xv
the fore. Five options are available. These can be classed as the northern, western,
eastern, southeastern, and southern routes:
Northern Route: Kazakhstan-Russia-Russian Port
This line, known as the Russian Gas Pipeline in Kazakhstan, was built in 1970 and
remains active. The length of the pipeline is 1280 km, with a capacity of carrying 30
million tons of oil per year. The estimated value of a new route based on a renewed
version of this pipeline will cost $3.8–4.5 billion, beginning in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan and crossing Russia to the northern port of its Black Sea coast. Many
years have passed since the pipeline’s capacity began to erode, and it is likely that
another pipeline will be built on the abovementioned path. Currently, the old lines
in the former USSR are transported to the world markets of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. These pipelines, now known as the northern route, include:
1. Tangiz-Samara-Europe
2. Tengiz-Volgograd-Norveysk
3. Tengiz-Komsomolsk-Norvezysk
4. Baku-Groznyi-Norveseisk
Tangiz-Samara-Europe
The advantage of these routes, which extend through Dagestan and Chechnya along
the Caucasus Mountains to the Black Sea coast, is that they are shorter than others.
The length of the route from Chechnya is 1400 km; 200 km of the route has been
restored in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, this transfer plan seems to be failing due to
ill-repair along other parts of the route, with the required repairs estimated at $300
million. Furthermore, the pipelines are frequently attacked by Chechen separatists
and thus any suggestion of large-scale repair work is greeted with little enthusiasm
from regional partners. This route has not been seriously reconsidered since the
Caspian oil countries continue to depend on Russia politically and economically. In
return, Russian strategists clearly need to preserve Russia’s domination of the
energy sector in the “Commonwealth of Independent States” (CIS) and prevent the
influence of the West (www.ensani.ir 2017). From Russian leaders’ point of view,
there are two serious considerations which need to be made to security policy:
ensuring the continued supply of Russian oil and raw materials to Central Asian and
Caucasian markets, and Russian military commitment to intervene in crises occurring outside the immediate area. As for the United States, which imports 50% of its
oil from abroad, it does not want oil and gas supplies to have to go through Russia,
as the country can prevent oil supplies from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan going any
further at any time (www.ensani.ir 2017).
Introduction
the fore. Five options are available. These can be classed as the northern, western,
eastern, southeastern, and southern routes:
Northern Route: Kazakhstan-Russia-Russian Port
This line, known as the Russian Gas Pipeline in Kazakhstan, was built in 1970 and
remains active. The length of the pipeline is 1280 km, with a capacity of carrying 30
million tons of oil per year. The estimated value of a new route based on a renewed
version of this pipeline will cost $3.8–4.5 billion, beginning in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan and crossing Russia to the northern port of its Black Sea coast. Many
years have passed since the pipeline’s capacity began to erode, and it is likely that
another pipeline will be built on the abovementioned path. Currently, the old lines
in the former USSR are transported to the world markets of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. These pipelines, now known as the northern route, include:
1. Tangiz-Samara-Europe
2. Tengiz-Volgograd-Norveysk
3. Tengiz-Komsomolsk-Norvezysk
4. Baku-Groznyi-Norveseisk
Tangiz-Samara-Europe
The advantage of these routes, which extend through Dagestan and Chechnya along
the Caucasus Mountains to the Black Sea coast, is that they are shorter than others.
The length of the route from Chechnya is 1400 km; 200 km of the route has been
restored in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, this transfer plan seems to be failing due to
ill-repair along other parts of the route, with the required repairs estimated at $300
million. Furthermore, the pipelines are frequently attacked by Chechen separatists
and thus any suggestion of large-scale repair work is greeted with little enthusiasm
from regional partners. This route has not been seriously reconsidered since the
Caspian oil countries continue to depend on Russia politically and economically. In
return, Russian strategists clearly need to preserve Russia’s domination of the
energy sector in the “Commonwealth of Independent States” (CIS) and prevent the
influence of the West (www.ensani.ir 2017). From Russian leaders’ point of view,
there are two serious considerations which need to be made to security policy:
ensuring the continued supply of Russian oil and raw materials to Central Asian and
Caucasian markets, and Russian military commitment to intervene in crises occurring outside the immediate area. As for the United States, which imports 50% of its
oil from abroad, it does not want oil and gas supplies to have to go through Russia,
as the country can prevent oil supplies from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan going any
further at any time (www.ensani.ir 2017).
Introduction