96
perception about the SCO however is that it is a China and Russia-led alliance created to counter US supremacy in the region at a regional and global level (Bedeski
and Swanström 2012:179). In a perhaps alarmist view, Frederick W. Stakelbeck
goes as far as to state that “the SCO is a menacing confederacy of powerful nations
arising out of the shadows of the Cold War that could cause tremendous global
instability and even lead to war” (Bedeski and Swanström 2012:179).
Regional cooperation and stability in the region were major motivations for the
Chinese to increase cooperation with Russia in the creation of a regional organization such as the SCO. Jan Arno Hessburgge argues that three factors encouraged
China to follow up the proposal to reach a mutual accommodation with Russia
rather than challenge it as regional hegemon. Firstly, Central Asian resources would
help an energy-hungry China diversify its energy resource. Secondly, the geostrategic importance of the Central Asia region has not been lost on Islamic non-state
militants who threaten instability in the region. And thirdly, ensuring stability and
access to the region allows China to concentrate its attention on the South China Sea
and Taiwan, which is a more delicate area in terms of its diplomatic activities (Arno
Hessbruegge 2004:3).
China’s growing energy demand can be eased with Central Asia’s huge oil and
gas reserves, while an understanding with Russia allows the country to build on the
active energy diplomacy in the region that it launched in the 1990s without having
to tiptoe around the concerns of its northern neighbor (Arno Hessbruegge 2004:3).
From China’s perspective, the SCO provides a security guarantee and is a platform
and an institutional channel which consolidates the country’s right to be involved in
Central Asian affairs. The SCO provides a strategic accord between China and
Russia: both countries agreeing to a strategic balance, respect, and recognized
mutual interests, using this as a pivot around which to cooperate strategically. In the
meantime, Western observers will equate this to a Sino-Russian effort to prevent the
US and NATO from gaining access to the region (B. Rumer and Zhao 2015:164).
With the signing of the 5+1 agreement with Iran over the country’s nuclear program having taken place, in June 2016, during the 15th annual summit of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Vladimir Putin announced that the news meant
there were “no obstacles left” to Iran joining the SCO. The country’s involvement
with the SCO goes back to 2005 when, as part of the Ahmadinejad administration’s
“Look East Policy” Iran became a SCO observer as part of a strategy to make up for
declining relations with the West. By 2008, Iran had applied for full accession
(www.foreignaffairs.com 2016a, b, c, d).
Iran’s full membership to the SCO would be beneficial to the organization, as it
would complement China’s “One Belt One Road” project which currently drives the
SCO’s economic agenda. Iran’s geographical location is key here, serving as a
bridge to the Middle East and Europe while bypassing Russia altogether. In China’s
favor, Iran’s membership would help to keep the project on track if any serious tensions were to arise with Russia. What’s more, Iran and China are linked by railways
which cut through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are more cost-effective
than shipping (www.foreignaffairs.com 2016a, b, c, d).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
perception about the SCO however is that it is a China and Russia-led alliance created to counter US supremacy in the region at a regional and global level (Bedeski
and Swanström 2012:179). In a perhaps alarmist view, Frederick W. Stakelbeck
goes as far as to state that “the SCO is a menacing confederacy of powerful nations
arising out of the shadows of the Cold War that could cause tremendous global
instability and even lead to war” (Bedeski and Swanström 2012:179).
Regional cooperation and stability in the region were major motivations for the
Chinese to increase cooperation with Russia in the creation of a regional organization such as the SCO. Jan Arno Hessburgge argues that three factors encouraged
China to follow up the proposal to reach a mutual accommodation with Russia
rather than challenge it as regional hegemon. Firstly, Central Asian resources would
help an energy-hungry China diversify its energy resource. Secondly, the geostrategic importance of the Central Asia region has not been lost on Islamic non-state
militants who threaten instability in the region. And thirdly, ensuring stability and
access to the region allows China to concentrate its attention on the South China Sea
and Taiwan, which is a more delicate area in terms of its diplomatic activities (Arno
Hessbruegge 2004:3).
China’s growing energy demand can be eased with Central Asia’s huge oil and
gas reserves, while an understanding with Russia allows the country to build on the
active energy diplomacy in the region that it launched in the 1990s without having
to tiptoe around the concerns of its northern neighbor (Arno Hessbruegge 2004:3).
From China’s perspective, the SCO provides a security guarantee and is a platform
and an institutional channel which consolidates the country’s right to be involved in
Central Asian affairs. The SCO provides a strategic accord between China and
Russia: both countries agreeing to a strategic balance, respect, and recognized
mutual interests, using this as a pivot around which to cooperate strategically. In the
meantime, Western observers will equate this to a Sino-Russian effort to prevent the
US and NATO from gaining access to the region (B. Rumer and Zhao 2015:164).
With the signing of the 5+1 agreement with Iran over the country’s nuclear program having taken place, in June 2016, during the 15th annual summit of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Vladimir Putin announced that the news meant
there were “no obstacles left” to Iran joining the SCO. The country’s involvement
with the SCO goes back to 2005 when, as part of the Ahmadinejad administration’s
“Look East Policy” Iran became a SCO observer as part of a strategy to make up for
declining relations with the West. By 2008, Iran had applied for full accession
(www.foreignaffairs.com 2016a, b, c, d).
Iran’s full membership to the SCO would be beneficial to the organization, as it
would complement China’s “One Belt One Road” project which currently drives the
SCO’s economic agenda. Iran’s geographical location is key here, serving as a
bridge to the Middle East and Europe while bypassing Russia altogether. In China’s
favor, Iran’s membership would help to keep the project on track if any serious tensions were to arise with Russia. What’s more, Iran and China are linked by railways
which cut through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are more cost-effective
than shipping (www.foreignaffairs.com 2016a, b, c, d).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region