12 WHY NORWAY AS A GREEN BATTERY …
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electricity market. Moreover, there has been a tremendous surge in the
focus on climate. Thus, the physical demand for a green battery to draw
on is far greater now than in 2013, and the overall demand for Norwegian
electricity has increased. Meanwhile, at the time of writing, two Norwegian subsea cables are close to completion (NordLink to Germany, due in
2020, and North Sea Link to Britain, due in 2021). In sum, many of the
underlying conditions for greater renewable integration between Norway
and Europe have changed since 2013. Thus, time is overdue to re-explore
the feasibility of Norway as a green battery for Europe.
In many countries, vested interest actors such as grid and electric
utility companies have been formidable incumbents, resisting grid expansion and keeping new renewables (primarily wind and solar) at arm’s
length (e.g., Moe 2012, 2015). However, as we return to later, when
it comes to subsea cables, these same actors may easily push for change
instead of resisting it (e.g., Kelsey 2018). Indeed, the two cables currently
under construction were enabled by a grand vested interest compromise
between the power sector and the energy-intensive industry, whereby
the power sector was granted cables for exports in return for windand hydropower installations generating cheap electricity for the industry.
Thus, with respect to wind power, conditions have also changed. The
2012 introduction of a green certificate scheme has boosted installations, and wind power costs have come dramatically down, dropping by
an average of 70% over a decade and 45% since 2012 (Lazard 2019).
This has eroded previous resistance from the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MOPE). Additionally, climate
change has acquired ever more prominence in Norwegian politics. With
less incumbent aversion to change, a more cost-competitive wind power
industry, and a generally greater focus on climate, one could reasonably
suspect Norwegian politicians—whether through suasion or conviction—
to have become more favorably inclined toward the green battery idea
since 2013.
Despite this, to a major extent we reiterate the conclusions of Gullberg.
Norwegian politicians have consistently been eager and willing to export
electricity, but are reluctant to build the necessary cable infrastructure,
or to phase in enough renewable energy for large-scale electricity sales to
occur. Rather than green battery, we find that the idea that is embraced
by most Norwegian actors is that of increased power exchange with other
states, i.e., Norway as a provider of balancing power, including some net
exports of electricity. Furthermore, while we suggest that a long-term
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electricity market. Moreover, there has been a tremendous surge in the
focus on climate. Thus, the physical demand for a green battery to draw
on is far greater now than in 2013, and the overall demand for Norwegian
electricity has increased. Meanwhile, at the time of writing, two Norwegian subsea cables are close to completion (NordLink to Germany, due in
2020, and North Sea Link to Britain, due in 2021). In sum, many of the
underlying conditions for greater renewable integration between Norway
and Europe have changed since 2013. Thus, time is overdue to re-explore
the feasibility of Norway as a green battery for Europe.
In many countries, vested interest actors such as grid and electric
utility companies have been formidable incumbents, resisting grid expansion and keeping new renewables (primarily wind and solar) at arm’s
length (e.g., Moe 2012, 2015). However, as we return to later, when
it comes to subsea cables, these same actors may easily push for change
instead of resisting it (e.g., Kelsey 2018). Indeed, the two cables currently
under construction were enabled by a grand vested interest compromise
between the power sector and the energy-intensive industry, whereby
the power sector was granted cables for exports in return for windand hydropower installations generating cheap electricity for the industry.
Thus, with respect to wind power, conditions have also changed. The
2012 introduction of a green certificate scheme has boosted installations, and wind power costs have come dramatically down, dropping by
an average of 70% over a decade and 45% since 2012 (Lazard 2019).
This has eroded previous resistance from the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MOPE). Additionally, climate
change has acquired ever more prominence in Norwegian politics. With
less incumbent aversion to change, a more cost-competitive wind power
industry, and a generally greater focus on climate, one could reasonably
suspect Norwegian politicians—whether through suasion or conviction—
to have become more favorably inclined toward the green battery idea
since 2013.
Despite this, to a major extent we reiterate the conclusions of Gullberg.
Norwegian politicians have consistently been eager and willing to export
electricity, but are reluctant to build the necessary cable infrastructure,
or to phase in enough renewable energy for large-scale electricity sales to
occur. Rather than green battery, we find that the idea that is embraced
by most Norwegian actors is that of increased power exchange with other
states, i.e., Norway as a provider of balancing power, including some net
exports of electricity. Furthermore, while we suggest that a long-term