pragmatist – Staudinger was not an uncompromising pacifist. “Our ancestors had no
choice but to drive out their neighbours and obtain more land and thus more space
to expand into”, he wrote in 1917 in the essay “Technik und Krieg” [4, p. 35;
cf. p. 101] that has already been mentioned. There was even talk of the “right”
of earlier generations “to wage a bloody war about the place in the sun” [4, p. 35].
“In the technical age, on the other hand, these old ideas about the necessity of wars –
which have brought such profound misery to Europe – must be abandoned”
[4, p. 101]. Staudinger rejected the fatalistic attitude “that there have always been
wars and that wars are unlikely to stop in future either in view of the nature of
humankind” [4, p. 101], because anyone who followed this argument was accepting
the possibility of “peoples being destroyed” [4, p. 101] in tomorrow’s world.
“Hoping for a war-free future” was encouraged for him specifically by the contemporary “prophecies” claiming “that we [. . .] are facing a time of particularly bitter
fighting” [4, p. 38]. This was no paradox – Staudinger was hoping that the
destructive capacity of high-tech armies would have a deterrent effect. This was
based on the confidence that humankind would be sensible enough to avoid the
abyss of self-destruction. The Second World War eliminated much of the basis for
such optimism, but at the same time confirmed that Staudinger’s warnings were as
important and relevant as ever. As early as 1919, he suspected that his calls for a
framework for stable, lasting peace would probably bear little fruit. “It is tragic [. . .]
to see that Germany, for which a policy of reconciliation between different peoples
would have been so important in view of its location and natural resources, relied
most firmly on military aggression, whereas America – the only country that could
have allowed itself to adopt such a policy thanks to its riches – has been trying for
decades now to promote peaceful coexistence – to no avail, unfortunately”
[4, p. 54].
1.8 Good Technology, Bad Technology
If Staudinger is right in saying that war is escalating because of modern technology,
then is such technology not evil in itself, so that war should in turn be declared on it
too? No, because then it would not be possible to enjoy the benefits of peaceful use
of the technology. Staudinger countered technophobic arguments of this kind by
outlining a vision of “controlled” technology, that offered excellent “potential for
life and development” now and in future [4, p. 101]: “Thanks to technology, more
people can live on a limited amount of land nowadays and they can enjoy an easier
life than a smaller number of people on the same amount of land in the ‘good old
days’” [4, p. 110; cf. p. 103]. It was not technology as such that was evil, but the
abuse of it; although technology added incredible destructive potential to wars, they
could not be vindicated for this very reason: “There is no justification for wars any
more [. . .]” [4, p. 101].
According to Sachsse [5, p. 976], Staudinger was disappointed by the response to
his political publications: “Even though they were extremely relevant, they were
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M. Weber and G. Deussing
choice but to drive out their neighbours and obtain more land and thus more space
to expand into”, he wrote in 1917 in the essay “Technik und Krieg” [4, p. 35;
cf. p. 101] that has already been mentioned. There was even talk of the “right”
of earlier generations “to wage a bloody war about the place in the sun” [4, p. 35].
“In the technical age, on the other hand, these old ideas about the necessity of wars –
which have brought such profound misery to Europe – must be abandoned”
[4, p. 101]. Staudinger rejected the fatalistic attitude “that there have always been
wars and that wars are unlikely to stop in future either in view of the nature of
humankind” [4, p. 101], because anyone who followed this argument was accepting
the possibility of “peoples being destroyed” [4, p. 101] in tomorrow’s world.
“Hoping for a war-free future” was encouraged for him specifically by the contemporary “prophecies” claiming “that we [. . .] are facing a time of particularly bitter
fighting” [4, p. 38]. This was no paradox – Staudinger was hoping that the
destructive capacity of high-tech armies would have a deterrent effect. This was
based on the confidence that humankind would be sensible enough to avoid the
abyss of self-destruction. The Second World War eliminated much of the basis for
such optimism, but at the same time confirmed that Staudinger’s warnings were as
important and relevant as ever. As early as 1919, he suspected that his calls for a
framework for stable, lasting peace would probably bear little fruit. “It is tragic [. . .]
to see that Germany, for which a policy of reconciliation between different peoples
would have been so important in view of its location and natural resources, relied
most firmly on military aggression, whereas America – the only country that could
have allowed itself to adopt such a policy thanks to its riches – has been trying for
decades now to promote peaceful coexistence – to no avail, unfortunately”
[4, p. 54].
1.8 Good Technology, Bad Technology
If Staudinger is right in saying that war is escalating because of modern technology,
then is such technology not evil in itself, so that war should in turn be declared on it
too? No, because then it would not be possible to enjoy the benefits of peaceful use
of the technology. Staudinger countered technophobic arguments of this kind by
outlining a vision of “controlled” technology, that offered excellent “potential for
life and development” now and in future [4, p. 101]: “Thanks to technology, more
people can live on a limited amount of land nowadays and they can enjoy an easier
life than a smaller number of people on the same amount of land in the ‘good old
days’” [4, p. 110; cf. p. 103]. It was not technology as such that was evil, but the
abuse of it; although technology added incredible destructive potential to wars, they
could not be vindicated for this very reason: “There is no justification for wars any
more [. . .]” [4, p. 101].
According to Sachsse [5, p. 976], Staudinger was disappointed by the response to
his political publications: “Even though they were extremely relevant, they were
88
M. Weber and G. Deussing