207
balance any efforts to reassure regional partners. To this end, Washington would
have to move away from its abolitionist approach toward Iran’s policies, which
would prevent Iran from coming to the table. The US needs to balance any efforts to
calm regional partners with a process that manages topics that could include Iran
and other international actors. Iran is skeptical of the US administration. Following
the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, a maximum pressure campaign, and the killing
of Qassim Soleimani, the country is hesitant to engage with the Trump administration. Iran officials may be willing to work on a deal in which it will reduce nuclear
program in return for the lifting of the sanctions. However, if Trump wishes to pursue a “more for more,” agreement talks may stall as there is little trust there (www.
cnas.org 2020). At the launch of a railway project near Tehran on December 31,
2019, President Hassan Rohani said, “Iran would have earned $200 billion surplus
income…if the country were not involved in an economic war” (www.aa.com.
tr 2020).
After abandoning the 2015 nuclear deal, the United States imposed new sanctions against Iran. The deal had seen Iran receive sanctions relief in exchange for
curbing its controversial nuclear program. Since the United States walked away
from the deal in 2018, Iran has lost 90% of its oil exports, a key source of revenue.
Inflation has surpassed 40%, and the Iranian rial has plummeted. President Rohani
also queried arguments made by hardline conservative critics and by those who say
that the sanctions have not had any impact on Iran. “What should we do? When
there is no food and water, you are still in danger no matter how strong you are,” he
said. Rohani’s comments came just weeks after millions of Iranians protested economic hardships, financial mismanagement, discrimination, and inequality, following a gas price hike in November 2019 (oilprice.com 2020a, b, c, d).
Another of Trump’s goals is to prevent investment in Iranian gas, its production,
and export to Europe. Because the European gas market is important for the life of
US gas exports, energy supply is one of the vital issues for European countries.
Energy is an essential material for these countries, which not only sustains their
economy and industry, but also the well-being of their citizens (www.irna.ir 2020a,
b). However, achieving these goals is not easy because the decision to dry out Iran’s
oil revenues could harm the interests of Iran’s major crude oil importers. Because
they have been barred from buying Iranian oil based on a decision contrary to trade
freedom and WTO rules, those countries say Trump administration officials must
choose between importing Iranian oil or trading with the United States, not both
(www.irna.ir 2020a, b).
Even before the coronavirus pandemic erupted, Iran’s oil exports were declining
because of secondary US sanctions. Global oversupply amid a drastic drop in consumer demand, caused by the virus and its economic effects, will likely continue to
depress Iranian exports for months to come. Prior to the US withdrawal from the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA) in May 2018, Iran was selling 2.5
million barrels of oil a day, primarily, to customers in Asia. Among the countries
purchasing Iranian oil was India (in addition to China)—one of the world’s two
largest energy consumers (www.atlanticcouncil.org 2020a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i)
(Fig. 6.2).
US Maximum Pressure Campaign
balance any efforts to reassure regional partners. To this end, Washington would
have to move away from its abolitionist approach toward Iran’s policies, which
would prevent Iran from coming to the table. The US needs to balance any efforts to
calm regional partners with a process that manages topics that could include Iran
and other international actors. Iran is skeptical of the US administration. Following
the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, a maximum pressure campaign, and the killing
of Qassim Soleimani, the country is hesitant to engage with the Trump administration. Iran officials may be willing to work on a deal in which it will reduce nuclear
program in return for the lifting of the sanctions. However, if Trump wishes to pursue a “more for more,” agreement talks may stall as there is little trust there (www.
cnas.org 2020). At the launch of a railway project near Tehran on December 31,
2019, President Hassan Rohani said, “Iran would have earned $200 billion surplus
income…if the country were not involved in an economic war” (www.aa.com.
tr 2020).
After abandoning the 2015 nuclear deal, the United States imposed new sanctions against Iran. The deal had seen Iran receive sanctions relief in exchange for
curbing its controversial nuclear program. Since the United States walked away
from the deal in 2018, Iran has lost 90% of its oil exports, a key source of revenue.
Inflation has surpassed 40%, and the Iranian rial has plummeted. President Rohani
also queried arguments made by hardline conservative critics and by those who say
that the sanctions have not had any impact on Iran. “What should we do? When
there is no food and water, you are still in danger no matter how strong you are,” he
said. Rohani’s comments came just weeks after millions of Iranians protested economic hardships, financial mismanagement, discrimination, and inequality, following a gas price hike in November 2019 (oilprice.com 2020a, b, c, d).
Another of Trump’s goals is to prevent investment in Iranian gas, its production,
and export to Europe. Because the European gas market is important for the life of
US gas exports, energy supply is one of the vital issues for European countries.
Energy is an essential material for these countries, which not only sustains their
economy and industry, but also the well-being of their citizens (www.irna.ir 2020a,
b). However, achieving these goals is not easy because the decision to dry out Iran’s
oil revenues could harm the interests of Iran’s major crude oil importers. Because
they have been barred from buying Iranian oil based on a decision contrary to trade
freedom and WTO rules, those countries say Trump administration officials must
choose between importing Iranian oil or trading with the United States, not both
(www.irna.ir 2020a, b).
Even before the coronavirus pandemic erupted, Iran’s oil exports were declining
because of secondary US sanctions. Global oversupply amid a drastic drop in consumer demand, caused by the virus and its economic effects, will likely continue to
depress Iranian exports for months to come. Prior to the US withdrawal from the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA) in May 2018, Iran was selling 2.5
million barrels of oil a day, primarily, to customers in Asia. Among the countries
purchasing Iranian oil was India (in addition to China)—one of the world’s two
largest energy consumers (www.atlanticcouncil.org 2020a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i)
(Fig. 6.2).
US Maximum Pressure Campaign