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The American government’s interest in East Asia would inevitably harm other
regional priorities. Owing to the governmental financial crisis, the deductions in the
American defense budget required the US to keep small armies in many of the
regions. Among other regions, it was Russia where the US sought shelter regarding
its foreign policy. In the 20 years after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, its
armed forces shrank by approximately 75%, and the widespread corruption in
Russia’s defense industry demoralized the remaining soldiers and their military
officers.
The world’s second-biggest nuclear Armory, which was essentially the primary
value that Kremlin possessed in the Cold War, was of little importance in daily foreign policy. Among these problems, the problem of “a seemingly never-ending
death rate crisis” was experienced by Russia due to deteriorating health conditions
and increased death rates. Meanwhile, an economic production with a value of 2.2
trillion American dollars was pale by comparison with the US’s recorded 14.7 trillion American dollars. Unlike China, Russia could not be considered an equivalent
rival for the US (Zihnioğlu 2016:366).
US Caspian Policy Under the Bush Era
By 2001, when Bush took office, the administration’s immediate focus rested heavily on oil. At the time, the US was faced with an increase in energy demand and thus
it was deemed necessary to embark on a massive diversification drive. However,
once the War on Terror entered full swing, the US not only paid more attention to
the Central Asian region as a potential market supplier but as a logistical springboard from which to send troops and equipment to the front line in Afghanistan.
It was not just practical necessity vis-à-vis the war in Afghanistan, but US policymakers’ unwavering determination to uphold enmity with Iran, forcing it out of
projects such as Nabucco (Author’s interview with Feridoon Barkeshli 2016), and
its protectionist desire to break the Russian monopoly in its traditional sphere which
resulted in an even more enthusiastic seizure upon the region as a potential hub of
future oil relations and economic independence for its European allies.
President Bush had a grand geopolitical approach toward the greater Middle East
in which Central Asia and the Caucasus were at least marginally included. However,
Washington’s involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq deepened in such a way that the
Caspian region was virtually excluded from US focus. The consequences of such a
focus persisted throughout the Obama era, with attempts by the president to disentangle the US’ direct military involvement taking the limelight. In any case,
Moscow’s omnipotent presence effectively limited the extent to which American
overtures could succeed. In fact, when President Obama arrived at the White House,
the limits of US strength as a dominant world political and military power had
already been demonstrated in a host of issues, not least their inability to intervene in
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 (Author’s interview with Feridoon
Barkeshli 2016).
US Caspian Policy Under the Bush Era
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