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powerful storms, and crop failures. “It’s important that the Biden plan is technology
neutral, so communities can pick their path to zero emissions.” The answer is an
unequivocal yes. “Getting to zero carbon for the power sector by 2035 is ambitious,
it’s difficult, but it’s achievable with policy support” (www.newsbreak.com 2020).
The Clean Power Plan, initiated by Obama, enforced the first rules regarding
carbon emissions on a nationwide scale. Via this plan, each state was prescribed
emissions goals and was provided with numerous actions to choose from in reducing climate pollution—the ultimate goal was to reduce the nation’s carbon emissions by 32%, i.e., below 2005 levels. On the other hand, Trump’s plan allows states
not to establish their own new rules so long as they provide a justification for the
reason why they feel it is unnecessary to do so. Hence, there is the likelihood that
some states that oppose Obama’s plan could choose not to go with this plan (insideclimatenews.org 2020).
Covid-19 and US LNG Exports
The United States is a long-term advocate of diversifying Europe’s gas supplies.
Efforts in this direction have not always been smooth and there have been conflicts
with some European countries, particularly when the US employs sanctions to
block projects in which European companies are engaged. Energy supply has the
potential to become a cause of friction. Strong support in Congress to block Nord
Stream 2 is a pertinent example of such discomfort. As the US is currently trying to
export LNG to the European market, suspicions around the motivations of
Washington may arise. It becomes a question of financial interests versus geopolitical stability in the region. Should financial interests be seen as more dominant, it
may hurt an already delicate alliance between Europe and the United States (U.S. LNG
into Europe after the Trump-Juncker Agreement https://www.csis.org/analysis/uslng-europe-after-trump-juncker-agreement 2018). For the United States, the key
questions are: Is US LNG competitive in the world market? Will companies want to
invest in US LNG projects? And will buyers consider the United States an attractive
source for gas, or will prices and politics preclude potential buyers from entering the
US market? For Europe, the question is: Is there sufficient infrastructure and an
efficient market where gas can be sourced at the lowest available price? These are
the important considerations; not how much US LNG is entering Europe in one day
or the next (U.S. LNG into Europe after the Trump-Juncker Agreement https://
www.csis.org/analysis/us-lng-europe-after-trump-juncker-agreement 2018).
Trump’s continued pushing of his America-First policy, and other states’ protection of their own citizens during the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the deterioration in transatlantic relations. In the past few years, European and American
governments have attempted to ease trade tensions and disagreements over the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline with promises of increased LNG imports. Even without the curOil Price War
powerful storms, and crop failures. “It’s important that the Biden plan is technology
neutral, so communities can pick their path to zero emissions.” The answer is an
unequivocal yes. “Getting to zero carbon for the power sector by 2035 is ambitious,
it’s difficult, but it’s achievable with policy support” (www.newsbreak.com 2020).
The Clean Power Plan, initiated by Obama, enforced the first rules regarding
carbon emissions on a nationwide scale. Via this plan, each state was prescribed
emissions goals and was provided with numerous actions to choose from in reducing climate pollution—the ultimate goal was to reduce the nation’s carbon emissions by 32%, i.e., below 2005 levels. On the other hand, Trump’s plan allows states
not to establish their own new rules so long as they provide a justification for the
reason why they feel it is unnecessary to do so. Hence, there is the likelihood that
some states that oppose Obama’s plan could choose not to go with this plan (insideclimatenews.org 2020).
Covid-19 and US LNG Exports
The United States is a long-term advocate of diversifying Europe’s gas supplies.
Efforts in this direction have not always been smooth and there have been conflicts
with some European countries, particularly when the US employs sanctions to
block projects in which European companies are engaged. Energy supply has the
potential to become a cause of friction. Strong support in Congress to block Nord
Stream 2 is a pertinent example of such discomfort. As the US is currently trying to
export LNG to the European market, suspicions around the motivations of
Washington may arise. It becomes a question of financial interests versus geopolitical stability in the region. Should financial interests be seen as more dominant, it
may hurt an already delicate alliance between Europe and the United States (U.S. LNG
into Europe after the Trump-Juncker Agreement https://www.csis.org/analysis/uslng-europe-after-trump-juncker-agreement 2018). For the United States, the key
questions are: Is US LNG competitive in the world market? Will companies want to
invest in US LNG projects? And will buyers consider the United States an attractive
source for gas, or will prices and politics preclude potential buyers from entering the
US market? For Europe, the question is: Is there sufficient infrastructure and an
efficient market where gas can be sourced at the lowest available price? These are
the important considerations; not how much US LNG is entering Europe in one day
or the next (U.S. LNG into Europe after the Trump-Juncker Agreement https://
www.csis.org/analysis/us-lng-europe-after-trump-juncker-agreement 2018).
Trump’s continued pushing of his America-First policy, and other states’ protection of their own citizens during the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the deterioration in transatlantic relations. In the past few years, European and American
governments have attempted to ease trade tensions and disagreements over the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline with promises of increased LNG imports. Even without the curOil Price War