4 JAPAN’S NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION POLICY
83
media and not just those associated with journalist clubs (“kisha clubs ”).
While a high degree of transparency allowed the public to watch the NRA
at work, there was no citizen participation in the decision-making process.
In sum, the NRA was on a good path towards becoming an independent regulatory agency. It enjoyed considerable independence as a
regulatory agency due to control over its human resources and budget,
rules for keeping a distance from the industry applying to both the NRA
board and consulted external experts, and transparency towards the public
as a prerequisite for public scrutiny.
However, there was considerable political pressure on the NRA to
return to pre-3/11 business as usual. For example, the energy policy
strategy adopted by the Abe government in 2014 and 2015 was contingent on the NRA swiftly approving reactors and on relaxing the newly
introduced safety requirements, discussed in the next section. Another
avenue for political influence was through the nomination of board
members with close ties to the industry.
A controversial choice by the Abe government was Tanaka Satoru due
to his closeness to the nuclear industry. As a professor at the Tokyo
University’s Department of Nuclear Engineering, he had long-standing
ties with the nuclear industry and had actively promoted and supported
nuclear power expansion in the past. Once appointed, NRA transparency
guidelines required Tanaka to disclose industry funding. He received 6
million yen in research funds from the nuclear power plant operator JPower and the plant manufacturers Hitachi and GE between 2004 and
2010. He also received funding in the three years prior to his nomination, for example from TEPCO Memorial Foundation, Hitachi GE, and
Taiheiyo Consultant, an engineering firm. In the light of this information,
critical voices warned that someone like Tanaka joining the NRA board
could undermine the independence of the nuclear safety regulator (Asahi
Shinbun 2014; The Japan Times 2014b). Regardless of criticism and all
seven opposition parties opposing Tanaka Satoru’s appointment, the Abe
government pushed the decision through the Diet.
Had Tanaka Satoru been appointed as NRA Chairman when the term
of the first chairman, Tanaka Shunichi, ended in 2017, this would have
been an instance of political influence. However, Tanaka Shunichi was
followed by Fuketa Toyoshi, an old colleague of Tanaka Shunichi and the
second board member present since the NRA’s creation in 2012. There
clearly was pressure on the NRA, but it passed the litmus test for political
influence when changing chairman. 8
83
media and not just those associated with journalist clubs (“kisha clubs ”).
While a high degree of transparency allowed the public to watch the NRA
at work, there was no citizen participation in the decision-making process.
In sum, the NRA was on a good path towards becoming an independent regulatory agency. It enjoyed considerable independence as a
regulatory agency due to control over its human resources and budget,
rules for keeping a distance from the industry applying to both the NRA
board and consulted external experts, and transparency towards the public
as a prerequisite for public scrutiny.
However, there was considerable political pressure on the NRA to
return to pre-3/11 business as usual. For example, the energy policy
strategy adopted by the Abe government in 2014 and 2015 was contingent on the NRA swiftly approving reactors and on relaxing the newly
introduced safety requirements, discussed in the next section. Another
avenue for political influence was through the nomination of board
members with close ties to the industry.
A controversial choice by the Abe government was Tanaka Satoru due
to his closeness to the nuclear industry. As a professor at the Tokyo
University’s Department of Nuclear Engineering, he had long-standing
ties with the nuclear industry and had actively promoted and supported
nuclear power expansion in the past. Once appointed, NRA transparency
guidelines required Tanaka to disclose industry funding. He received 6
million yen in research funds from the nuclear power plant operator JPower and the plant manufacturers Hitachi and GE between 2004 and
2010. He also received funding in the three years prior to his nomination, for example from TEPCO Memorial Foundation, Hitachi GE, and
Taiheiyo Consultant, an engineering firm. In the light of this information,
critical voices warned that someone like Tanaka joining the NRA board
could undermine the independence of the nuclear safety regulator (Asahi
Shinbun 2014; The Japan Times 2014b). Regardless of criticism and all
seven opposition parties opposing Tanaka Satoru’s appointment, the Abe
government pushed the decision through the Diet.
Had Tanaka Satoru been appointed as NRA Chairman when the term
of the first chairman, Tanaka Shunichi, ended in 2017, this would have
been an instance of political influence. However, Tanaka Shunichi was
followed by Fuketa Toyoshi, an old colleague of Tanaka Shunichi and the
second board member present since the NRA’s creation in 2012. There
clearly was pressure on the NRA, but it passed the litmus test for political
influence when changing chairman. 8