12 P. MIDFORD
has promoted nuclear energy as the primary alternative to oil, and the
solution to energy insecurity, not renewable energy, while also pursuing
energy conservation. Climate change mitigation policy is closely tied to
energy policy, over which the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
(ANRE) of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has
jurisdiction. The lack of strong political leadership on energy and climate
policy leaves organized vested economic interests and METI as the most
influential actors in setting policy. Thus, despite its tremendous potential
to become a leader in renewable energy, Japan has effectively relinquished
its leadership in climate diplomacy and the development of renewable
energy.
In Chapter 4, Florentine Koppenborg analyzes nuclear power regulation, which as briefly discussed by Ohta, Hasegawa, and Midford in
other Japan chapters, has a real influence on energy politics and policy in
Japan, not least of all on renewable energy policy. A trade-off between
promoting renewables and nuclear power is often visible in Japanese
politics and energy policy. Koppenborg focuses on the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) that was created in reaction to Japan’s Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear plant accident of March 2011, and its attempts to regain
public trust by strictly regulating the safety of nuclear power. Defying
expectations of collusion, the NRA has asserted itself as an independent
regulatory agency. It warded off pressure from the Abe administration to
speed up the restart process, and its enforcing of new safety standards
has meant that plant operators have faced the need for expensive investments, expensive enough to render some nuclear reactors economically
unviable. As a result, the maximum feasible share of nuclear power in the
country’s energy mix by 2030 will be approximately 15%, as opposed to
the 20–22% the Abe administration set as a target. However, independent safety regulation has not been enough to convince the majority of
Japanese that nuclear reactors should be restarted. Lawsuits by citizens
challenging restarts have in some cases added to the already high costs
of nuclear safety by prolonging the restart process. Overall, the NRA’s
independent nuclear safety regulation turned out to be a game changer
for Japan’s nuclear policy—and Japan’s climate policy goals, unless the
gap in electricity generation can be quickly filled with renewable energy
sources.
Chapter 5 by Paul Midford examines the post-3–11 politics of nuclear
power restarts versus renewable energy promotion. The Abe administration’s support for restarting some nuclear power plants, based on safety
has promoted nuclear energy as the primary alternative to oil, and the
solution to energy insecurity, not renewable energy, while also pursuing
energy conservation. Climate change mitigation policy is closely tied to
energy policy, over which the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
(ANRE) of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has
jurisdiction. The lack of strong political leadership on energy and climate
policy leaves organized vested economic interests and METI as the most
influential actors in setting policy. Thus, despite its tremendous potential
to become a leader in renewable energy, Japan has effectively relinquished
its leadership in climate diplomacy and the development of renewable
energy.
In Chapter 4, Florentine Koppenborg analyzes nuclear power regulation, which as briefly discussed by Ohta, Hasegawa, and Midford in
other Japan chapters, has a real influence on energy politics and policy in
Japan, not least of all on renewable energy policy. A trade-off between
promoting renewables and nuclear power is often visible in Japanese
politics and energy policy. Koppenborg focuses on the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) that was created in reaction to Japan’s Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear plant accident of March 2011, and its attempts to regain
public trust by strictly regulating the safety of nuclear power. Defying
expectations of collusion, the NRA has asserted itself as an independent
regulatory agency. It warded off pressure from the Abe administration to
speed up the restart process, and its enforcing of new safety standards
has meant that plant operators have faced the need for expensive investments, expensive enough to render some nuclear reactors economically
unviable. As a result, the maximum feasible share of nuclear power in the
country’s energy mix by 2030 will be approximately 15%, as opposed to
the 20–22% the Abe administration set as a target. However, independent safety regulation has not been enough to convince the majority of
Japanese that nuclear reactors should be restarted. Lawsuits by citizens
challenging restarts have in some cases added to the already high costs
of nuclear safety by prolonging the restart process. Overall, the NRA’s
independent nuclear safety regulation turned out to be a game changer
for Japan’s nuclear policy—and Japan’s climate policy goals, unless the
gap in electricity generation can be quickly filled with renewable energy
sources.
Chapter 5 by Paul Midford examines the post-3–11 politics of nuclear
power restarts versus renewable energy promotion. The Abe administration’s support for restarting some nuclear power plants, based on safety