15 CONCLUSIONS
379
grid (Moe 2014a), but did not otherwise spend much time and effort
on it. That is one of the major differences between these two volumes.
The present volume focuses explicitly on challenges to renewable energy
development that were still issues for the future in 2014.
As ever more renewable energy is phased onto the grid, in country
after country, the grid itself is put under ever greater strain. This is not
primarily because the amounts of electricity provided by renewables itself
are so enormous: As mentioned, worldwide, wind and solar power still
account for only 8.7% of total electricity consumption (REN21 2020).
Rather, it is the intermittencies of renewable energy and the lack of good
energy storage assets that makes renewable energy problematic for the
grid system.
What makes this a problem that must be dealt with, is that any
renewable energy transition away from fossil fuels requires literally every
country to grid-connect much greater amounts of renewable electricity
than is currently produced. Thus, persisting with the present grid system
is simply not an option. For electricity systems to become carbon-free,
what is required is a grid system with a capacity that far exceeds that
of the current. This means that domestically countries require systems
that far improve on the current in terms of accepting intermittent energy.
However, what is also required is a system that allows countries to buy
and sell electricity from each other more easily. This means significantly
increasing the number and capacity of interconnectors between countries.
There is far more literature on the political economy of renewable
energy than on the political economy of electricity grids. Over the past few
years, the amount of literature that tries to describe and explain why countries do or do not support renewable energy strategies has grown rapidly,
see for instance both our previous volume (Moe and Midford 2014) and
the monograph by this author (Moe 2015) for works on the political
economy of renewable energy. But in these, as in much of the other literature, the grid system was given scant attention. There are undoubtedly
many reasons for this, but I speculate that there are at least two. First,
the physical visibility of new renewable energy installations is far greater
than the physical visibility of grid-line expansions and upgrades to existing
infrastructures. For very material reasons, it has been easier to intuitively
grasp and enthuse over or rage against renewable installations, especially
wind power.
However, second, and possibly more importantly, as suggested earlier,
renewable energy policy is (or was) not all that difficult. Granted, there
379
grid (Moe 2014a), but did not otherwise spend much time and effort
on it. That is one of the major differences between these two volumes.
The present volume focuses explicitly on challenges to renewable energy
development that were still issues for the future in 2014.
As ever more renewable energy is phased onto the grid, in country
after country, the grid itself is put under ever greater strain. This is not
primarily because the amounts of electricity provided by renewables itself
are so enormous: As mentioned, worldwide, wind and solar power still
account for only 8.7% of total electricity consumption (REN21 2020).
Rather, it is the intermittencies of renewable energy and the lack of good
energy storage assets that makes renewable energy problematic for the
grid system.
What makes this a problem that must be dealt with, is that any
renewable energy transition away from fossil fuels requires literally every
country to grid-connect much greater amounts of renewable electricity
than is currently produced. Thus, persisting with the present grid system
is simply not an option. For electricity systems to become carbon-free,
what is required is a grid system with a capacity that far exceeds that
of the current. This means that domestically countries require systems
that far improve on the current in terms of accepting intermittent energy.
However, what is also required is a system that allows countries to buy
and sell electricity from each other more easily. This means significantly
increasing the number and capacity of interconnectors between countries.
There is far more literature on the political economy of renewable
energy than on the political economy of electricity grids. Over the past few
years, the amount of literature that tries to describe and explain why countries do or do not support renewable energy strategies has grown rapidly,
see for instance both our previous volume (Moe and Midford 2014) and
the monograph by this author (Moe 2015) for works on the political
economy of renewable energy. But in these, as in much of the other literature, the grid system was given scant attention. There are undoubtedly
many reasons for this, but I speculate that there are at least two. First,
the physical visibility of new renewable energy installations is far greater
than the physical visibility of grid-line expansions and upgrades to existing
infrastructures. For very material reasons, it has been easier to intuitively
grasp and enthuse over or rage against renewable installations, especially
wind power.
However, second, and possibly more importantly, as suggested earlier,
renewable energy policy is (or was) not all that difficult. Granted, there