1.5 No Response to the Call for Peace
Staudinger did not make just this one attempt. At the end of 1917, he wrote to the
leadership of the German Army directly and demanded a stop to the fighting,
because “the opponents of Germany are much superior now” as a result of
America’s decision to enter the war. New military victories would be bad for
Germany in two different respects: “On the one hand, they will intensify the
resistance put up by the Americans, while they will, on the other hand, distract
the German people from what they should really be doing, i.e. trying to find a
peaceful solution on the only possible basis, via negotiation.” [5, p. 975]. The
20-page letter to the High Command of the German Armed Forces, which has just
been quoted here, is entitled “Zur Beurteilung Amerikas” [6]; the manuscript has
survived as part of Staudinger’s estate and is kept at the Deutsches Museum in
Munich.
Sachsse [5, p. 976] comments as follows: “In view of the German mentality at
the time, Staudinger’s action was outrageous. Public opinion rejected negotiations
of any kind. German university professors had insisted on several occasions that it
was necessary to persevere come what may.” As expected, the German Emperor
and Chancellor did not therefore respond to the offer of peace made by the US
President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) in January 1918 – the famous “14 points”.
The outcome of the war was supposed to be decided via a victory or defeat on the
battlefield, so the leaders continued to ignore the fact that the country’s ability to
fight was diminishing, blinded as they were by isolated military successes. In
retrospect, Staudinger concluded that July 1918 was the “turning point”. In his
paper “Der erste Weltkrieg unter technischen Gesichtspunkten” [7] (an extended
version was printed later in [4], pp. 45–55), he wrote: “The most recent efforts did
not have any major impact even on France, but [. . .] the Americans started to
provide particularly intensive support, so that the superiority of the alliance was
now clear to see.” [4, p. 53]. He accused the political community of failing to heed
his warning, the German defeat was “unavoidable” because of the “American
opposition”: “Germany’s fate was decided in the spring of 1917 rather than in the
autumn of 1918.” [4, p. 53]. Because – in retrospect – the technical balance of
power and the growing superiority of the alliance made “the course and end of the
war inevitable”, so that “even the most talentest of military commanders was unable
to avoid the consequences” [4, p. 46].
Staudinger did not just call for a truce; his appeal for peace was more radical
than this. In view of the destructive capacity of modern weapons technology, war
was completely out of the question for him as a political instrument, because there
were only losers now, with both murder and suicide being involved: “In future, a
war could [. . .] lead to unimaginable destruction; since this is the case, it appears to
be vital for humankind as a whole to find really permanent peace – a problem [. . .] it
is particularly important to solve today if entire peoples and cultures are not be in
danger of annihilation. Peace that only amounts to a kind of truce would be the
worst thing that could happen to Europe.” [4, p. 38; cf. p. 48]. Staudinger was
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M. Weber and G. Deussing
Staudinger did not make just this one attempt. At the end of 1917, he wrote to the
leadership of the German Army directly and demanded a stop to the fighting,
because “the opponents of Germany are much superior now” as a result of
America’s decision to enter the war. New military victories would be bad for
Germany in two different respects: “On the one hand, they will intensify the
resistance put up by the Americans, while they will, on the other hand, distract
the German people from what they should really be doing, i.e. trying to find a
peaceful solution on the only possible basis, via negotiation.” [5, p. 975]. The
20-page letter to the High Command of the German Armed Forces, which has just
been quoted here, is entitled “Zur Beurteilung Amerikas” [6]; the manuscript has
survived as part of Staudinger’s estate and is kept at the Deutsches Museum in
Munich.
Sachsse [5, p. 976] comments as follows: “In view of the German mentality at
the time, Staudinger’s action was outrageous. Public opinion rejected negotiations
of any kind. German university professors had insisted on several occasions that it
was necessary to persevere come what may.” As expected, the German Emperor
and Chancellor did not therefore respond to the offer of peace made by the US
President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) in January 1918 – the famous “14 points”.
The outcome of the war was supposed to be decided via a victory or defeat on the
battlefield, so the leaders continued to ignore the fact that the country’s ability to
fight was diminishing, blinded as they were by isolated military successes. In
retrospect, Staudinger concluded that July 1918 was the “turning point”. In his
paper “Der erste Weltkrieg unter technischen Gesichtspunkten” [7] (an extended
version was printed later in [4], pp. 45–55), he wrote: “The most recent efforts did
not have any major impact even on France, but [. . .] the Americans started to
provide particularly intensive support, so that the superiority of the alliance was
now clear to see.” [4, p. 53]. He accused the political community of failing to heed
his warning, the German defeat was “unavoidable” because of the “American
opposition”: “Germany’s fate was decided in the spring of 1917 rather than in the
autumn of 1918.” [4, p. 53]. Because – in retrospect – the technical balance of
power and the growing superiority of the alliance made “the course and end of the
war inevitable”, so that “even the most talentest of military commanders was unable
to avoid the consequences” [4, p. 46].
Staudinger did not just call for a truce; his appeal for peace was more radical
than this. In view of the destructive capacity of modern weapons technology, war
was completely out of the question for him as a political instrument, because there
were only losers now, with both murder and suicide being involved: “In future, a
war could [. . .] lead to unimaginable destruction; since this is the case, it appears to
be vital for humankind as a whole to find really permanent peace – a problem [. . .] it
is particularly important to solve today if entire peoples and cultures are not be in
danger of annihilation. Peace that only amounts to a kind of truce would be the
worst thing that could happen to Europe.” [4, p. 38; cf. p. 48]. Staudinger was
86
M. Weber and G. Deussing