115
Little wonder then, that the project constituted the most important alternative to
the EU and the most lucrative option in terms of the “East-West Energy Corridor”
dream, potentially solving the issue of energy diversity and energy security in natural gas. If this dream had been realized, Turkey would have become both one of the
most important transit countries for the EU and a serious alternative to Russian
natural gas, upon which the continent relies on for over 60% of its energy needs
(www.uluslararasigundem.com 2016). In the joint declaration signed by parties to
the Nabucco Project Intergovernmental Agreement, it is was stated with an optimism which now may appear foolhardy, that parties would take all necessary steps
to conclude the project support agreement with Nabucco International Company
within 6 months (www.dunya.com 2016a, b).
The joint declaration was signed with great fanfare by Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Austrian Prime Minister Werner Faymann, Bulgarian Prime
Minister Sergei Stanishev, Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, Romanian
Prime Minister Emil Boc, and EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso.
Approximately 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas would be carried through the
pipeline per year, with this figure increasing to 31 billion cubic meters of natural gas
by 2020 as part of the grand Trans-European Energy Line. The Nabucco Project
benefited from EU funding for its feasibility and engineering studies. Responding to
the momentum, Azerbaijan developed the Shah Deniz 2 project and announced that
it would be able to supply 8–9 billion cubic meters of gas to the Nabucco line by
2016 despite no written commitment or agreement ever being made (Taheri and
Farahmand 2014:154).
Nabucco was widely understood as a European-American rescue package aimed
at circumventing the domination of Russian gas giants. A scholar claims that this
was quite clear to all observers while extending a cautious message to Iran: “With
strategic guidance from the United States, the Nabucco project has opened an old
wound in Russia-Western relations, though the parties deny it in their official statements. But the study of political economic events between the West and Russia in
the last decade, as well as the decision not to invite Iran to attend the Budapest
Summit, or the signing ceremony in Ankara, confirmed that the project was more
political than merely commercial and economic in its outlook. It seems that the
Nabucco project has been co-opted in the greater general containment strategy
towards Russia and Iran. Although the pipeline may work with gas from Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan in the early stages, in the long run it needs the contribution of Iran
and Russia to survive. According to available evidence, in the most optimistic scenario, by the year 2020, Nabucco’s Azerbaijani gas resources will be finished, leaving no reliable alternative sources other than Iran and Russia” (Taheri and Farahmand
2014:154).
The Nabucco Project is undoubtedly geared toward route and resource diversification, giving the EU and Turkey more advantages in terms of supply security than
the South Stream Project. At this point, 64.2% of the total natural gas used in the
European Union is imported, with many countries within the block, as well as
Turkey, being completely dependent on imported natural gas. Bulgaria’s imported
natural gas dependency rate is well above the EU average at 98.6%, but it is not
Regional Security and Economic Organization and Projects
Little wonder then, that the project constituted the most important alternative to
the EU and the most lucrative option in terms of the “East-West Energy Corridor”
dream, potentially solving the issue of energy diversity and energy security in natural gas. If this dream had been realized, Turkey would have become both one of the
most important transit countries for the EU and a serious alternative to Russian
natural gas, upon which the continent relies on for over 60% of its energy needs
(www.uluslararasigundem.com 2016). In the joint declaration signed by parties to
the Nabucco Project Intergovernmental Agreement, it is was stated with an optimism which now may appear foolhardy, that parties would take all necessary steps
to conclude the project support agreement with Nabucco International Company
within 6 months (www.dunya.com 2016a, b).
The joint declaration was signed with great fanfare by Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Austrian Prime Minister Werner Faymann, Bulgarian Prime
Minister Sergei Stanishev, Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, Romanian
Prime Minister Emil Boc, and EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso.
Approximately 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas would be carried through the
pipeline per year, with this figure increasing to 31 billion cubic meters of natural gas
by 2020 as part of the grand Trans-European Energy Line. The Nabucco Project
benefited from EU funding for its feasibility and engineering studies. Responding to
the momentum, Azerbaijan developed the Shah Deniz 2 project and announced that
it would be able to supply 8–9 billion cubic meters of gas to the Nabucco line by
2016 despite no written commitment or agreement ever being made (Taheri and
Farahmand 2014:154).
Nabucco was widely understood as a European-American rescue package aimed
at circumventing the domination of Russian gas giants. A scholar claims that this
was quite clear to all observers while extending a cautious message to Iran: “With
strategic guidance from the United States, the Nabucco project has opened an old
wound in Russia-Western relations, though the parties deny it in their official statements. But the study of political economic events between the West and Russia in
the last decade, as well as the decision not to invite Iran to attend the Budapest
Summit, or the signing ceremony in Ankara, confirmed that the project was more
political than merely commercial and economic in its outlook. It seems that the
Nabucco project has been co-opted in the greater general containment strategy
towards Russia and Iran. Although the pipeline may work with gas from Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan in the early stages, in the long run it needs the contribution of Iran
and Russia to survive. According to available evidence, in the most optimistic scenario, by the year 2020, Nabucco’s Azerbaijani gas resources will be finished, leaving no reliable alternative sources other than Iran and Russia” (Taheri and Farahmand
2014:154).
The Nabucco Project is undoubtedly geared toward route and resource diversification, giving the EU and Turkey more advantages in terms of supply security than
the South Stream Project. At this point, 64.2% of the total natural gas used in the
European Union is imported, with many countries within the block, as well as
Turkey, being completely dependent on imported natural gas. Bulgaria’s imported
natural gas dependency rate is well above the EU average at 98.6%, but it is not
Regional Security and Economic Organization and Projects