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2. Develop a long-term policy in the region and foster relations with Europe on
shared policies. Commercial alignment and government cooperation are necessary to endure the construction of new pipelines.
3. Convince regional governments that the US is looking to commit long-term
within the region. Sponsorship of projects by private oil and gas enterprises in
the region should be extended and involved to work on developing routes connecting to the West.
4. As transit through Baku is the only way to avoid crossing Russia, Nabucco must
be given priority by Western states. Nabucco is unfortunately challenged by the
security situation in the Caucasus and must seek to align the political and commercial necessities of the region to be successful.
5. Russia’s interests in the region cannot be underestimated. Russia considers itself
to be a significant global power, despite having continued economic, social, and
institutional problems. In light of this, the US should look to objectives which
will enable countries in the area to avoid making a choice for or against Russia
and its aims.
6. Benefit from Western cultural influence; educational and cultural exchanges
along with high profile visits and media inclusion would facilitate vital components of soft power (www.brookings.edu 2016).
Bush aimed to secure US oil not only from the Middle East but also from around
the world in order to diversify the US’ supply, lessening dependence on the Persian
Gulf. One of the alternatives from Persian Gulf oil resources was Central Asia.
However, the West was faced with a number of setbacks on the TAP project due to
increased instability in Afghanistan (Mehdi 2012:178).
Although the US’ Eurasian strategy throughout the 1990s pertained to economic
cooperation, the Bush era marked the encouragement of political reforms and military links, attempting to achieve idealist goals through realist methods. However,
underpinning the drive for such idealist goals was an aggressiveness fueled by the
emphasis on enmities which legitimized strategic moves to shore up influence in the
Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and preserve supremacy in Southeast
Asia and the Pacific.
Post 9/11 US Foreign Policy in Central Asia
As the main transatlantic player on the chessboard that is Central Asia, the United
States has, to varying degrees since the fall of the USSR, attempted to take advantage of the vacuum of power subsequently created in the Central Asian and Caspian
region. Historically, America’s central role in Central Asia, as of the launching of
the Gorbachev program in the late 1980s, was to rebuild the economy, according to
which the main strategy of the Soviet Union was the economic and technological
development of the country through the attraction of foreign investments into the
Soviet system. This position gave space for American engagement in the conclusion
Post 9/11 US Foreign Policy in Central Asia
2. Develop a long-term policy in the region and foster relations with Europe on
shared policies. Commercial alignment and government cooperation are necessary to endure the construction of new pipelines.
3. Convince regional governments that the US is looking to commit long-term
within the region. Sponsorship of projects by private oil and gas enterprises in
the region should be extended and involved to work on developing routes connecting to the West.
4. As transit through Baku is the only way to avoid crossing Russia, Nabucco must
be given priority by Western states. Nabucco is unfortunately challenged by the
security situation in the Caucasus and must seek to align the political and commercial necessities of the region to be successful.
5. Russia’s interests in the region cannot be underestimated. Russia considers itself
to be a significant global power, despite having continued economic, social, and
institutional problems. In light of this, the US should look to objectives which
will enable countries in the area to avoid making a choice for or against Russia
and its aims.
6. Benefit from Western cultural influence; educational and cultural exchanges
along with high profile visits and media inclusion would facilitate vital components of soft power (www.brookings.edu 2016).
Bush aimed to secure US oil not only from the Middle East but also from around
the world in order to diversify the US’ supply, lessening dependence on the Persian
Gulf. One of the alternatives from Persian Gulf oil resources was Central Asia.
However, the West was faced with a number of setbacks on the TAP project due to
increased instability in Afghanistan (Mehdi 2012:178).
Although the US’ Eurasian strategy throughout the 1990s pertained to economic
cooperation, the Bush era marked the encouragement of political reforms and military links, attempting to achieve idealist goals through realist methods. However,
underpinning the drive for such idealist goals was an aggressiveness fueled by the
emphasis on enmities which legitimized strategic moves to shore up influence in the
Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and preserve supremacy in Southeast
Asia and the Pacific.
Post 9/11 US Foreign Policy in Central Asia
As the main transatlantic player on the chessboard that is Central Asia, the United
States has, to varying degrees since the fall of the USSR, attempted to take advantage of the vacuum of power subsequently created in the Central Asian and Caspian
region. Historically, America’s central role in Central Asia, as of the launching of
the Gorbachev program in the late 1980s, was to rebuild the economy, according to
which the main strategy of the Soviet Union was the economic and technological
development of the country through the attraction of foreign investments into the
Soviet system. This position gave space for American engagement in the conclusion
Post 9/11 US Foreign Policy in Central Asia