156
occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave has often been a cause for negative
perceptions of the US in Azerbaijani public opinion, with implications on American
economic, political, and security issues. This cynicalism feeds into the perception
that the 2001 amendment was merely drafted to capitalize on tensions between
Azerbaijan and Iran that year over the legal status of the Caspian (www.newtimes.
az 2016).
Jim Bridenstine is a State Representative framed his support for the amendment
as a means of allowing for a greater relationship with Azerbaijan and allowing for
more robust energy diplomacy.
…Protecting Azerbaijan’s energy renaissance supports the foundational US foreign policy
objectives of ensuring our allies’ political independence and free markets… While
Azerbaijan and America see energy as the means to generate prosperity and security, other
countries take a darker view. With few other sources of power, Russia uses energy as a
weapon to intimidate and coerce. Many of our NATO allies rely heavily on Russian oil and
gas. This dependency provides Moscow with license to meddle in the internal affairs and
foreign policies of many countries, particularly our newest NATO allies in Eastern Europe.
In January 2009, for example, Russia halted gas exports to Ukraine in the dead of winter,
and people suffered. (www.washingtontimes.com 2015)
The Obama administration however cut the funds which were released by this
amendment to promote democracy in the region. Ironically, this affected US relations with more kleptocratic regimes in the region (www.foreignpolicy.com 2014).
But Bush administration never cuts the budget for democracy promotion. It seems
that during the Obama administration cutting off budget for democracy promotion
affected US–Azerbaijan relations. For Edward C. Chow, “Senior Fellow of the
Energy and National Security Program at Center for Strategic and International
Studies,” the Obama White House never gave full consideration to the possible benefits of Caspian Basin energy diplomacy, especially when compared to the efforts of
the Clinton and Bush administrations. Speaking from first-hand experience, Chow
states (Author’s interview with Ed Chow 2016):
When I worked at Chevron in 1990, we needed the Treasury to help us relate to Caspian
energy. It was easy to get their attention, because they knew that the White House paid
attention to it. If as a department, you thought the White House was not interested in something, how active would you be? The State Department was very active on Caspian energy.
You cannot move policy from Bureau of Energy Resources [where the mandate for Central
Asian diplomacy was shifted]. It is impossible to do that. During the Bush Administration,
the National Security Council, the Vice Present, and the Oval Office were all interested; but
you just couldn’t see such activity during the Obama era.
Responding to such accusations at the time, George A. Krol, Deputy Assistant of
the Secretary of State insisted that the Obama Administration had not revised its
view of the Caspian as a “forgotten backwater, peripheral to US interests” and stated
that the region was “at the fulcrum of key US security, economic and political interests” (Bluth 2014:209). However, Brenda Shaffer joins critics in opining that the
Obama administration showed significantly less attention to the region, stating;
With the exception of the issue of military bases and over flight rights into Afghanistan and
promoting the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia, an additional sign of
5 US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration
occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave has often been a cause for negative
perceptions of the US in Azerbaijani public opinion, with implications on American
economic, political, and security issues. This cynicalism feeds into the perception
that the 2001 amendment was merely drafted to capitalize on tensions between
Azerbaijan and Iran that year over the legal status of the Caspian (www.newtimes.
az 2016).
Jim Bridenstine is a State Representative framed his support for the amendment
as a means of allowing for a greater relationship with Azerbaijan and allowing for
more robust energy diplomacy.
…Protecting Azerbaijan’s energy renaissance supports the foundational US foreign policy
objectives of ensuring our allies’ political independence and free markets… While
Azerbaijan and America see energy as the means to generate prosperity and security, other
countries take a darker view. With few other sources of power, Russia uses energy as a
weapon to intimidate and coerce. Many of our NATO allies rely heavily on Russian oil and
gas. This dependency provides Moscow with license to meddle in the internal affairs and
foreign policies of many countries, particularly our newest NATO allies in Eastern Europe.
In January 2009, for example, Russia halted gas exports to Ukraine in the dead of winter,
and people suffered. (www.washingtontimes.com 2015)
The Obama administration however cut the funds which were released by this
amendment to promote democracy in the region. Ironically, this affected US relations with more kleptocratic regimes in the region (www.foreignpolicy.com 2014).
But Bush administration never cuts the budget for democracy promotion. It seems
that during the Obama administration cutting off budget for democracy promotion
affected US–Azerbaijan relations. For Edward C. Chow, “Senior Fellow of the
Energy and National Security Program at Center for Strategic and International
Studies,” the Obama White House never gave full consideration to the possible benefits of Caspian Basin energy diplomacy, especially when compared to the efforts of
the Clinton and Bush administrations. Speaking from first-hand experience, Chow
states (Author’s interview with Ed Chow 2016):
When I worked at Chevron in 1990, we needed the Treasury to help us relate to Caspian
energy. It was easy to get their attention, because they knew that the White House paid
attention to it. If as a department, you thought the White House was not interested in something, how active would you be? The State Department was very active on Caspian energy.
You cannot move policy from Bureau of Energy Resources [where the mandate for Central
Asian diplomacy was shifted]. It is impossible to do that. During the Bush Administration,
the National Security Council, the Vice Present, and the Oval Office were all interested; but
you just couldn’t see such activity during the Obama era.
Responding to such accusations at the time, George A. Krol, Deputy Assistant of
the Secretary of State insisted that the Obama Administration had not revised its
view of the Caspian as a “forgotten backwater, peripheral to US interests” and stated
that the region was “at the fulcrum of key US security, economic and political interests” (Bluth 2014:209). However, Brenda Shaffer joins critics in opining that the
Obama administration showed significantly less attention to the region, stating;
With the exception of the issue of military bases and over flight rights into Afghanistan and
promoting the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia, an additional sign of
5 US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration