2 JAPAN’S ENERGY POLICY AND COMMUNITY POWER …
35
clear. No cities or towns have yet shown any interest in hosting this site
(Hasegawa 2017).
The second problem is the issue of surplus plutonium. Measured by
its plutonium stockpile of 45.7 ton as of the end of 2018 (Office of
Atomic Energy Policy of Cabinet Office 2019), Japan has been estimated
to have the highest potential capability for nuclear armament in the world
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which has been very
concerned by the proliferation risk posed by this stockpile. For this reason,
in 1991 the Japanese government announced its commitment to not hold
surplus plutonium. For Japan to adhere to its two principles, namely, the
full reprocessing of all spent nuclear fuel and zero surplus plutonium,
it needs to strictly maintain the demand and supply balance for plutonium extracted by reprocessing. The dilemma is that reprocessing needs
to be stopped in order to prevent the accumulation of surplus plutonium, but this cessation will breach the principle of full reprocessing
of all spent nuclear fuel. The Fukushima accident makes this dilemma
much more severe (see Hasegawa 2015, pp. 51–53). The Japanese term
“pluthermal” signifies the use of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel
(MOX) in thermal reactors (light water reactors). After the Fukushima
accident, the pluthermal program is operating only at reactor number 3
of the Genkai nuclear power plant, and reactors 3 and 4 of the Takahama nuclear plant, which together burn a total of 1.5 tons of plutonium
per year (Office of Atomic Energy Policy of Cabinet Office 2019). At
this current rate, it is hard for Japan to fully reprocess all spent fuel and
maintain no surplus plutonium.
The third problem is the difficulty of changing policy despite the
high cost of reprocessing. Why is Japan so obstinately fixated on reprocessing? The ulterior motive may be to retain international rights relevant
to the potential military use of nuclear resources in the future. After
Germany abandoned its program to extract plutonium, Japan is the only
non-nuclear-weapon state allowed to possess technologies for uranium
enrichment, reprocessing and fast breeder reactors. The fundamental
premise of the nuclear fuel cycle was to continue to expand nuclear power
generation. However, the Fukushima accident prompted Japanese society
to radically rethink to the point of abandoning the nuclear fuel cycle
program. In December 2016, Japanese government finally decided to
abandon the multi-decade troubled and highly costly fast breeder reactor,
Monju. The nuclear fuel cycle program has thus lost one of its essential
35
clear. No cities or towns have yet shown any interest in hosting this site
(Hasegawa 2017).
The second problem is the issue of surplus plutonium. Measured by
its plutonium stockpile of 45.7 ton as of the end of 2018 (Office of
Atomic Energy Policy of Cabinet Office 2019), Japan has been estimated
to have the highest potential capability for nuclear armament in the world
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which has been very
concerned by the proliferation risk posed by this stockpile. For this reason,
in 1991 the Japanese government announced its commitment to not hold
surplus plutonium. For Japan to adhere to its two principles, namely, the
full reprocessing of all spent nuclear fuel and zero surplus plutonium,
it needs to strictly maintain the demand and supply balance for plutonium extracted by reprocessing. The dilemma is that reprocessing needs
to be stopped in order to prevent the accumulation of surplus plutonium, but this cessation will breach the principle of full reprocessing
of all spent nuclear fuel. The Fukushima accident makes this dilemma
much more severe (see Hasegawa 2015, pp. 51–53). The Japanese term
“pluthermal” signifies the use of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel
(MOX) in thermal reactors (light water reactors). After the Fukushima
accident, the pluthermal program is operating only at reactor number 3
of the Genkai nuclear power plant, and reactors 3 and 4 of the Takahama nuclear plant, which together burn a total of 1.5 tons of plutonium
per year (Office of Atomic Energy Policy of Cabinet Office 2019). At
this current rate, it is hard for Japan to fully reprocess all spent fuel and
maintain no surplus plutonium.
The third problem is the difficulty of changing policy despite the
high cost of reprocessing. Why is Japan so obstinately fixated on reprocessing? The ulterior motive may be to retain international rights relevant
to the potential military use of nuclear resources in the future. After
Germany abandoned its program to extract plutonium, Japan is the only
non-nuclear-weapon state allowed to possess technologies for uranium
enrichment, reprocessing and fast breeder reactors. The fundamental
premise of the nuclear fuel cycle was to continue to expand nuclear power
generation. However, the Fukushima accident prompted Japanese society
to radically rethink to the point of abandoning the nuclear fuel cycle
program. In December 2016, Japanese government finally decided to
abandon the multi-decade troubled and highly costly fast breeder reactor,
Monju. The nuclear fuel cycle program has thus lost one of its essential