12 WHY NORWAY AS A GREEN BATTERY …
299
2005–2013 left-center coalition government of Stoltenberg (Labor Party,
Center Party, Socialist Left Party) that in 2012 approved the construction
of two subsea cables to Germany and Britain—NordLink and North Sea
Link—with support from the opposition.
Although part of the government coalition, the Center Party was
never as sanguine about the green battery idea as the Labor Party. Illustratively, when then Petroleum and Energy Minister Ola Borten Moe
(Center Party) in 2011 gave the official approval to NordLink and North
Sea Link, he supported renewable energy installations to lower the electricity price, but generally warned against subsea cables (Statnett then
had plans for five) (TU 2011b). His opinion was that cables could be
built only if socially profitable and if strengthening the reliability of
energy supply. His aim was to improve the power exchange (TU 2012).
Borten Moe was criticized by environmentalists for preventing the realization of Norway as a green battery, and claims surfaced that German
politicians were unhappy with perceived Norwegian backpedaling on
earlier pledges (Dagens Perspektiv 2011; TV2 2011). However, despite
Stoltenberg’s earlier green battery rhetoric, by 2012 Stoltenberg and
Borten Moe were adamant that subsidizing Norwegian renewable energy
to sell it cheaply to Europe was a horrible business idea. One telling
quote from Stoltenberg’s autobiography, referring to the green certificate system eventually introduced in 2012, was “I have nothing against
Germans, but I cannot understand why we should build expensive electricity in Norway only to sell it cheaply to German power companies?”
(Stoltenberg 2016, p. 420). To Stoltenberg, the green certificate system
constituted erroneous investments of billions of Norwegian kroner in
transfers to foreign countries (Stoltenberg 2016). For similar reasons, in
2013 Borten Moe put the partially private-owned cable NorthConnect
on indefinite hold. Stoltenberg emphasized that the government would
not privatize cable construction, arguing that this might hurt Norwegian
industry (TU 2013).
Thus, despite lofty early rhetoric about contributing to a European
energy transition, it is conspicuous how the focus soon shifted from the
international to the national, and from green battery to power exchange.
Cables would improve the flexibility of the grid and increase the reliability
of supply. Norway would profit from power exchange since electricity
prices abroad are generally higher than in Norway. Simultaneously, the
increased generation of renewable energy would lower electricity bills for
households and industry.
299
2005–2013 left-center coalition government of Stoltenberg (Labor Party,
Center Party, Socialist Left Party) that in 2012 approved the construction
of two subsea cables to Germany and Britain—NordLink and North Sea
Link—with support from the opposition.
Although part of the government coalition, the Center Party was
never as sanguine about the green battery idea as the Labor Party. Illustratively, when then Petroleum and Energy Minister Ola Borten Moe
(Center Party) in 2011 gave the official approval to NordLink and North
Sea Link, he supported renewable energy installations to lower the electricity price, but generally warned against subsea cables (Statnett then
had plans for five) (TU 2011b). His opinion was that cables could be
built only if socially profitable and if strengthening the reliability of
energy supply. His aim was to improve the power exchange (TU 2012).
Borten Moe was criticized by environmentalists for preventing the realization of Norway as a green battery, and claims surfaced that German
politicians were unhappy with perceived Norwegian backpedaling on
earlier pledges (Dagens Perspektiv 2011; TV2 2011). However, despite
Stoltenberg’s earlier green battery rhetoric, by 2012 Stoltenberg and
Borten Moe were adamant that subsidizing Norwegian renewable energy
to sell it cheaply to Europe was a horrible business idea. One telling
quote from Stoltenberg’s autobiography, referring to the green certificate system eventually introduced in 2012, was “I have nothing against
Germans, but I cannot understand why we should build expensive electricity in Norway only to sell it cheaply to German power companies?”
(Stoltenberg 2016, p. 420). To Stoltenberg, the green certificate system
constituted erroneous investments of billions of Norwegian kroner in
transfers to foreign countries (Stoltenberg 2016). For similar reasons, in
2013 Borten Moe put the partially private-owned cable NorthConnect
on indefinite hold. Stoltenberg emphasized that the government would
not privatize cable construction, arguing that this might hurt Norwegian
industry (TU 2013).
Thus, despite lofty early rhetoric about contributing to a European
energy transition, it is conspicuous how the focus soon shifted from the
international to the national, and from green battery to power exchange.
Cables would improve the flexibility of the grid and increase the reliability
of supply. Norway would profit from power exchange since electricity
prices abroad are generally higher than in Norway. Simultaneously, the
increased generation of renewable energy would lower electricity bills for
households and industry.