xiii
publication. I sent several transcriptions of the interviews to those who requested in
order to seek their approval and confirmation of quotes before use. All voice recordings have been kept in network-secure hard drives and e-mail inboxes. Financial
limitations have meant that not all the books, e-books, journals, and papers I could
otherwise benefit from have been sources, and for the same reasons, a more extensive trip around the region could not be taken, although I was glad to be able to have
attended a number of Caspian energy resource conferences held across the region
and the EU. I was able to overcome many obstacles and managed to conduct interviews with around 90 US former embassy staff in the region, a US special envoy for
Eurasia energy, a number of high-level managers from EU and US-based oil
companies.
The “First Phase” of the Caspian energy diplomacy began directly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and is characterized by the frenzy of international
companies in ceasing upon access to energy resources long inaccessible to the free
market. The second, longer-lasting phase, has been a subtler one, with companies
competing for rights to explore and develop as in any other region. There is now
more-or-less open competition, with many companies competing for access and
influence in the region. However, despite the calm, political and geographic factors
continue to maintain importance in the Caspian region (author’s interview with
Ambassador John Maresca, May 03, 2016).
Based on the information provided by the “Energy Information Administration,”
the Caspian Sea holds the following oil and gas reserves.
Oil and gas production by the Caspian Sea states
Caspian littoral
states
Oil production (mn mt/
year)
Sale gas production (bn m
3
/
year)
Start of
production
Azerbaijan
39
18
1952
Turkmenistan
2.5
5.5
2006—oil
2011—gas
Russia
2
–
2010
Kazakhstan
1
0.5
2013/2016
a
Iran
0
0
2013/2016
a
Source: Companies, NGW, Natural Gas World Magazine, Vol. 2, No, 17.
a
Kazakhstan stopped Kashaghan output when acidic liquids almost immediately destroyed the
pipeline, but it restarted in October 2016 with the correct pipes.
In recent years, Iran has negotiated with Russian Lukoil, Norwegian Statoil, and
Danish Maersk Group to convince them to participate in Caspian projects, but to no
avail. The water on the Iranian side of the Caspian Sea is less suitable for development, sometimes plunging to a depth of 1 km, compared with the Azeri side, which
often descends only a few hundred meters. Iran carried out 3-D seismic operations
in a 4000 km
2
area of the Caspian Sea covering blocks 6, 7, 8, and 21 between 2003
Introduction
publication. I sent several transcriptions of the interviews to those who requested in
order to seek their approval and confirmation of quotes before use. All voice recordings have been kept in network-secure hard drives and e-mail inboxes. Financial
limitations have meant that not all the books, e-books, journals, and papers I could
otherwise benefit from have been sources, and for the same reasons, a more extensive trip around the region could not be taken, although I was glad to be able to have
attended a number of Caspian energy resource conferences held across the region
and the EU. I was able to overcome many obstacles and managed to conduct interviews with around 90 US former embassy staff in the region, a US special envoy for
Eurasia energy, a number of high-level managers from EU and US-based oil
companies.
The “First Phase” of the Caspian energy diplomacy began directly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and is characterized by the frenzy of international
companies in ceasing upon access to energy resources long inaccessible to the free
market. The second, longer-lasting phase, has been a subtler one, with companies
competing for rights to explore and develop as in any other region. There is now
more-or-less open competition, with many companies competing for access and
influence in the region. However, despite the calm, political and geographic factors
continue to maintain importance in the Caspian region (author’s interview with
Ambassador John Maresca, May 03, 2016).
Based on the information provided by the “Energy Information Administration,”
the Caspian Sea holds the following oil and gas reserves.
Oil and gas production by the Caspian Sea states
Caspian littoral
states
Oil production (mn mt/
year)
Sale gas production (bn m
3
/
year)
Start of
production
Azerbaijan
39
18
1952
Turkmenistan
2.5
5.5
2006—oil
2011—gas
Russia
2
–
2010
Kazakhstan
1
0.5
2013/2016
a
Iran
0
0
2013/2016
a
Source: Companies, NGW, Natural Gas World Magazine, Vol. 2, No, 17.
a
Kazakhstan stopped Kashaghan output when acidic liquids almost immediately destroyed the
pipeline, but it restarted in October 2016 with the correct pipes.
In recent years, Iran has negotiated with Russian Lukoil, Norwegian Statoil, and
Danish Maersk Group to convince them to participate in Caspian projects, but to no
avail. The water on the Iranian side of the Caspian Sea is less suitable for development, sometimes plunging to a depth of 1 km, compared with the Azeri side, which
often descends only a few hundred meters. Iran carried out 3-D seismic operations
in a 4000 km
2
area of the Caspian Sea covering blocks 6, 7, 8, and 21 between 2003
Introduction