74 J. KRANE
end of the typical scale for nuclear of between 7.3 and 14 US cents per
kWh. 47
Abu Dhabi’s experience with nuclear power has been difficult, and it
appears that it will not be repeated in its current form. The emirate’s
ambitious completion deadlines fell by the wayside, while the complexity
and cost of the Barakah plant have rendered them uncompetitive with
competing options. However, mastery of the development process frees
Abu Dhabi to consider a future array of nuclear options, such as small
modular reactors, which might help the emirate cope with challenges
from international climate action.
Nuclear power confers further benefits to Abu Dhabi beyond the
5.6 GW of firm, zero-carbon power generation capacity. These range
from freeing domestic hydrocarbons for export, transfer of complex technology, and creating high-value employment. 48 Abu Dhabi’s nuclear
investment allows the state to leverage an oil windfall to meet essential long term power needs. 49 Nuclear power’s long time horizon—the
Barakah reactors may provide electricity until 2080—allows the state to
transfer today’s oil wealth to future generations.
From the perspective of an autocratic regime, there are further benefits
from civil nuclear power. The nuclearization process tends to encourage
a strengthening of the central state and the regime’s control over society,
through increased internal security measures and enhanced coercive
apparatus, ostensibly justified by the technology’s inherent hazards. 50
Vulnerabilities in nuclear systems also create new requirements for secrecy
and surveillance, and less tolerance for dissent. 51 Protecting the fuel cycle
does double duty in bolstering regime security.
Finally, for Abu Dhabi, ‘going nuclear’ may also increase the West’s
stake in the survival of the regime because a shift to anti-US governance
could open the door to proliferation of nuclear technology. Gulf Arab
rulers have had reason to fear that Washington may eventually seek to
end its role as the GCC’s long-term guardian. Nuclearization under those
circumstances may offer an alternate path to maintaining the strategic
interest of the United States and other global powers. 52
The Political Economy of Gulf Solar Power
Early ambitions for solar technology to contribute materially to the UAE’s
power supply fell far short of initial expectations. But precipitous cost
declines in solar reached a threshold by 2016 that allowed the technology
end of the typical scale for nuclear of between 7.3 and 14 US cents per
kWh. 47
Abu Dhabi’s experience with nuclear power has been difficult, and it
appears that it will not be repeated in its current form. The emirate’s
ambitious completion deadlines fell by the wayside, while the complexity
and cost of the Barakah plant have rendered them uncompetitive with
competing options. However, mastery of the development process frees
Abu Dhabi to consider a future array of nuclear options, such as small
modular reactors, which might help the emirate cope with challenges
from international climate action.
Nuclear power confers further benefits to Abu Dhabi beyond the
5.6 GW of firm, zero-carbon power generation capacity. These range
from freeing domestic hydrocarbons for export, transfer of complex technology, and creating high-value employment. 48 Abu Dhabi’s nuclear
investment allows the state to leverage an oil windfall to meet essential long term power needs. 49 Nuclear power’s long time horizon—the
Barakah reactors may provide electricity until 2080—allows the state to
transfer today’s oil wealth to future generations.
From the perspective of an autocratic regime, there are further benefits
from civil nuclear power. The nuclearization process tends to encourage
a strengthening of the central state and the regime’s control over society,
through increased internal security measures and enhanced coercive
apparatus, ostensibly justified by the technology’s inherent hazards. 50
Vulnerabilities in nuclear systems also create new requirements for secrecy
and surveillance, and less tolerance for dissent. 51 Protecting the fuel cycle
does double duty in bolstering regime security.
Finally, for Abu Dhabi, ‘going nuclear’ may also increase the West’s
stake in the survival of the regime because a shift to anti-US governance
could open the door to proliferation of nuclear technology. Gulf Arab
rulers have had reason to fear that Washington may eventually seek to
end its role as the GCC’s long-term guardian. Nuclearization under those
circumstances may offer an alternate path to maintaining the strategic
interest of the United States and other global powers. 52
The Political Economy of Gulf Solar Power
Early ambitions for solar technology to contribute materially to the UAE’s
power supply fell far short of initial expectations. But precipitous cost
declines in solar reached a threshold by 2016 that allowed the technology