40 R. MILLS
by 2030, including new hydro, 105 amounting to 3% of total generation.
However, it rejected large-scale solar on the grounds that it was (then) too
expensive compared to Iraq’s cheap and abundant gas, although the MOE
planned at that point 50 MW of solar/wind hybrid plants in remote locations where they would be competitive with diesel generators. In October
2012, the MOE announced plans for 400 MW of solar and wind, but
these did not proceed. 106
Following the defeat of ISIS, in 2018 the Iraqi government issued
a long list of projects for international investment and reconstruction,
which including 410 MW of solar power in various sites, as well as a solar
research and manufacturing centre. 107 MOE’s own projections showed
2695 MW of solar PV being installed between 2017 and 2020, spread
across most provinces of the country, though excluding the KRI and the
northern provinces of Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salahuddin, which were still
affected by ISIS activities. 108 Projects were awarded to some regional
companies: 465 MW in five locations to Sama Baghdad, and 230 MW
in four locations to Kuwait-based Al Dana International. However, in
the absence of a clear plan, priorities and investment model, these also
did not go ahead. MOE has consistently suffered from a high turnover
of ministers, because of changes of government and because of dismissal
following allegations of corruption (Raad Shalal in 2011) and summer
power cuts and protests (Karim Waheed in 2010 and Qassim Al Fahdawi
in July 2018).
During this period, numerous companies approached the MOE with
offers for solar projects, but these were generally rejected as too expensive. A feed-in tariff of 3.5 USc/kWh was set, inspired by the low prices
achieved in some neighbouring countries, but given the early stage of
solar power in Iraq and its particular challenges, this was not attractive.
For comparison, bids in Jordan in 2015 were around 6–7 USc/kWh, 109
and its Risha project tendered in 2017 was awarded at 5.9 USc/kWh. The
Iraqi projects offered were individually relatively small, so not achieving
economies of scale. Part of the intention appeared to be to spread development across most provinces, particularly poorer rural provinces with
limited other investment and weak grid connections, as well as widening
the opportunity for insiders to benefit through land leases and contracts.
Although security in most parts of Iraq has improved significantly, it
remains a concern, along with high levels of corruption. Importantly,
because of low electricity tariffs, theft and very high levels of nonpayment, the MOE is reliant on budget transfers (the same applies to
by 2030, including new hydro, 105 amounting to 3% of total generation.
However, it rejected large-scale solar on the grounds that it was (then) too
expensive compared to Iraq’s cheap and abundant gas, although the MOE
planned at that point 50 MW of solar/wind hybrid plants in remote locations where they would be competitive with diesel generators. In October
2012, the MOE announced plans for 400 MW of solar and wind, but
these did not proceed. 106
Following the defeat of ISIS, in 2018 the Iraqi government issued
a long list of projects for international investment and reconstruction,
which including 410 MW of solar power in various sites, as well as a solar
research and manufacturing centre. 107 MOE’s own projections showed
2695 MW of solar PV being installed between 2017 and 2020, spread
across most provinces of the country, though excluding the KRI and the
northern provinces of Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salahuddin, which were still
affected by ISIS activities. 108 Projects were awarded to some regional
companies: 465 MW in five locations to Sama Baghdad, and 230 MW
in four locations to Kuwait-based Al Dana International. However, in
the absence of a clear plan, priorities and investment model, these also
did not go ahead. MOE has consistently suffered from a high turnover
of ministers, because of changes of government and because of dismissal
following allegations of corruption (Raad Shalal in 2011) and summer
power cuts and protests (Karim Waheed in 2010 and Qassim Al Fahdawi
in July 2018).
During this period, numerous companies approached the MOE with
offers for solar projects, but these were generally rejected as too expensive. A feed-in tariff of 3.5 USc/kWh was set, inspired by the low prices
achieved in some neighbouring countries, but given the early stage of
solar power in Iraq and its particular challenges, this was not attractive.
For comparison, bids in Jordan in 2015 were around 6–7 USc/kWh, 109
and its Risha project tendered in 2017 was awarded at 5.9 USc/kWh. The
Iraqi projects offered were individually relatively small, so not achieving
economies of scale. Part of the intention appeared to be to spread development across most provinces, particularly poorer rural provinces with
limited other investment and weak grid connections, as well as widening
the opportunity for insiders to benefit through land leases and contracts.
Although security in most parts of Iraq has improved significantly, it
remains a concern, along with high levels of corruption. Importantly,
because of low electricity tariffs, theft and very high levels of nonpayment, the MOE is reliant on budget transfers (the same applies to