194 S. Y. KIM AND I. SUN
(2018~2022), the government is planning to launch a power intermediary market in which intermediary agencies can trade electrical power
on behalf of individuals generating renewable energy in various forms.
The same plan also contains a proposal to build an integrated renewable
energy control system by 2020 (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy
2018).
What is notable in the energy policy of the new administration is the
effort to shift the national energy policy from the centralized energy
system (notably based on nuclear energy and coal) to more decentralized,
democratic, and participatory mode of energy production and consumption. Despite the new policy attempts to increase renewable energy, South
Korea’s low percentages of renewable energy production are likely to
linger on longer than the written plans. In addition to the already low
level of the WTP of South Korea, a low level of the willingness to accept
(WTA) for renewables has recently become a significant challenge for the
diffusion of renewable energy in South Korea.
In fact, 37.5% of renewable electricity generation projects were rejected
or postponed in 2016 due to resistance from nearby residents to new
construction of solar or wind power plants (Jung 2017; Lee 2017). Given
the lack of incentives for residents from renewable power plants, their
resistance often leads to a higher level of regulation by local governments,
which is more likely to limit new construction of renewable energy facilities. Therefore, there are several calls for creating more incentives for local
communities by allowing them to participate in local renewable business
(Rogers et al. 2008; Warren and McFadyen 2010; Ejdemo and Söderholm
2015; Howard 2015).
According to a recent survey conducted by Korea Energy Economics
Institute, local acceptance for renewables power generation turned out
to be significantly lower than that of nationwide public acceptance (Jung
2017). The expected rates of return from participating in renewable business differ noticeably between the general public and local residents living
close to renewable power plants. For example, local residents are likely to
accept a renewable power project when they annually expect a 12.3% rate
of return, whereas the general public accepts the same at a rate of return of
3.1%. Also, the expected rate of return varies depending on the renewable
energy source—photovoltaics are the most costly for local WTA, followed
by biomass and wind energy (see chapters on Japan, China, and Norway
in this book regarding Not-in-my-backyard [NIMBY] movements).
(2018~2022), the government is planning to launch a power intermediary market in which intermediary agencies can trade electrical power
on behalf of individuals generating renewable energy in various forms.
The same plan also contains a proposal to build an integrated renewable
energy control system by 2020 (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy
2018).
What is notable in the energy policy of the new administration is the
effort to shift the national energy policy from the centralized energy
system (notably based on nuclear energy and coal) to more decentralized,
democratic, and participatory mode of energy production and consumption. Despite the new policy attempts to increase renewable energy, South
Korea’s low percentages of renewable energy production are likely to
linger on longer than the written plans. In addition to the already low
level of the WTP of South Korea, a low level of the willingness to accept
(WTA) for renewables has recently become a significant challenge for the
diffusion of renewable energy in South Korea.
In fact, 37.5% of renewable electricity generation projects were rejected
or postponed in 2016 due to resistance from nearby residents to new
construction of solar or wind power plants (Jung 2017; Lee 2017). Given
the lack of incentives for residents from renewable power plants, their
resistance often leads to a higher level of regulation by local governments,
which is more likely to limit new construction of renewable energy facilities. Therefore, there are several calls for creating more incentives for local
communities by allowing them to participate in local renewable business
(Rogers et al. 2008; Warren and McFadyen 2010; Ejdemo and Söderholm
2015; Howard 2015).
According to a recent survey conducted by Korea Energy Economics
Institute, local acceptance for renewables power generation turned out
to be significantly lower than that of nationwide public acceptance (Jung
2017). The expected rates of return from participating in renewable business differ noticeably between the general public and local residents living
close to renewable power plants. For example, local residents are likely to
accept a renewable power project when they annually expect a 12.3% rate
of return, whereas the general public accepts the same at a rate of return of
3.1%. Also, the expected rate of return varies depending on the renewable
energy source—photovoltaics are the most costly for local WTA, followed
by biomass and wind energy (see chapters on Japan, China, and Norway
in this book regarding Not-in-my-backyard [NIMBY] movements).