42 R. MILLS
Distributed solar power would seem to be an ideal initiative for Iraq,
given its frequent power cuts and the high cost of electricity from generators. There has been some degree of adoption in the KRI in particular,
where small private companies offer installations. 115 But in practice,
‘rooftop’ solar has made little progress. Part of this could be due to opposition from the ‘generator mafia’, politicians with stakes in the local diesel
generators, who have been blamed for ending pilots of electricity tariff
reform. 116
Conclusions
The political and financial capital the Iranian state has invested in its
nuclear programme, and in totemic features such as its right to domestic
enrichment, make it extremely difficult to back down. Its nuclear activities have incurred very heavy diplomatic and economic costs, but at the
same time, they have been convenient to some elements of the regime,
particularly the IRGC. Similarly, hydropower offers rent-seeking opportunities to developers, and temporarily satisfies the demands of constituents
such as farmers. Non-hydro renewables have not yet attracted the same
level of interest, though they may as the sector grows. They have suffered
from a lack of suitable incentives, the limited scale and experience of local
developers, US-imposed sanctions and continuing subsidies.
Iraq’s lack of progress in renewables is more straightforward. It
is mostly a story of ineffective organisation and capacity, overbearing
bureaucracy, unworkable financing and investment models, insecurity and
war damage, vested political interests and corruption, government instability, and cheap, subsidised electricity and gas. The renewables sector
is not unusual in these regards; most parts of the Iraqi economy post2003 have similarly failed to attract international or domestic private
investment.
Yet objectively, both countries could realise enormous benefits from
exploiting their abundant solar and wind resources, given the vast
improvements in performance and cost of renewable technologies over
the past few years. They have several regional examples of success that
could be used as models. Their lack of progress is also not unique; several
other neighbours, under apparently more favourable conditions, such as
Bahrain, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria, have also not managed to install
much renewable capacity. Only one other Middle Eastern state, the UAE,
has succeeded in completing a civil nuclear power programme.
Distributed solar power would seem to be an ideal initiative for Iraq,
given its frequent power cuts and the high cost of electricity from generators. There has been some degree of adoption in the KRI in particular,
where small private companies offer installations. 115 But in practice,
‘rooftop’ solar has made little progress. Part of this could be due to opposition from the ‘generator mafia’, politicians with stakes in the local diesel
generators, who have been blamed for ending pilots of electricity tariff
reform. 116
Conclusions
The political and financial capital the Iranian state has invested in its
nuclear programme, and in totemic features such as its right to domestic
enrichment, make it extremely difficult to back down. Its nuclear activities have incurred very heavy diplomatic and economic costs, but at the
same time, they have been convenient to some elements of the regime,
particularly the IRGC. Similarly, hydropower offers rent-seeking opportunities to developers, and temporarily satisfies the demands of constituents
such as farmers. Non-hydro renewables have not yet attracted the same
level of interest, though they may as the sector grows. They have suffered
from a lack of suitable incentives, the limited scale and experience of local
developers, US-imposed sanctions and continuing subsidies.
Iraq’s lack of progress in renewables is more straightforward. It
is mostly a story of ineffective organisation and capacity, overbearing
bureaucracy, unworkable financing and investment models, insecurity and
war damage, vested political interests and corruption, government instability, and cheap, subsidised electricity and gas. The renewables sector
is not unusual in these regards; most parts of the Iraqi economy post2003 have similarly failed to attract international or domestic private
investment.
Yet objectively, both countries could realise enormous benefits from
exploiting their abundant solar and wind resources, given the vast
improvements in performance and cost of renewable technologies over
the past few years. They have several regional examples of success that
could be used as models. Their lack of progress is also not unique; several
other neighbours, under apparently more favourable conditions, such as
Bahrain, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria, have also not managed to install
much renewable capacity. Only one other Middle Eastern state, the UAE,
has succeeded in completing a civil nuclear power programme.