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gas and in this regard the US requires to exercise a more critical policy in Eurasia in
general and the Caspian sea (www.socar.de 2015).
Turkey
Turkey’s security and stability lies at the heart of its power in energy affairs.
Indeed, security, stability, and prosperity in the Middle East, especially with the
country’s neighbors, became Turkey’s highest priority under the AKP administration. In order to achieve these aims, the government required the establishment of
subregional institutions and cooperation-integration schemes to moderate political
disputes and conflicts. Even a superficial examination of Turkey’s energy policies
shows the country’s territory as a prime base for gas and oil pipelines both real and
proposed. Its goal of constituting an energy hub is thus a reality in the making, with
four phases having already been achieved, these being:
• Early phase with political-cultural concerns: 1991–1994.
• East-West energy corridor from Caspian: 1994–2005.
• East-West energy corridor from Eurasia and the Middle East: 2005–2009.
• East-West and North-South hub linking Russia, the Caspian, and the Middle
East: 2009 and on.
In the first phase, Turkey limited its operations to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline
from Iraq to the Mediterranean coast, showing little further interest in energy as an
issue. Due to the rigidity of the international system brought on by the Cold War, not
to mention the disastrous Iran-Iraq war raging to its immediate south, Turkey was in
any case, unable to even consider a foreign policy based on energy up until this
time. In its second phase however Turkey responded to the proposals of many gas
and oil pipeline projects aiming to transport Caspian Basin hydrocarbons westward.
Iran’s political and economic isolation, as well as insufficient infrastructure, had
from this point until recently, limited Turkey’s power to map out additional pipelines from Turkmenistan and Iran. As mentioned above, Turkey is now making conscious efforts to become an energy hub of the region. The biggest successes in this
endeavor have been the Baku-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline
projects. Turkey has realized important energy projects such as the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan crude oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. The projects
were launched in March 2007 (www.socar.az 2017). Turkey is also working with
Azerbaijan to transport its gas and oil to European markets via the Trans-Anatolian
Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project. It is hoped that TANAP will play a key role in
Turkey’s mission of becoming a “bridge” for the transporting of energy from
resource-rich regions (namely, the Caspian Basin and the Caucasus) to the EU market (http://www.aljazeera.com: 2016). Such gas and oil pipelines circumventing
Russian territory, stemming from Caspian Basin states, such as Iran, Azerbaijan,
and Turkmenistan (with possible expansions from Qatar and Iraq) through Turkey,
Turkey
gas and in this regard the US requires to exercise a more critical policy in Eurasia in
general and the Caspian sea (www.socar.de 2015).
Turkey
Turkey’s security and stability lies at the heart of its power in energy affairs.
Indeed, security, stability, and prosperity in the Middle East, especially with the
country’s neighbors, became Turkey’s highest priority under the AKP administration. In order to achieve these aims, the government required the establishment of
subregional institutions and cooperation-integration schemes to moderate political
disputes and conflicts. Even a superficial examination of Turkey’s energy policies
shows the country’s territory as a prime base for gas and oil pipelines both real and
proposed. Its goal of constituting an energy hub is thus a reality in the making, with
four phases having already been achieved, these being:
• Early phase with political-cultural concerns: 1991–1994.
• East-West energy corridor from Caspian: 1994–2005.
• East-West energy corridor from Eurasia and the Middle East: 2005–2009.
• East-West and North-South hub linking Russia, the Caspian, and the Middle
East: 2009 and on.
In the first phase, Turkey limited its operations to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline
from Iraq to the Mediterranean coast, showing little further interest in energy as an
issue. Due to the rigidity of the international system brought on by the Cold War, not
to mention the disastrous Iran-Iraq war raging to its immediate south, Turkey was in
any case, unable to even consider a foreign policy based on energy up until this
time. In its second phase however Turkey responded to the proposals of many gas
and oil pipeline projects aiming to transport Caspian Basin hydrocarbons westward.
Iran’s political and economic isolation, as well as insufficient infrastructure, had
from this point until recently, limited Turkey’s power to map out additional pipelines from Turkmenistan and Iran. As mentioned above, Turkey is now making conscious efforts to become an energy hub of the region. The biggest successes in this
endeavor have been the Baku-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline
projects. Turkey has realized important energy projects such as the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan crude oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. The projects
were launched in March 2007 (www.socar.az 2017). Turkey is also working with
Azerbaijan to transport its gas and oil to European markets via the Trans-Anatolian
Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project. It is hoped that TANAP will play a key role in
Turkey’s mission of becoming a “bridge” for the transporting of energy from
resource-rich regions (namely, the Caspian Basin and the Caucasus) to the EU market (http://www.aljazeera.com: 2016). Such gas and oil pipelines circumventing
Russian territory, stemming from Caspian Basin states, such as Iran, Azerbaijan,
and Turkmenistan (with possible expansions from Qatar and Iraq) through Turkey,
Turkey