50
to use most of its ports. Novorossiysk on the Black Sea is probably the most accessible port for Russia, but even this port remains closed to tankers many times a year
due to weather conditions. Use of this port also means Russia is reliant on access to
the Bosphorus Straits, yet nonetheless, the country devotes much of its foreign and
energy policy to reliance on transit states (Shaffer 2009:112). As Paul Kubicek
states, the country’s pipeline politics remain informally related to the underlying
issues of the geopolitical situation in the region (Kubicek 2004:209). Russian energy
policy in the Caspian Sea, as well as comprehensive policy in the region, is indicative of a critical and salutary trend in Russia’s foreign policy in which pragmatists
trump those who pine for the glory of a restored empire (Kubicek 2004:209).
In 2005, Putin proposed transforming Russia into an “energy super-state” centered on energy-focused policies in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. The country’s
hegemonic ambitions regarding regional energy transit and energy infrastructure
have raised questions of Russia having prevented the construction of the TransCaspian Pipeline and pipelines to transit oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to
foreign markets. Attempts at outsourcing have thus been successfully rescinded,
and by 2008, Russia managed to ensure its pipelines were the main ones being used,
with the Trans-Caspian Pipeline being shelved for the foreseeable future (Kazantsev
2008:1085–1086).
Andrei Kazantsev believes that the two main reasons for this achievement on
Russia’s part were firstly, that the coalition against terrorism seriously weakened
Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the region in 2001–2003, and secondly, US support
for “colour revolutions” alienated regional political classes while Russia showed
loyalty to these elites (Kazantsev 2008:1085–1086).
In his works where he addresses Russia’s New Caspian policy since 2000,
Douglas Blum explains his observations of Russia in the current period (Blum
2000:5). Accordingly,
• The new Caspian policy that Russia assumed has significantly established novel
and revitalized targets to become winners in the high-stakes competition for
energy agreements and advantageous transportation routes. Moscow’s skillfully
formed policy is likely to obtain revenue, leading to reinforced connections with
Kazakhstan and perhaps a more friendly relationship with Azerbaijan.
• Russia is bound to gain at least a large share of the crucial energy transit projects
currently on the agenda. In the course of achieving this share, she could certainly
succeed in derailing either or both the TCP and Baku-Ceyhan. However, should
there be such an outcome, this ought to be linked not to the destructive machinations of Russia, but to a combination of strong diplomatic initiatives, geographic
and infrastructural advantages, existing geopolitical realities, and the economics
of the international energy market.
• Russia’s attempts to reconstruct itself as a formidable competitor in this area will
not necessarily put America’s interests at risk. On the contrary, when Russia is
more effectively integrated and has displayed a more business-like approach, she
will provide the US companies with numerous opportunities to function in the
Caspian area. Furthermore, she will probably be more predictable in making use
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
to use most of its ports. Novorossiysk on the Black Sea is probably the most accessible port for Russia, but even this port remains closed to tankers many times a year
due to weather conditions. Use of this port also means Russia is reliant on access to
the Bosphorus Straits, yet nonetheless, the country devotes much of its foreign and
energy policy to reliance on transit states (Shaffer 2009:112). As Paul Kubicek
states, the country’s pipeline politics remain informally related to the underlying
issues of the geopolitical situation in the region (Kubicek 2004:209). Russian energy
policy in the Caspian Sea, as well as comprehensive policy in the region, is indicative of a critical and salutary trend in Russia’s foreign policy in which pragmatists
trump those who pine for the glory of a restored empire (Kubicek 2004:209).
In 2005, Putin proposed transforming Russia into an “energy super-state” centered on energy-focused policies in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. The country’s
hegemonic ambitions regarding regional energy transit and energy infrastructure
have raised questions of Russia having prevented the construction of the TransCaspian Pipeline and pipelines to transit oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to
foreign markets. Attempts at outsourcing have thus been successfully rescinded,
and by 2008, Russia managed to ensure its pipelines were the main ones being used,
with the Trans-Caspian Pipeline being shelved for the foreseeable future (Kazantsev
2008:1085–1086).
Andrei Kazantsev believes that the two main reasons for this achievement on
Russia’s part were firstly, that the coalition against terrorism seriously weakened
Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the region in 2001–2003, and secondly, US support
for “colour revolutions” alienated regional political classes while Russia showed
loyalty to these elites (Kazantsev 2008:1085–1086).
In his works where he addresses Russia’s New Caspian policy since 2000,
Douglas Blum explains his observations of Russia in the current period (Blum
2000:5). Accordingly,
• The new Caspian policy that Russia assumed has significantly established novel
and revitalized targets to become winners in the high-stakes competition for
energy agreements and advantageous transportation routes. Moscow’s skillfully
formed policy is likely to obtain revenue, leading to reinforced connections with
Kazakhstan and perhaps a more friendly relationship with Azerbaijan.
• Russia is bound to gain at least a large share of the crucial energy transit projects
currently on the agenda. In the course of achieving this share, she could certainly
succeed in derailing either or both the TCP and Baku-Ceyhan. However, should
there be such an outcome, this ought to be linked not to the destructive machinations of Russia, but to a combination of strong diplomatic initiatives, geographic
and infrastructural advantages, existing geopolitical realities, and the economics
of the international energy market.
• Russia’s attempts to reconstruct itself as a formidable competitor in this area will
not necessarily put America’s interests at risk. On the contrary, when Russia is
more effectively integrated and has displayed a more business-like approach, she
will provide the US companies with numerous opportunities to function in the
Caspian area. Furthermore, she will probably be more predictable in making use
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region