2 THE POLITICS OF LOW-CARBON ENERGY IN IRAN AND IRAQ
23
industry, reinjection, pipeline exports (with LNG exports last, had there
been any). Residential use had the attraction of bringing gas even to relatively small and remote communities, and winning electoral support for
local members of the Majles (parliament). The grid expansion also benefited IRGC-linked construction and steel companies, a positive point for
then President Ahmadinejad. The length of gas distribution pipelines rose
from 120,852 km in 2005 to 286,756 km in 2015, 13 before the growth
rate slowed down as gasification was largely completed.
In transport, key aims were to reduce pollution, and to limit reliance
on petrol (gasoline), and CNG use really accelerated from 2005. 14 Iran
had to import gasoline and this vulnerability was targeted by US sanctions, though subsequently new refining capacity has eliminated imports.
For power, gas was displacing oil which could then be exported. In
industry, well-connected business groups were able to secure allocations, particularly under the administrations of then President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). However, when at times gas supplies were
limited, particularly during cold winters, industry has often suffered
cut-offs.
Reinjection was lower-priority and fell far below planned rates
(achieving only 40% in 2015 15 ), affecting the country’s oil export
capacity, though when production was limited by the periods of US sanctions, this did not matter so much. The economic attractiveness of higher
oil production was outweighed by the relatively long response time of
the reservoirs, and therefore the temptation to divert gas to more urgent
needs elsewhere.
Exports by pipeline to Turkey began in 2001 and to Iraq in 2017 16 ;
small amounts are also exported to Azerbaijan and Armenia. Iran has
imported gas from Turkmenistan to serve its northern provinces, due to
limited capacity to move gas from southern fields. These imports ceased
in late 2016 17 due to a commercial dispute and Iran’s own rising output
and expanded pipeline and storage capacity to the north. But again,
when domestic gas has been short, Iran has cut exports to Turkey and
Iraq despite incurring commercial and reputational penalties. A pipeline
was completed to the UAE emirate of Sharjah, but never functioned
commercially after technical problems, sanctions delays and allegations of
corruption and underpricing. Plans for pipelines to Pakistan and Oman
have similarly been stymied by long commercial negotiations and American opposition. In this way, with the exception of Iraq, Iran lost its
opportunity to create some mutual dependence with neighbours, which
23
industry, reinjection, pipeline exports (with LNG exports last, had there
been any). Residential use had the attraction of bringing gas even to relatively small and remote communities, and winning electoral support for
local members of the Majles (parliament). The grid expansion also benefited IRGC-linked construction and steel companies, a positive point for
then President Ahmadinejad. The length of gas distribution pipelines rose
from 120,852 km in 2005 to 286,756 km in 2015, 13 before the growth
rate slowed down as gasification was largely completed.
In transport, key aims were to reduce pollution, and to limit reliance
on petrol (gasoline), and CNG use really accelerated from 2005. 14 Iran
had to import gasoline and this vulnerability was targeted by US sanctions, though subsequently new refining capacity has eliminated imports.
For power, gas was displacing oil which could then be exported. In
industry, well-connected business groups were able to secure allocations, particularly under the administrations of then President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). However, when at times gas supplies were
limited, particularly during cold winters, industry has often suffered
cut-offs.
Reinjection was lower-priority and fell far below planned rates
(achieving only 40% in 2015 15 ), affecting the country’s oil export
capacity, though when production was limited by the periods of US sanctions, this did not matter so much. The economic attractiveness of higher
oil production was outweighed by the relatively long response time of
the reservoirs, and therefore the temptation to divert gas to more urgent
needs elsewhere.
Exports by pipeline to Turkey began in 2001 and to Iraq in 2017 16 ;
small amounts are also exported to Azerbaijan and Armenia. Iran has
imported gas from Turkmenistan to serve its northern provinces, due to
limited capacity to move gas from southern fields. These imports ceased
in late 2016 17 due to a commercial dispute and Iran’s own rising output
and expanded pipeline and storage capacity to the north. But again,
when domestic gas has been short, Iran has cut exports to Turkey and
Iraq despite incurring commercial and reputational penalties. A pipeline
was completed to the UAE emirate of Sharjah, but never functioned
commercially after technical problems, sanctions delays and allegations of
corruption and underpricing. Plans for pipelines to Pakistan and Oman
have similarly been stymied by long commercial negotiations and American opposition. In this way, with the exception of Iraq, Iran lost its
opportunity to create some mutual dependence with neighbours, which