122 P. MIDFORD
EPCO did not offer consumers a renewable energy option). Choices
were limited in Hokkaido, with electricity only sold to members of two
consumer cooperatives and by LOOP. In Hokuriku, LOOP was the only
renewable choice, and in Shikoku only Minna Denryoku and LOOP
were options, plus Shikoku EPCO, with two more renewable-energy
promoting companies preparing to enter the market (Pawa-shifuto 2020;
LOOP, n.d.). 22
It remains to be seen how much influence consumers’ “voting” for
renewable energy (so far no companies are offering pure nuclear-power
packages) will have on Japan’s energy mix moving forward, but at least
this choice (along with the choice of becoming a small-scale rooftop
solar generator oneself, or a prosumer) has become available to retail
consumers who own their own roof. Given that an overwhelming majority
of Japanese favor nuclear phaseout, and that nearly as large majorities
are willing to pay more for renewable energy, there is reason to expect
that many more consumers will choose providers that offer renewable
electricity plans if they are given reasonably competitive choices in their
service region.
Conclusions: Resilient Renewables
The fundamental shift in energy policy following 3-11 that DPJ Prime
Minister Kan launched with his abandonment of nuclear expansion and
his zero nuclear declaration, which were fleshed by his successor through
what this chapter calls the Kan-Noda road map, largely survived the
shift in administration back to the LDP and an openly pronuclear prime
minister. 23 As per the Kan-Noda road map, the Abe administration forced
the EPCOs to accept major electricity sector reform and liberalization,
unbundling their ownership of the grid, forcing them to buy electricity
from hundreds of thousands of essentially rival electricity producers,
including ordinary retail customers, ending their profitable monopoly
on retail electricity sales that had accounted for approximately 90% of
their profits (Daily Yomiuri 2013). Indeed, electricity sector reform was
arguably the leading achievement of structural reform under Abenomics.
At the same time, nuclear restarts have been expensive and have
proceeded at a glacial pace, even as installed solar PV capacity has grown
dramatically since 2012. Although the Abe administration abandoned the
Kan-Noda road map goal of phasing out nuclear power by the end of
the 2030s, its actual policy trajectory suggests that phaseout will happen
EPCO did not offer consumers a renewable energy option). Choices
were limited in Hokkaido, with electricity only sold to members of two
consumer cooperatives and by LOOP. In Hokuriku, LOOP was the only
renewable choice, and in Shikoku only Minna Denryoku and LOOP
were options, plus Shikoku EPCO, with two more renewable-energy
promoting companies preparing to enter the market (Pawa-shifuto 2020;
LOOP, n.d.). 22
It remains to be seen how much influence consumers’ “voting” for
renewable energy (so far no companies are offering pure nuclear-power
packages) will have on Japan’s energy mix moving forward, but at least
this choice (along with the choice of becoming a small-scale rooftop
solar generator oneself, or a prosumer) has become available to retail
consumers who own their own roof. Given that an overwhelming majority
of Japanese favor nuclear phaseout, and that nearly as large majorities
are willing to pay more for renewable energy, there is reason to expect
that many more consumers will choose providers that offer renewable
electricity plans if they are given reasonably competitive choices in their
service region.
Conclusions: Resilient Renewables
The fundamental shift in energy policy following 3-11 that DPJ Prime
Minister Kan launched with his abandonment of nuclear expansion and
his zero nuclear declaration, which were fleshed by his successor through
what this chapter calls the Kan-Noda road map, largely survived the
shift in administration back to the LDP and an openly pronuclear prime
minister. 23 As per the Kan-Noda road map, the Abe administration forced
the EPCOs to accept major electricity sector reform and liberalization,
unbundling their ownership of the grid, forcing them to buy electricity
from hundreds of thousands of essentially rival electricity producers,
including ordinary retail customers, ending their profitable monopoly
on retail electricity sales that had accounted for approximately 90% of
their profits (Daily Yomiuri 2013). Indeed, electricity sector reform was
arguably the leading achievement of structural reform under Abenomics.
At the same time, nuclear restarts have been expensive and have
proceeded at a glacial pace, even as installed solar PV capacity has grown
dramatically since 2012. Although the Abe administration abandoned the
Kan-Noda road map goal of phasing out nuclear power by the end of
the 2030s, its actual policy trajectory suggests that phaseout will happen