56 H. OHTA
This energy strategy, however, had to be fundamentally revised due
to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident that occurred on March 11,
2011, when a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of northeast Honsh¯ u not far Sendai. Colossal tsunamis swept away and destroyed
essential facilities and equipment, including the emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) of the plant. The damages done by the earthquake and
ensuing tsunamis forced Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) to decide
to decommission four nuclear reactors (reactors numbers 1 to 4) of the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex. On April 12, according to the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the level of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear accident was categorized as scale seven, that is, the same
level as the Chernobyl accident that occurred in 1986. Despite Prime
Minister Noda’s declaration of attaining the state of a “cold shutdown”
of nuclear reactors in mid-December 2011, the accidents were not yet
entirely under control, and more than 90,000 people at the time remained
displaced away from the evacuation zone around the nuclear power plant
(Tabuchi 2011). The sense of distrust of nuclear safety has now spread
among the Japanese along with a shared sense of “risk society” à la Ulrich
Beck (Beck 1992).
Compared with its nuclear energy policy, Japan’s renewable energy
policy is meager. As to METI’s policy relating to renewable energy, the
New Energy Law of 1997 and the Special Measures Law on Promoting
Use of New Energy by Electric Enterprises (RPS law) of 2003 are notable.
The former law defines “new energy” (or renewable energy excluding
hydro and geothermal energy sources) and encourages measures to
promote it. The RPS law required the power utilities to generate a certain
amount of electricity from new energy sources such as solar PV, wind
power, and biomass. However, this piece of law did not encourage the
full-scale introduction of “new energy” by subsidizing with a fixed price
for electricity generated from these sources as the equivalent German
policy did. Thus, the 2010 target under the RPS law aimed at generating 12.2 billion kWh, which comprised only 1.2% of the total national
electric power supply (Oshima 2010, p. 21).
As of 2005, nearly 50% of the world’s photovoltaic (PV) solar cell
production was manufactured in Japan. Japan led the world in thin-film
PV cells with the highest capacity of operational manufacturing plants.
Kyocera, Kaneka, Matsushita Battery, Sanyo, and Sharp dominated the
market (Kimura and Suzuki 2006, p. 7). Helped by government subsidies,
This energy strategy, however, had to be fundamentally revised due
to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident that occurred on March 11,
2011, when a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of northeast Honsh¯ u not far Sendai. Colossal tsunamis swept away and destroyed
essential facilities and equipment, including the emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) of the plant. The damages done by the earthquake and
ensuing tsunamis forced Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) to decide
to decommission four nuclear reactors (reactors numbers 1 to 4) of the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex. On April 12, according to the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the level of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear accident was categorized as scale seven, that is, the same
level as the Chernobyl accident that occurred in 1986. Despite Prime
Minister Noda’s declaration of attaining the state of a “cold shutdown”
of nuclear reactors in mid-December 2011, the accidents were not yet
entirely under control, and more than 90,000 people at the time remained
displaced away from the evacuation zone around the nuclear power plant
(Tabuchi 2011). The sense of distrust of nuclear safety has now spread
among the Japanese along with a shared sense of “risk society” à la Ulrich
Beck (Beck 1992).
Compared with its nuclear energy policy, Japan’s renewable energy
policy is meager. As to METI’s policy relating to renewable energy, the
New Energy Law of 1997 and the Special Measures Law on Promoting
Use of New Energy by Electric Enterprises (RPS law) of 2003 are notable.
The former law defines “new energy” (or renewable energy excluding
hydro and geothermal energy sources) and encourages measures to
promote it. The RPS law required the power utilities to generate a certain
amount of electricity from new energy sources such as solar PV, wind
power, and biomass. However, this piece of law did not encourage the
full-scale introduction of “new energy” by subsidizing with a fixed price
for electricity generated from these sources as the equivalent German
policy did. Thus, the 2010 target under the RPS law aimed at generating 12.2 billion kWh, which comprised only 1.2% of the total national
electric power supply (Oshima 2010, p. 21).
As of 2005, nearly 50% of the world’s photovoltaic (PV) solar cell
production was manufactured in Japan. Japan led the world in thin-film
PV cells with the highest capacity of operational manufacturing plants.
Kyocera, Kaneka, Matsushita Battery, Sanyo, and Sharp dominated the
market (Kimura and Suzuki 2006, p. 7). Helped by government subsidies,