especially within liberal institutionalism, neorealism and, more recently,
systematic constructivism…’ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 5). The organising question that is fundamental to RIPE is ‘who governs, and how is…order regulated?’
(Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 5) (see Table 2.1). The actors that are central to a
RIPE epistemology and ontology are its structures, institutions or élites (Hobson and
Seabrooke 2007), such as transnational corporations (Meissner and Ramasar 2015)
and, in this case, TNC and eThekwini. The theory places little importance on actor
identity and has a tendency to view ‘…actors’ preferences as being aligned with
their material self-interest’ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 13). Systematic constructivism, which discusses how actors and norm entrepreneurs diffuse their identities,
view RIPE and its material self-interest manifestation as an internalised obligation,
rather than a source of everyday actors (Seabrooke and Sending 2006; Hobson and
Seabrooke 2007), such as the Amakhosi and Durban’s wider public. This obligation