of a neutral position with respect to the participants in the war, whom he called
on in 1917 to cease all fighting and to initiate peace negotiations.
3.3 “Betrayal Theory” Revealed to Be a Myth
• After the USA joined in the war, Staudinger felt that Germany was bound to be
defeated on the battlefield, because it was inferior to the Americans both
economically and where armaments were concerned (see Sect. 1:
“1881–1919” for details). Staudinger was therefore vilified as a “pacifist and
annihilator of German military power” [35, p. 604] by nationalistic circles after
1918 and, in particular, after 1933, this being quoted as key evidence for what
came to be known as the “betrayal theory”. According to this theory, a revolt on
the “home front” undermined the German Army, which was “undefeated in the
field” and was to blame for the defeat. Staudinger [4, p. 42] countered this by
saying that the political leaders failed by believing illusions about a German
victory rather than taking up the offer of peace made by US President Wilson
(cf. [4], p. 42). The misjudgement of the military situation had extended the war
unnecessarily – although there was no longer any chance of winning it – and had
made Germany’s defeat particularly bitter (cf. [4], pp. 41, 44, 53). The betrayal
theory was developed to distract from this political mistake: it “made the
German people forget the military defeat suffered in the First World War,
which [. . .] military leaders admitted in awareness of their responsibility”, as
can be read in Staudinger’s writings [4], p. 44. His chief witness in this context is
General Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937), who confessed in his War memoirs that
appeared in 1919: “8 August (1918; the start of the battle near Amiens, editor’s
note) established the demise of our combat powers [. . .]. This meant [. . .] that
the campaign took on the character of an irresponsible gamble that I always
considered to be ruinous. The fate of the German people was too important to me
to risk it in a game of chance. The war needed to be ended” (quoted from [4],
pp. 42–43). A view that Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) also
voiced unmistakably: “Under these circumstances, it is essential to discontinue the
fighting, in order to avoid useless sacrifices by the German people and their allies.
Every further day costs thousands of courageous soldiers their lives” (quoted from
[4], p. 44). With this quote, Staudinger revealed that the alleged betrayal theory was
a myth – and also that the man who was later to become President of the Reich was a
liar, since he was soon to betray his own convictions. Because Hindenburg said in
his appeal to the German people at Christmas 1918: “This powerful instrument of
war (i.e. the German people in arms, editor’s note) did not collapse under attack by
enemy armies. It withstood a world of enemies to the final hour, until the order was
issued to end the fighting and return home. [. . .] German warriors are leaving all the
battlefields undefeated” (quoted from [4], p. 45).
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on in 1917 to cease all fighting and to initiate peace negotiations.
3.3 “Betrayal Theory” Revealed to Be a Myth
• After the USA joined in the war, Staudinger felt that Germany was bound to be
defeated on the battlefield, because it was inferior to the Americans both
economically and where armaments were concerned (see Sect. 1:
“1881–1919” for details). Staudinger was therefore vilified as a “pacifist and
annihilator of German military power” [35, p. 604] by nationalistic circles after
1918 and, in particular, after 1933, this being quoted as key evidence for what
came to be known as the “betrayal theory”. According to this theory, a revolt on
the “home front” undermined the German Army, which was “undefeated in the
field” and was to blame for the defeat. Staudinger [4, p. 42] countered this by
saying that the political leaders failed by believing illusions about a German
victory rather than taking up the offer of peace made by US President Wilson
(cf. [4], p. 42). The misjudgement of the military situation had extended the war
unnecessarily – although there was no longer any chance of winning it – and had
made Germany’s defeat particularly bitter (cf. [4], pp. 41, 44, 53). The betrayal
theory was developed to distract from this political mistake: it “made the
German people forget the military defeat suffered in the First World War,
which [. . .] military leaders admitted in awareness of their responsibility”, as
can be read in Staudinger’s writings [4], p. 44. His chief witness in this context is
General Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937), who confessed in his War memoirs that
appeared in 1919: “8 August (1918; the start of the battle near Amiens, editor’s
note) established the demise of our combat powers [. . .]. This meant [. . .] that
the campaign took on the character of an irresponsible gamble that I always
considered to be ruinous. The fate of the German people was too important to me
to risk it in a game of chance. The war needed to be ended” (quoted from [4],
pp. 42–43). A view that Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) also
voiced unmistakably: “Under these circumstances, it is essential to discontinue the
fighting, in order to avoid useless sacrifices by the German people and their allies.
Every further day costs thousands of courageous soldiers their lives” (quoted from
[4], p. 44). With this quote, Staudinger revealed that the alleged betrayal theory was
a myth – and also that the man who was later to become President of the Reich was a
liar, since he was soon to betray his own convictions. Because Hindenburg said in
his appeal to the German people at Christmas 1918: “This powerful instrument of
war (i.e. the German people in arms, editor’s note) did not collapse under attack by
enemy armies. It withstood a world of enemies to the final hour, until the order was
issued to end the fighting and return home. [. . .] German warriors are leaving all the
battlefields undefeated” (quoted from [4], p. 45).
112
M. Weber and G. Deussing