17
impact on central Asia and Caucasus in line with NATO goals. The US also found a
lever in the form of the EU energy diversification drive aimed at reducing dependency on Russian oil and gas, having the added bonus effect of isolating the Russian
economy as a political and military rival at regional and global levels. This policy,
it was hoped, would expand the influence of the US in Central Asia and Caucasus;
strengthen the economy of those countries (located between Russia and Iran) as oil
and gas producers; and reduce the political and economic influence of both countries in Caspian Sea region (Author’s interview with Javad Amin Mansour 2016).
The Bush Administration’s focus toward Central Asia and the Caucasus became
overwhelmingly oriented to security concerns in the years following the September
11, 2001, dated al-Qaeda attacks to the United States. Even energy matters took a relative back seat. The Obama Administration rightly recalibrated US policy to focus on
broader overall engagement on a broad spectrum of political, security, and economic
issues, as well as other matters. Regarding Russia, the Obama Administration’s socalled reset policy aimed to move past a range of tensions that developed in the mid2000s, but ultimately proved unable to sustain the kinds of developments in Russia
and in the relationships between Moscow and its neighboring countries that would
make a positive relationship achievable (Author’s Ambassador Ross Wilson 2016).
With the declaration of independence of former USSR countries, America’s
main interest was geopolitical in nature. The utterance of Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Jimmy Carter’s National Security Adviser, reflect as much in frank terms: “The
[Caspian’s] strategic importance has existed from the beginning; it is not just about
oil.” Furthermore, the US’ interests were presented as strategic or vital interests,
despite generally being referred to as merely “important” given not every incident
in the region directly affects US interests. However, when there is an active struggle
between greater powers in the region, strategic interests can rise to the forefront—
especially when such developments move into the realm of the transnational (such
as the rise of political, ethnic developments, and religious movements) or when
political stability weakens. In addition, as the number of actors in this geography
has increased, with power shifting to and for at various periods, the US has needed
to define and redefine its interests (Gurpinar and Kesici 2005:167–190). Indeed,
many of what were initially formulated as “important interests” to the US, seem to
have been the product of successful pressure group campaigns and tactical support
of members of congress (e.g., such as the case of the Armenian lobby in the
Karabakh dispute). Interests as defined by these groups thus generally revolve
around specific issues of ethnic minority rights, the environment, human rights,
democratic reform, and religious freedom (Gurpinar and Kesici 2005:167–190).
There are also several elements beyond interests which define US policy of the
region, which can be surmised as (1) matters pertaining to external environment and
(2) those pertaining to internal structure. In this context, the former refers to the influence of neighboring powers in the area, namely China, Iran, and Russia, all of which
have been or remain potential rivals to the United States and whose systems are different from the US and have been deeply influenced by US policies. Anxieties arising
from such differences have contributed to bringing about the active engagement of
these countries in the area intentionally from the view of the United States. As a matter
US Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region
impact on central Asia and Caucasus in line with NATO goals. The US also found a
lever in the form of the EU energy diversification drive aimed at reducing dependency on Russian oil and gas, having the added bonus effect of isolating the Russian
economy as a political and military rival at regional and global levels. This policy,
it was hoped, would expand the influence of the US in Central Asia and Caucasus;
strengthen the economy of those countries (located between Russia and Iran) as oil
and gas producers; and reduce the political and economic influence of both countries in Caspian Sea region (Author’s interview with Javad Amin Mansour 2016).
The Bush Administration’s focus toward Central Asia and the Caucasus became
overwhelmingly oriented to security concerns in the years following the September
11, 2001, dated al-Qaeda attacks to the United States. Even energy matters took a relative back seat. The Obama Administration rightly recalibrated US policy to focus on
broader overall engagement on a broad spectrum of political, security, and economic
issues, as well as other matters. Regarding Russia, the Obama Administration’s socalled reset policy aimed to move past a range of tensions that developed in the mid2000s, but ultimately proved unable to sustain the kinds of developments in Russia
and in the relationships between Moscow and its neighboring countries that would
make a positive relationship achievable (Author’s Ambassador Ross Wilson 2016).
With the declaration of independence of former USSR countries, America’s
main interest was geopolitical in nature. The utterance of Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Jimmy Carter’s National Security Adviser, reflect as much in frank terms: “The
[Caspian’s] strategic importance has existed from the beginning; it is not just about
oil.” Furthermore, the US’ interests were presented as strategic or vital interests,
despite generally being referred to as merely “important” given not every incident
in the region directly affects US interests. However, when there is an active struggle
between greater powers in the region, strategic interests can rise to the forefront—
especially when such developments move into the realm of the transnational (such
as the rise of political, ethnic developments, and religious movements) or when
political stability weakens. In addition, as the number of actors in this geography
has increased, with power shifting to and for at various periods, the US has needed
to define and redefine its interests (Gurpinar and Kesici 2005:167–190). Indeed,
many of what were initially formulated as “important interests” to the US, seem to
have been the product of successful pressure group campaigns and tactical support
of members of congress (e.g., such as the case of the Armenian lobby in the
Karabakh dispute). Interests as defined by these groups thus generally revolve
around specific issues of ethnic minority rights, the environment, human rights,
democratic reform, and religious freedom (Gurpinar and Kesici 2005:167–190).
There are also several elements beyond interests which define US policy of the
region, which can be surmised as (1) matters pertaining to external environment and
(2) those pertaining to internal structure. In this context, the former refers to the influence of neighboring powers in the area, namely China, Iran, and Russia, all of which
have been or remain potential rivals to the United States and whose systems are different from the US and have been deeply influenced by US policies. Anxieties arising
from such differences have contributed to bringing about the active engagement of
these countries in the area intentionally from the view of the United States. As a matter
US Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region