308 E. MOE ET AL.
Second, also striking was how few actors thought of energy exports
primarily as a climate contribution and as climate politics. Except for
the most ardent opponents of cables and wind power, nearly all interviewees recognized the potential climate contribution to a European
energy transition through renewable energy exports. However, beyond
environmental organizations like Zero and Bellona, and the most climateconscious political parties, the belief that Norwegian renewable energy
should be utilized to as great an extent as possible to assist a European
energy transition is entirely absent. Instead, the dominant perspective
among political decision-makers is that energy exports are about utilizing
natural resources in as socially profitable a way as possible, without unduly
reducing the competitiveness of Norwegian industry.
On the one hand, considerations of social profitability clearly weigh
more heavily than climate considerations. On the other, several interviewees talked about climate gain by other means than electricity exports,
arguing that Norway’s most important climate contribution is one of
manufacturing and exporting energy-intensive products (needed among
other things for an energy transition) with a lower carbon footprint
than any other country on the planet. The job was made easier for the
politicians by the two major vested interests—the power sector and the
industry. These came together and carved out a compromise whereby
more wind power would be installed, alleviating the energy-intensive
industry’s fear of increasing electricity prices, in return for subsea cables
being built for renewable energy exports to Europe. With the political
right tending toward the power sector and the left toward the industry,
this grand bargain alleviated important political tension, especially easing
the pressure on the Labor Party. It is also a bargain that points towards
the future. The strength of the power sector and the industry suggests
that their interests to a major extent will be accommodated by politicians
also in the future. Policy swings are likely to be moderate rather than
dramatic.
Furthermore, very few Norwegian politicians think of renewable
energy exports as part of a green battery vision but as belonging to
the realm of energy politics. They are preoccupied with how Norwegian natural resources can be utilized to maximize social profits. Despite
the global nature of man-made climate change, and despite ever closer
integration with the EU energy union, Norwegian decision-making is
characterized by national over international considerations.
Second, also striking was how few actors thought of energy exports
primarily as a climate contribution and as climate politics. Except for
the most ardent opponents of cables and wind power, nearly all interviewees recognized the potential climate contribution to a European
energy transition through renewable energy exports. However, beyond
environmental organizations like Zero and Bellona, and the most climateconscious political parties, the belief that Norwegian renewable energy
should be utilized to as great an extent as possible to assist a European
energy transition is entirely absent. Instead, the dominant perspective
among political decision-makers is that energy exports are about utilizing
natural resources in as socially profitable a way as possible, without unduly
reducing the competitiveness of Norwegian industry.
On the one hand, considerations of social profitability clearly weigh
more heavily than climate considerations. On the other, several interviewees talked about climate gain by other means than electricity exports,
arguing that Norway’s most important climate contribution is one of
manufacturing and exporting energy-intensive products (needed among
other things for an energy transition) with a lower carbon footprint
than any other country on the planet. The job was made easier for the
politicians by the two major vested interests—the power sector and the
industry. These came together and carved out a compromise whereby
more wind power would be installed, alleviating the energy-intensive
industry’s fear of increasing electricity prices, in return for subsea cables
being built for renewable energy exports to Europe. With the political
right tending toward the power sector and the left toward the industry,
this grand bargain alleviated important political tension, especially easing
the pressure on the Labor Party. It is also a bargain that points towards
the future. The strength of the power sector and the industry suggests
that their interests to a major extent will be accommodated by politicians
also in the future. Policy swings are likely to be moderate rather than
dramatic.
Furthermore, very few Norwegian politicians think of renewable
energy exports as part of a green battery vision but as belonging to
the realm of energy politics. They are preoccupied with how Norwegian natural resources can be utilized to maximize social profits. Despite
the global nature of man-made climate change, and despite ever closer
integration with the EU energy union, Norwegian decision-making is
characterized by national over international considerations.