193
sure despite its being a Central Asian country, and all the Central Asian governments are expanding their links there. From this respect, the policy pursued by the
Trump Administration brings to mind the Clinton Administration’s favorable
approach toward Central Asia in the late 1990s. Trump’s policy seems to be founded
on realistic grounds regarding the political development of the region. In addition,
there seems to be a constructive and positive attitude, which enables Trump to work
“with” as opposed to “on” the governments in Central Asia, as indicated during his
hosting of the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 2018. Moreover, the
Administration’s policies demonstrate an appreciation of the region’s value relative
to great power politics. In fact, the Trump Administration’s interest in Central Asia
no doubt rests with its identification, in the National Defense Strategy and National
Security Strategy, of great power competition as the key challenge to US global
interests (thediplomat.com 2020a, b).
US Foreign Policy and Euro-Caspian Energy Security
In the year 2019, President Donald Trump corresponded with the presidents of both
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, in the months March and May, respectively. While he
expressed his wish, in his correspondence with Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, that
Turkmenistan would soon export gas to the West, Trump wrote to Aliyev to express
his appreciation for Azerbaijan’s cooperative relationship with the US in diversifying energy routes and sources in Europe. Subsequently—in December 2019—
Trump signed the “Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020.” This included
the legislation titled “European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019,”
according to which Azerbaijan would import gas from Turkmenistan to meet the
needs of its rapidly developing petrochemical industry. However, Azerbaijan needed
the support of the US against a probable countermovement from Moscow. Currently,
the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea is in force. Hence, the EU is
now able to import substantial volumes of Turkmen gas or blue hydrogen produced
from this gas. Turkmenistan has been insistent on the full oil pipeline since it
strongly believed that alternative smaller-sized platforms would not be a solution
even if various commitments were made. Turkmenistan would accept the opportunity to export to Europe; however, this would only be realized via a shore-to-shore
pipeline with its onshore pipeline system connected to it, and the shut-in wells in the
eastern part of the country to Azerbaijan’s onshore system (atlanticcouncil.org
2020a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i).
On the other hand, the energy security policy of Georgia has been scrutinized by
the members of the American Congress, who specifically criticized Georgia for not
abiding by their promises of maintaining a level political arena and an independent
judiciary. Georgia has an advantageous location and a free trade agreement with the
EU, yet it does not make maximum use of these conveniences. It has been 30 years
since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, yet Georgia is still importing electricity
from and is highly dependent on Russia economically. It is quite evident that such
trade transactions in the energy field enable Russia to cause political corruption as
US Foreign Policy and Euro-Caspian Energy Security
Précédent

- 209/295

Suivant