Ladies and Gentlemen,
The relationship between philosophy and science is, first of all, hierarchical. The
intention of philosophy is building a general conceptualization of the structure and
meaning of the universe, it constructs some basic patterns, which are reflected not
only in scientific ideas, but also in human relations and in the society as a whole.
However, the method of generalization of particular empiric regularities through
generalized laws, what is the role of metaphysics, is in principle questionable.
Namely, if some constructed concept or hypothesis, or even a language is more
general, it becomes less precise. Following this idea, philosophical, say, metaphysical concepts cannot be immediately applied. Rather, they should be reduced to
scientific laws and theories. The metaphysics could be evaluated just by using this
criterion: good metaphysics ought to be reducible to physics! [1]
Conversely, the generalization of physics leads to metaphysics. This relationship
physics-metaphysics is in focus of philosophy of science. In the broadest possible
sense, we could consider the possibility of analogous relationship such as
chemistry-metaphysics or metaphysics-chemistry. Other words, how chemistry
could contribute to philosophy, which of chemical concepts could be generalized,
or, which of metaphysical schemes have better examples in chemistry than in other
sciences [2]. The question that emerges is following: would philosophy be the same
as it is if chemistry would be absent from the spectrum of various sciences?
Philosophy of science plays also another even more important role: it is science
about sciences, the metascience. Before discussing this aspect of philosophy of
science, we have to tell something more about systematization (or classification) of
particular sciences.
There are two independent modes of systematization of sciences. First system of
classification is based on the fields of scientific interest: subject-oriented sciences,
structural sciences, and metasciences [3]. Subject-oriented are sciences dealing with
the perceptual experience of the nature and society, for instance physics, chemistry,
biology, geology, anthropology, psychology or sociology. In focus of structural
sciences are abstract ideas, structures, the ways of connections between entities,
derivations, methods of conclusions. Their knowledges and results are fundamental
basis for functioning of the subject-oriented sciences. Logics, mathematics, informatics, theory of automata, cybernetics, system theory, game theory, theory of
formal languages, etc., belong to this group. Subject-oriented sciences have to use
the methodologies of structural sciences for studying their subjects! Similar or
analogous concepts that have its origin in structural sciences can be recognized
even in very different subject-oriented sciences. This led us to an important mode of
thinking, the use of analogies. As we will explain in following chapters, the
thinking in analogies has been crucial in the historical development of chemical
concepts [4, 5]. Within the third group of sciences we can find various metasciences, i.e. sciences about sciences such as philosophy of science, cognition
theory, semiotics, sociology of science, etc.
2
1 Chemistry and Philosophy of Science
The relationship between philosophy and science is, first of all, hierarchical. The
intention of philosophy is building a general conceptualization of the structure and
meaning of the universe, it constructs some basic patterns, which are reflected not
only in scientific ideas, but also in human relations and in the society as a whole.
However, the method of generalization of particular empiric regularities through
generalized laws, what is the role of metaphysics, is in principle questionable.
Namely, if some constructed concept or hypothesis, or even a language is more
general, it becomes less precise. Following this idea, philosophical, say, metaphysical concepts cannot be immediately applied. Rather, they should be reduced to
scientific laws and theories. The metaphysics could be evaluated just by using this
criterion: good metaphysics ought to be reducible to physics! [1]
Conversely, the generalization of physics leads to metaphysics. This relationship
physics-metaphysics is in focus of philosophy of science. In the broadest possible
sense, we could consider the possibility of analogous relationship such as
chemistry-metaphysics or metaphysics-chemistry. Other words, how chemistry
could contribute to philosophy, which of chemical concepts could be generalized,
or, which of metaphysical schemes have better examples in chemistry than in other
sciences [2]. The question that emerges is following: would philosophy be the same
as it is if chemistry would be absent from the spectrum of various sciences?
Philosophy of science plays also another even more important role: it is science
about sciences, the metascience. Before discussing this aspect of philosophy of
science, we have to tell something more about systematization (or classification) of
particular sciences.
There are two independent modes of systematization of sciences. First system of
classification is based on the fields of scientific interest: subject-oriented sciences,
structural sciences, and metasciences [3]. Subject-oriented are sciences dealing with
the perceptual experience of the nature and society, for instance physics, chemistry,
biology, geology, anthropology, psychology or sociology. In focus of structural
sciences are abstract ideas, structures, the ways of connections between entities,
derivations, methods of conclusions. Their knowledges and results are fundamental
basis for functioning of the subject-oriented sciences. Logics, mathematics, informatics, theory of automata, cybernetics, system theory, game theory, theory of
formal languages, etc., belong to this group. Subject-oriented sciences have to use
the methodologies of structural sciences for studying their subjects! Similar or
analogous concepts that have its origin in structural sciences can be recognized
even in very different subject-oriented sciences. This led us to an important mode of
thinking, the use of analogies. As we will explain in following chapters, the
thinking in analogies has been crucial in the historical development of chemical
concepts [4, 5]. Within the third group of sciences we can find various metasciences, i.e. sciences about sciences such as philosophy of science, cognition
theory, semiotics, sociology of science, etc.
2
1 Chemistry and Philosophy of Science