124 P. MIDFORD
In early 2020, the Abe administration introduced a new support
scheme for renewable energy: the feed-in premium (or FIP), which
provides payments to renewable energy producers if prices for their electricity fall below a set floor. The legislation also includes more funds for
grid expansion and eases the rules for establishing local grids independent of the EPCO grids (Asahi Shimbun 2020a), which is important for
some renewable energy producers, like Aizu Power in western Fukushima
prefecture, who are trying to set up local grids. 25 The Abe administration’s stimulus package in response to the COVID19 pandemic allocated
108 trillion Yen (almost USD 1 billion) to subsidize the development of
onsite renewables in support of corporate Power Purchase Agreements
(PPAs). This support was included under the rubric of “Development of
Resilient Economic Structures” (Bhambhani 2020).
These new policies reflect a significant shift in how renewable energy
was framed by the Abe administration after September 2019, when
a powerful typhoon devastated Chiba prefecture just east of Tokyo,
and left hundreds of thousands of customers there without electricity
for days and even weeks, piercing TEPCO’s (and the other EPCOs’)
track record of reliability (Kyodo News 2020b). This encouraged many
Japanese households to purchase rooftop solar and storage battery sets
to protect themselves against blackouts (PV Tech 2020). METI and the
Abe administration responded by reframing renewable energy as a form
of disaster preparedness and resilience, promoting distributed renewable energy generation and local grids to minimize electricity disruptions
during natural disasters.
The findings of this chapter point to the influence of two variables
identified in the introduction, namely the influence of a strong state and
public opinion, and indicate that the influence of vested interests has been
less than the literature and many observers have found. Abe’s personal
pronuclear opinions were less influential than often perceived. Clearly, the
EPCOs have an interest in preserving their investments in nuclear power
and restarting those assets while stopping retail market liberalization, the
unbundling of their transmission business, and preventing rival renewable
energy producers from having grid access. Other members of the so-called
nuclear village have even clearer incentives to favor a return to nuclearpower expansion policies. Yet, EPCOs and these other actors have not
been able to realize their preferences. 3-11 itself is a partial explanation, as
it empowered METI to implement reforms it had long been advocating,
In early 2020, the Abe administration introduced a new support
scheme for renewable energy: the feed-in premium (or FIP), which
provides payments to renewable energy producers if prices for their electricity fall below a set floor. The legislation also includes more funds for
grid expansion and eases the rules for establishing local grids independent of the EPCO grids (Asahi Shimbun 2020a), which is important for
some renewable energy producers, like Aizu Power in western Fukushima
prefecture, who are trying to set up local grids. 25 The Abe administration’s stimulus package in response to the COVID19 pandemic allocated
108 trillion Yen (almost USD 1 billion) to subsidize the development of
onsite renewables in support of corporate Power Purchase Agreements
(PPAs). This support was included under the rubric of “Development of
Resilient Economic Structures” (Bhambhani 2020).
These new policies reflect a significant shift in how renewable energy
was framed by the Abe administration after September 2019, when
a powerful typhoon devastated Chiba prefecture just east of Tokyo,
and left hundreds of thousands of customers there without electricity
for days and even weeks, piercing TEPCO’s (and the other EPCOs’)
track record of reliability (Kyodo News 2020b). This encouraged many
Japanese households to purchase rooftop solar and storage battery sets
to protect themselves against blackouts (PV Tech 2020). METI and the
Abe administration responded by reframing renewable energy as a form
of disaster preparedness and resilience, promoting distributed renewable energy generation and local grids to minimize electricity disruptions
during natural disasters.
The findings of this chapter point to the influence of two variables
identified in the introduction, namely the influence of a strong state and
public opinion, and indicate that the influence of vested interests has been
less than the literature and many observers have found. Abe’s personal
pronuclear opinions were less influential than often perceived. Clearly, the
EPCOs have an interest in preserving their investments in nuclear power
and restarting those assets while stopping retail market liberalization, the
unbundling of their transmission business, and preventing rival renewable
energy producers from having grid access. Other members of the so-called
nuclear village have even clearer incentives to favor a return to nuclearpower expansion policies. Yet, EPCOs and these other actors have not
been able to realize their preferences. 3-11 itself is a partial explanation, as
it empowered METI to implement reforms it had long been advocating,