66
• Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. Kazakhstan must connect this pipeline to
the port of Aktau in order to benefit from the BTC. The BTC’s current capacity
is 1,200,000 bpd, and covers a length of around 2300 km. (Babali 2009:1033).
• Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline. The 1000 km Kazakhstan-China pipeline began
oil transit in 2006, and was the first pipeline from a Central Asian republic which
did not access the world energy market via Russia (www.bbc.co.uk 2017a).
China has spent around $6 billion on the project, completing the first phase in
2003 after five years of construction. In the first phase, a link was forged to transit oil from the Aktobe region to the oil hub of Atyrau, before expanding in 2006,
and finally being completed in 2009 via the connection of Kenkiyak and Kumkot.
After completion of the final stages, project capacity increased to 400,000 bpd.
Capacity again increased in 2011 and reached 500,000 bpd. (Babali 2009:1032)
Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran route. Before the EU and US sanctions were
introduced, Iran signed swap agreements with both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Iran halted its swap agreement with Kazakhstan during this era, in 2010 (www.
azernews.az 2017a, b). Since the 5+1 agreement however Iran is trying to play a key
role in oil and gas transit from the Caspian Sea to international markets (www.
azernews.az 2017a, b). The Iranian route is one of the best alternatives for Kashagan
oil, and Iran is now in negotiations with Russia and Kazakhstan to transit oil to
consume market (www.azernews.az 2017a, b). The proposed pipeline from
Kazakhstan to Iran through Turkmenistan would have 1 million bpd capacity and
cost around $1.2 billion. This route is one of the shortest and cheapest pipelines
possible yet, at least during the sanction’s era, the US stood.
Azerbaijan
Various domestic and international factors impact foreign policies. Azerbaijan
needs to evaluate a variety of determinants to seek how and to what degree they
impact foreign policy. Thus, they should assess the nature of their regime during the
process of founding the post-Soviet state, questions regarding national identity, the
influential impacts of local groups, the geography of the Caspian Sea, the intentions
of neighboring powers, and the investment of multinational oil companies, and most
importantly, the probabilities of the state and Azerbaijan (Ipek 2009:238–239).
The process of oil development and its relationship with multinational oil companies guides foreign policy. This argument shows that geopolitics is important for
the strategic goals of Western-oriented foreign policy, which is mainly influenced
by the interactions between the oil development process and regional conflicts. In
addition, in comparison, for example, to Kazakhstan’s multi-vertical foreign policy, the combination of security threats in the early years of Azerbaijan’s independence and a historical milestone known as “Black June” influenced the
pro-independence and anti-Russian sentiment among Azeris and influenced its
national identity, in determining the Western orientation in Azerbaijani foreign
policy (Ipek 2009:238–239).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
• Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. Kazakhstan must connect this pipeline to
the port of Aktau in order to benefit from the BTC. The BTC’s current capacity
is 1,200,000 bpd, and covers a length of around 2300 km. (Babali 2009:1033).
• Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline. The 1000 km Kazakhstan-China pipeline began
oil transit in 2006, and was the first pipeline from a Central Asian republic which
did not access the world energy market via Russia (www.bbc.co.uk 2017a).
China has spent around $6 billion on the project, completing the first phase in
2003 after five years of construction. In the first phase, a link was forged to transit oil from the Aktobe region to the oil hub of Atyrau, before expanding in 2006,
and finally being completed in 2009 via the connection of Kenkiyak and Kumkot.
After completion of the final stages, project capacity increased to 400,000 bpd.
Capacity again increased in 2011 and reached 500,000 bpd. (Babali 2009:1032)
Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran route. Before the EU and US sanctions were
introduced, Iran signed swap agreements with both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Iran halted its swap agreement with Kazakhstan during this era, in 2010 (www.
azernews.az 2017a, b). Since the 5+1 agreement however Iran is trying to play a key
role in oil and gas transit from the Caspian Sea to international markets (www.
azernews.az 2017a, b). The Iranian route is one of the best alternatives for Kashagan
oil, and Iran is now in negotiations with Russia and Kazakhstan to transit oil to
consume market (www.azernews.az 2017a, b). The proposed pipeline from
Kazakhstan to Iran through Turkmenistan would have 1 million bpd capacity and
cost around $1.2 billion. This route is one of the shortest and cheapest pipelines
possible yet, at least during the sanction’s era, the US stood.
Azerbaijan
Various domestic and international factors impact foreign policies. Azerbaijan
needs to evaluate a variety of determinants to seek how and to what degree they
impact foreign policy. Thus, they should assess the nature of their regime during the
process of founding the post-Soviet state, questions regarding national identity, the
influential impacts of local groups, the geography of the Caspian Sea, the intentions
of neighboring powers, and the investment of multinational oil companies, and most
importantly, the probabilities of the state and Azerbaijan (Ipek 2009:238–239).
The process of oil development and its relationship with multinational oil companies guides foreign policy. This argument shows that geopolitics is important for
the strategic goals of Western-oriented foreign policy, which is mainly influenced
by the interactions between the oil development process and regional conflicts. In
addition, in comparison, for example, to Kazakhstan’s multi-vertical foreign policy, the combination of security threats in the early years of Azerbaijan’s independence and a historical milestone known as “Black June” influenced the
pro-independence and anti-Russian sentiment among Azeris and influenced its
national identity, in determining the Western orientation in Azerbaijani foreign
policy (Ipek 2009:238–239).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region