8.1 Food Frauds and Yerba Mate. Possible Connections
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(2) Is willing to take advantage from the fraudulent exposition of the food product
naming it in a non-real way, or claiming one or some specific features this food
cannot hold
(3) Is well aware that the modification and/or omission of certain information can
give some economic gain.
It has to be recognised that each FBO interested in food fraud gains is not interested
in safety and health-related consequences of EMA activities. Arguments, such as
health properties linked with vegetable polyphenols, traceability, quality management systems, history and social diffusion, and so on (Barbieri et al. 2014, 2019;
Bhagat et al. 2019; Burris et al. 2012; Chammem et al. 2018; da Veiga et al. 2018;
Delgado et al. 2016a, b, 2017, 2019; Del Águila 2014; Fiorino et al. 2019; Haddad
et al. 2020a, b; Keller and Giberti 2011; Loria et al. 2009; Martin et al. 2013; Messina
et al. 2015; Mania et al. 2016a, b, 2018; Parisi 2019; Parisi et al. 2020; PiovezanBorges et al. 2016), may be discussed in this ambit. The real and appreciable result
of EMA actions is only the economic advantage. On the other side, EMA may be the
cause of safety incidents. Several situations—addition of urea to wheat flour, USA,
1970s; addition of melamine to milk, China, 2007 (Tucker 2011)—have demonstrated the possible occurrence of serious risks originating from EMA episodes.
In other situations, the ethical and implicit agreement between producer and food
consumer has been broken; the ‘horse meat scandal’ (addition or replacement of beef
meat in beefburgers with undeclared horse meat or pig meat (United Kingdom 2007)
has demonstrated the need for a reliable and powerful control system when speaking
of foods and beverages in general (Meikle and McDonald 2013).
Consequently, food frauds can be considered as real crimes against the food
consumers. With relation to the United Kingdom, the recent institution of the Food
Standard Agency’s National Food Crime Unit (NFCU) aims at preventing all possible
‘food crimes’, including also (Food Standards Agency 2020):
(a) Illegal processing
(b) Re-use of food, drink, or feed in the supply chain in an illegal way
(c) Adulteration: addition or replacement of undeclared ingredient(s) of lower
quality and/or unacceptable types with concern to consumer safety and health
(d) Misrepresentation: commercial claims which intend define the food product
with high and non-real quality
(e) False documentation supporting illegal foods.
The analysis of these situations includes also the needed countermeasures:
(1) Analysis of labelling, supporting documents, and commercial information,
also by means of web-based databases and official systems for the record of
Notifications and alerts (Parisi et al. 2016)
(2) Analytical detection of food frauds, with a sampling method able to define
reliably a lot of food products as matching the declared information
(3) Control of information flows in the raw materials—final product direction
(4) Control of the information flow in the final product—raw materials direction
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(2) Is willing to take advantage from the fraudulent exposition of the food product
naming it in a non-real way, or claiming one or some specific features this food
cannot hold
(3) Is well aware that the modification and/or omission of certain information can
give some economic gain.
It has to be recognised that each FBO interested in food fraud gains is not interested
in safety and health-related consequences of EMA activities. Arguments, such as
health properties linked with vegetable polyphenols, traceability, quality management systems, history and social diffusion, and so on (Barbieri et al. 2014, 2019;
Bhagat et al. 2019; Burris et al. 2012; Chammem et al. 2018; da Veiga et al. 2018;
Delgado et al. 2016a, b, 2017, 2019; Del Águila 2014; Fiorino et al. 2019; Haddad
et al. 2020a, b; Keller and Giberti 2011; Loria et al. 2009; Martin et al. 2013; Messina
et al. 2015; Mania et al. 2016a, b, 2018; Parisi 2019; Parisi et al. 2020; PiovezanBorges et al. 2016), may be discussed in this ambit. The real and appreciable result
of EMA actions is only the economic advantage. On the other side, EMA may be the
cause of safety incidents. Several situations—addition of urea to wheat flour, USA,
1970s; addition of melamine to milk, China, 2007 (Tucker 2011)—have demonstrated the possible occurrence of serious risks originating from EMA episodes.
In other situations, the ethical and implicit agreement between producer and food
consumer has been broken; the ‘horse meat scandal’ (addition or replacement of beef
meat in beefburgers with undeclared horse meat or pig meat (United Kingdom 2007)
has demonstrated the need for a reliable and powerful control system when speaking
of foods and beverages in general (Meikle and McDonald 2013).
Consequently, food frauds can be considered as real crimes against the food
consumers. With relation to the United Kingdom, the recent institution of the Food
Standard Agency’s National Food Crime Unit (NFCU) aims at preventing all possible
‘food crimes’, including also (Food Standards Agency 2020):
(a) Illegal processing
(b) Re-use of food, drink, or feed in the supply chain in an illegal way
(c) Adulteration: addition or replacement of undeclared ingredient(s) of lower
quality and/or unacceptable types with concern to consumer safety and health
(d) Misrepresentation: commercial claims which intend define the food product
with high and non-real quality
(e) False documentation supporting illegal foods.
The analysis of these situations includes also the needed countermeasures:
(1) Analysis of labelling, supporting documents, and commercial information,
also by means of web-based databases and official systems for the record of
Notifications and alerts (Parisi et al. 2016)
(2) Analytical detection of food frauds, with a sampling method able to define
reliably a lot of food products as matching the declared information
(3) Control of information flows in the raw materials—final product direction
(4) Control of the information flow in the final product—raw materials direction