4 JAPAN’S NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION POLICY
91
about half of the installed capacity available prior to the Fukushima accident. In 2010, nuclear power covered 29% of Japan’s electricity demand.
Assuming a stable electricity demand, the 26 reactors could provide close
to 15% of Japan’s electricity demand by 2030—far from enough to reach
the government’s goal of 20–22% by 2030. Even if the NRA approved
restarts of all reactors utilities are currently trying to bring back into
service, it would not be enough to reach the target of providing 20–22%
of Japan’s electricity supply.
The strategy pursued by electricity utilities was to submit safety review
applications not for all reactors, but the ones with the highest chances
of improved safety measure investments paying off eventually. Accordingly, utilities mainly submitted review requests for 26 newer reactors with
large electricity generation capacity. Meeting safety requirements even for
those 26 reactors forced utilities to make costly investments. Asked about
the estimated costs of investments for reactors they submitted a review
request for, utilities estimated total costs of 1.6 trillion yen in January
2014. By July 2015, that figure rose to 2.4 trillion yen (The Tokyo
Shinbun 2015b) and even reached 5 trillion yen by July 2019 (Asahi
Shinbun 2019b). With higher than anticipated refurbishing costs, electricity utilities chose to invest only in the most profitable nuclear reactors
and have begun shutting down older and smaller ones.
Almost ten years after 3/11, Japan’s once large nuclear reactor fleet,
which at the time ranked as the third largest in the world after the US
and France, has shrunk considerably. As of September 2019, a total of 35
reactors remained. Even with two additional reactors under construction,
that is a far cry from the 54 commercial nuclear reactors Japan before
3/11. Thus, the margin between reactors under review and additional
reactors utilities can apply for has decreased rapidly.
Looking at the time taken by the NRA to assess safety and the
additional safety costs imposed on electric utilities shows regulatory independence on the part of the NRA. It took much longer than politicians
asked for and imposed much higher than anticipated safety investments
on utilities—possibly high enough to undermine economic viability of
the business of operating nuclear reactors. Further adding to difficulties
in achieving nuclear policy targets are lawsuits against the restarting of
nuclear power plants based on safety concerns. With courts as the only
bodies with the authority to override NRA decisions, the outcome of
these lawsuits has strong implications regarding the future of nuclear
power in Japan.
91
about half of the installed capacity available prior to the Fukushima accident. In 2010, nuclear power covered 29% of Japan’s electricity demand.
Assuming a stable electricity demand, the 26 reactors could provide close
to 15% of Japan’s electricity demand by 2030—far from enough to reach
the government’s goal of 20–22% by 2030. Even if the NRA approved
restarts of all reactors utilities are currently trying to bring back into
service, it would not be enough to reach the target of providing 20–22%
of Japan’s electricity supply.
The strategy pursued by electricity utilities was to submit safety review
applications not for all reactors, but the ones with the highest chances
of improved safety measure investments paying off eventually. Accordingly, utilities mainly submitted review requests for 26 newer reactors with
large electricity generation capacity. Meeting safety requirements even for
those 26 reactors forced utilities to make costly investments. Asked about
the estimated costs of investments for reactors they submitted a review
request for, utilities estimated total costs of 1.6 trillion yen in January
2014. By July 2015, that figure rose to 2.4 trillion yen (The Tokyo
Shinbun 2015b) and even reached 5 trillion yen by July 2019 (Asahi
Shinbun 2019b). With higher than anticipated refurbishing costs, electricity utilities chose to invest only in the most profitable nuclear reactors
and have begun shutting down older and smaller ones.
Almost ten years after 3/11, Japan’s once large nuclear reactor fleet,
which at the time ranked as the third largest in the world after the US
and France, has shrunk considerably. As of September 2019, a total of 35
reactors remained. Even with two additional reactors under construction,
that is a far cry from the 54 commercial nuclear reactors Japan before
3/11. Thus, the margin between reactors under review and additional
reactors utilities can apply for has decreased rapidly.
Looking at the time taken by the NRA to assess safety and the
additional safety costs imposed on electric utilities shows regulatory independence on the part of the NRA. It took much longer than politicians
asked for and imposed much higher than anticipated safety investments
on utilities—possibly high enough to undermine economic viability of
the business of operating nuclear reactors. Further adding to difficulties
in achieving nuclear policy targets are lawsuits against the restarting of
nuclear power plants based on safety concerns. With courts as the only
bodies with the authority to override NRA decisions, the outcome of
these lawsuits has strong implications regarding the future of nuclear
power in Japan.