64 H. OHTA
This time his policy focus was economic recovery from two decades of
deflation, or so-called Abenomics, consisting of fiscal stimulus, an easymoney policy, and structural reform of the economy. Unlike his previous
cabinet, whose members were mostly from his ideological clique, he
formed his second administration by including moderate/liberal politicians from different factions. In this way not only could he ensure
stable support from within the LDP, but he could also dilute his blatant
conservative political inclinations (Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara 2015).
However, by the time Abe reshuffled his cabinet in December 2014, he
was gradually putting forward his conservative political agenda. The Abe
Cabinet established the “National Security Council (NSC)” on December
4, 2013, and changed the interpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution to enable the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the
condition of a clear threat to the country’s survival and the undermining
of citizens’ rights (MOFA 2014).
Contrary to Abe’s forceful leadership in taking initiatives in security policy, both energy policy and climate change policy are lagging
far behind. The mode of policymaking on energy and climate policy is
becoming similar to that of the pre-Fukushima era. Abe’s LDP-Komeito
coalition government adopted a new “Strategic Energy Plan” (Basic
Energy Plan in Japanese) at the cabinet meeting on April 11, 2014.
The new energy strategy ranked nuclear energy as an essential baseload
power. It allowed the restart of nuclear power plants without any conditions if the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) concludes that they
have taken necessary measures to conform to the new safety regulations
introduced after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The new energy
plan suggested the reversal of the nuclear policy of the previous administration by implying the construction of new nuclear power plants. The
DPJ’s “Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment” (ISEE)
established the principle of a forty-year limitation of nuclear power
plant operations and the policy that no construction of new nuclear
power plants and no installations of additional nuclear reactors at existing
nuclear power plant sites would occur. The new strategy also upheld the
continuation of the nuclear fuel cycle policy by continuing to operate
the trouble-plagued Monju prototype fast breeder reactor, 8 which was
supposed to be decommissioned according to the DPJ government. The
Abe government finally decided to decommission Monju on December
21, 2016. As to the target for renewable energy, while the ISEE set up
the concrete target of more than 3000 billion kWh (3 times of the current
This time his policy focus was economic recovery from two decades of
deflation, or so-called Abenomics, consisting of fiscal stimulus, an easymoney policy, and structural reform of the economy. Unlike his previous
cabinet, whose members were mostly from his ideological clique, he
formed his second administration by including moderate/liberal politicians from different factions. In this way not only could he ensure
stable support from within the LDP, but he could also dilute his blatant
conservative political inclinations (Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara 2015).
However, by the time Abe reshuffled his cabinet in December 2014, he
was gradually putting forward his conservative political agenda. The Abe
Cabinet established the “National Security Council (NSC)” on December
4, 2013, and changed the interpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution to enable the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the
condition of a clear threat to the country’s survival and the undermining
of citizens’ rights (MOFA 2014).
Contrary to Abe’s forceful leadership in taking initiatives in security policy, both energy policy and climate change policy are lagging
far behind. The mode of policymaking on energy and climate policy is
becoming similar to that of the pre-Fukushima era. Abe’s LDP-Komeito
coalition government adopted a new “Strategic Energy Plan” (Basic
Energy Plan in Japanese) at the cabinet meeting on April 11, 2014.
The new energy strategy ranked nuclear energy as an essential baseload
power. It allowed the restart of nuclear power plants without any conditions if the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) concludes that they
have taken necessary measures to conform to the new safety regulations
introduced after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The new energy
plan suggested the reversal of the nuclear policy of the previous administration by implying the construction of new nuclear power plants. The
DPJ’s “Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment” (ISEE)
established the principle of a forty-year limitation of nuclear power
plant operations and the policy that no construction of new nuclear
power plants and no installations of additional nuclear reactors at existing
nuclear power plant sites would occur. The new strategy also upheld the
continuation of the nuclear fuel cycle policy by continuing to operate
the trouble-plagued Monju prototype fast breeder reactor, 8 which was
supposed to be decommissioned according to the DPJ government. The
Abe government finally decided to decommission Monju on December
21, 2016. As to the target for renewable energy, while the ISEE set up
the concrete target of more than 3000 billion kWh (3 times of the current