99
Smaller states, in turn, could benefit from a relationship with these major external
actors. All in all, then, multilateral access may logically be seen as the way forward,
an institutionalized cooperative framework mitigating the potential for mutually
unfavorable clashes between actors (Overland et al. 2010:173).
Challenges and Opportunities for the SCO
The possible foundation of an SCO energy club, in Pan Guan’s view, carries with it
a number of benefits. The first of these is that domestic and regional security crises,
including the fallout of the conflict in Afghanistan may be better resolved through
multilateral security and anti-terrorism measures. Secondly, the growing number of
links between China and Central Asia and China and Russia prove that new cooperation opportunities have already appeared within SCO framework thus pointing
toward the potential for spillover within an institutional framework. Thirdly, the
approval of new Observer Regulations, Dialogue Partnership Ordinance, and New
Members Acceptance Regulations have enabled the SCO to further enlarge, expand,
outpace, and contribute to wider international cooperation. Lastly, current cooperation in disaster relief, health care, and educational schemes point to the potential of
the SCO to benefit countries in a humanitarian sense, as well as purely practical and
economical (Denoon 2015: 354–357).
All will not be plane sailing, however. Stability in Central Asia is one of the main
pillars of the SCO and will likely prove an ongoing challenge for the foreseeable
future. Continued tension in Afghanistan and the Middle East means a greater
imperative for anti-terrorism cooperation alone; yet given the threat extremism
presents to the coming into fruition of the region’s hopes of revivifying the spirit of
“Silk Road” economic cooperation, such work also carries economic importance. If
non-state militancy increases in this regard, then members may find themselves
fighting the tide in pursuit of such ambitions. Furthermore, there are a number of
nontraditional security threats emerging—such as disputes over water and the exact
placement of borders, which present a direct challenge to the potential of various
SCO member states’ ability to concur on various issues (Denoon 2015:354–357).
The SCO’s approach to economic and political issues is unlike other models such
as the EU, and, while it lacks some of the necessary mechanisms to cope with
emerging issues, in the long run it may have the potential to constitute an “Asian
Union” (www.iuvmpress.com 2017). For example, while the economic benefits of
China’s cooperation with the West and the country billions of dollars in the West
and in America have invested, but against Russia under the most severe economic
sanctions the West and economic approaches in conflict with America and the
West’s interests. In such circumstances, while waiting to go to China and other SCO
members in support of Russia’s economic relations with the West reduced, and the
country in addressing economic problems it helps, but it became clear that Beijing
is not ready for Russia relations to Western countries in danger. So that should be
said that Shanghai and its members never in line with the objectives of Russia does
not work, because the interests of China and India as appropriate, not with the West
Regional Security and Economic Organization and Projects
Smaller states, in turn, could benefit from a relationship with these major external
actors. All in all, then, multilateral access may logically be seen as the way forward,
an institutionalized cooperative framework mitigating the potential for mutually
unfavorable clashes between actors (Overland et al. 2010:173).
Challenges and Opportunities for the SCO
The possible foundation of an SCO energy club, in Pan Guan’s view, carries with it
a number of benefits. The first of these is that domestic and regional security crises,
including the fallout of the conflict in Afghanistan may be better resolved through
multilateral security and anti-terrorism measures. Secondly, the growing number of
links between China and Central Asia and China and Russia prove that new cooperation opportunities have already appeared within SCO framework thus pointing
toward the potential for spillover within an institutional framework. Thirdly, the
approval of new Observer Regulations, Dialogue Partnership Ordinance, and New
Members Acceptance Regulations have enabled the SCO to further enlarge, expand,
outpace, and contribute to wider international cooperation. Lastly, current cooperation in disaster relief, health care, and educational schemes point to the potential of
the SCO to benefit countries in a humanitarian sense, as well as purely practical and
economical (Denoon 2015: 354–357).
All will not be plane sailing, however. Stability in Central Asia is one of the main
pillars of the SCO and will likely prove an ongoing challenge for the foreseeable
future. Continued tension in Afghanistan and the Middle East means a greater
imperative for anti-terrorism cooperation alone; yet given the threat extremism
presents to the coming into fruition of the region’s hopes of revivifying the spirit of
“Silk Road” economic cooperation, such work also carries economic importance. If
non-state militancy increases in this regard, then members may find themselves
fighting the tide in pursuit of such ambitions. Furthermore, there are a number of
nontraditional security threats emerging—such as disputes over water and the exact
placement of borders, which present a direct challenge to the potential of various
SCO member states’ ability to concur on various issues (Denoon 2015:354–357).
The SCO’s approach to economic and political issues is unlike other models such
as the EU, and, while it lacks some of the necessary mechanisms to cope with
emerging issues, in the long run it may have the potential to constitute an “Asian
Union” (www.iuvmpress.com 2017). For example, while the economic benefits of
China’s cooperation with the West and the country billions of dollars in the West
and in America have invested, but against Russia under the most severe economic
sanctions the West and economic approaches in conflict with America and the
West’s interests. In such circumstances, while waiting to go to China and other SCO
members in support of Russia’s economic relations with the West reduced, and the
country in addressing economic problems it helps, but it became clear that Beijing
is not ready for Russia relations to Western countries in danger. So that should be
said that Shanghai and its members never in line with the objectives of Russia does
not work, because the interests of China and India as appropriate, not with the West
Regional Security and Economic Organization and Projects