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post-Cold War era, conflicts over resources would become a typical feature of international security crises. He posits that of the US’ objectives since the end of the
Cold War, “none has so profoundly influenced US military policy as the determination
to ensure American access to overseas supplies of vital resources (Klare 2002:81–92),
and none of these natural resources is more likely to aggravate conflict in the twentyfirst century oil” (Klare 2002:81–92).
The US’ presence in the region increased to a considerable extent, and this
harmed the positions of Russia and China, the two most populated foreign policy
agencies of the former era. Moscow is no longer able to protect the interests of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in her relations with Washington. Moreover,
Russia’s presence in the Middle East is rapidly diminishing. Today, it is possible for
Astana to establish an independent relationship with Washington without looking at
Moscow over her shoulder. This points to a serious geopolitical change in the local
power balances: the US is trying to establish complete dominance in the Caspian
region (Aydin 2005:409).
According to Tuncay Babali, the geographical features of the Caspian Basin
force a high degree of dependence on producer countries, as the question of how to
transit energy immediately brings one at loggerheads with the ambitions of surrounding nations. The conflict between Russia, Turkey, and Iran over the Caspian
Basin’s hydrocarbon resources and the location of an oil and gas export pipeline is
a complex one. It involves not only the three rivals’ efforts to outshine one another
but also the calculations of the region’s Turkic states regarding how best to facilitate
the economic benefits of their mineral resources without antagonizing either Turkey,
Russia, or Iran, and without becoming dependent on anyone. Dependence on only
one country could make Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, or Turkmenistan hostage to the
goodwill of the former. Western counter moves, in turn, demonstrate that beyond the
region, demand for diversity in oil and gas sources is strong, with the EU and other
actors working hard to balance in-take from the Gulf, Siberia, and the Caspian Sea.
In terms of low risk, low priced resources, attainable upon good terms, the Caspian
Basin has much to offer so long as circumstance allows it (Babali 2006:223–224).
As the world’s number one energy consumer, the US pays much attention to
energy security; a key pillar in US foreign policy. As David Bernell and Christopher
A. Simon point out, the quest for energy security does not conflict too greatly with
other major goals of American policy, such as national security, however the 1973
OPEC oil embargo thrust concerns over US energy supplies into a major number of
domestic and foreign policy discourses. With regard to foreign policy, this is first
and foremost evident in the massive military presence that the US has maintained in
the Middle East. The logic behind this is in itself, incorporates domestic economic
concerns: without ready access to continuous supplies of reasonably priced energy
resources, much of the developed world would rapidly fall behind in terms of commercial activity, economic dynamism, and overall quality of daily life (Bernell and
Simon 2016:30–197).
The US has long supplied arms and military training to Arab Countries in the
Persian Gulf area, and by 1990 the US had to extend such aid to prospective partners
in the Caspian Basin. Russia, meanwhile, continues to supply arms to the former
2 Literature Review
post-Cold War era, conflicts over resources would become a typical feature of international security crises. He posits that of the US’ objectives since the end of the
Cold War, “none has so profoundly influenced US military policy as the determination
to ensure American access to overseas supplies of vital resources (Klare 2002:81–92),
and none of these natural resources is more likely to aggravate conflict in the twentyfirst century oil” (Klare 2002:81–92).
The US’ presence in the region increased to a considerable extent, and this
harmed the positions of Russia and China, the two most populated foreign policy
agencies of the former era. Moscow is no longer able to protect the interests of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in her relations with Washington. Moreover,
Russia’s presence in the Middle East is rapidly diminishing. Today, it is possible for
Astana to establish an independent relationship with Washington without looking at
Moscow over her shoulder. This points to a serious geopolitical change in the local
power balances: the US is trying to establish complete dominance in the Caspian
region (Aydin 2005:409).
According to Tuncay Babali, the geographical features of the Caspian Basin
force a high degree of dependence on producer countries, as the question of how to
transit energy immediately brings one at loggerheads with the ambitions of surrounding nations. The conflict between Russia, Turkey, and Iran over the Caspian
Basin’s hydrocarbon resources and the location of an oil and gas export pipeline is
a complex one. It involves not only the three rivals’ efforts to outshine one another
but also the calculations of the region’s Turkic states regarding how best to facilitate
the economic benefits of their mineral resources without antagonizing either Turkey,
Russia, or Iran, and without becoming dependent on anyone. Dependence on only
one country could make Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, or Turkmenistan hostage to the
goodwill of the former. Western counter moves, in turn, demonstrate that beyond the
region, demand for diversity in oil and gas sources is strong, with the EU and other
actors working hard to balance in-take from the Gulf, Siberia, and the Caspian Sea.
In terms of low risk, low priced resources, attainable upon good terms, the Caspian
Basin has much to offer so long as circumstance allows it (Babali 2006:223–224).
As the world’s number one energy consumer, the US pays much attention to
energy security; a key pillar in US foreign policy. As David Bernell and Christopher
A. Simon point out, the quest for energy security does not conflict too greatly with
other major goals of American policy, such as national security, however the 1973
OPEC oil embargo thrust concerns over US energy supplies into a major number of
domestic and foreign policy discourses. With regard to foreign policy, this is first
and foremost evident in the massive military presence that the US has maintained in
the Middle East. The logic behind this is in itself, incorporates domestic economic
concerns: without ready access to continuous supplies of reasonably priced energy
resources, much of the developed world would rapidly fall behind in terms of commercial activity, economic dynamism, and overall quality of daily life (Bernell and
Simon 2016:30–197).
The US has long supplied arms and military training to Arab Countries in the
Persian Gulf area, and by 1990 the US had to extend such aid to prospective partners
in the Caspian Basin. Russia, meanwhile, continues to supply arms to the former
2 Literature Review