20 R. MILLS
the story. But institutional capacity, high-level government strategic priorities, the interests of key players, and the ease or difficulty of accessing
international finance and technology, differ between the two. Even if the
raw statistics in terms of renewable deployment look quite similar, the
processes of getting there have been unlike.
Iran
Background
Despite its large land-mass, wealth of renewable resources, heavy energy
demand and technically-skilled population, Iran has made relatively little
progress in renewables, with the exception of hydroelectricity. This is in
sharp contrast with regional neighbours such as the UAE and Turkey.
On the other hand, it was the first Middle Eastern country to begin
generating nuclear power. Nuclear forms only a small part of its future
planned energy mix, yet has received disproportionate political attention
and funding. Nuclear’s low-carbon nature has not been an important
factor in Iran’s choice to adopt it.
By 2019, Iran’s installed generation capacity amounted to 81 GW of
gas and oil-fired generation, 16 GW of hydropower, 1 GW of nuclear,
0.35 GW of solar photovoltaic, 0.02 GW of solar thermal and 0.3 GW of
wind. There are some limited plans for coal power in the Tabas mining
area in eastern Iran.
Electricity generation growth was exceptionally rapid following the
Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), with a compound average growth rate of
7.6%, driven by economic reconstruction, fast population growth, the
extension of the grid to more remote locations and low, subsidised prices.
Annual growth slowed to 3.5% from 2010 to 2018, as most population centres had been connected to power, population growth slowed,
the economy suffered two intense phases of sanctions, and subsidies
were sharply reduced in late 2010. Nevertheless, keeping up with such
fast growth without major nationwide power shortages was a significant
achievement. 1
Iran’s complex and factionalised political system features a number
of loosely organised groupings, which compete for power and financial resources under the supervision of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei. Apart from material and social interests, ideological differences
the story. But institutional capacity, high-level government strategic priorities, the interests of key players, and the ease or difficulty of accessing
international finance and technology, differ between the two. Even if the
raw statistics in terms of renewable deployment look quite similar, the
processes of getting there have been unlike.
Iran
Background
Despite its large land-mass, wealth of renewable resources, heavy energy
demand and technically-skilled population, Iran has made relatively little
progress in renewables, with the exception of hydroelectricity. This is in
sharp contrast with regional neighbours such as the UAE and Turkey.
On the other hand, it was the first Middle Eastern country to begin
generating nuclear power. Nuclear forms only a small part of its future
planned energy mix, yet has received disproportionate political attention
and funding. Nuclear’s low-carbon nature has not been an important
factor in Iran’s choice to adopt it.
By 2019, Iran’s installed generation capacity amounted to 81 GW of
gas and oil-fired generation, 16 GW of hydropower, 1 GW of nuclear,
0.35 GW of solar photovoltaic, 0.02 GW of solar thermal and 0.3 GW of
wind. There are some limited plans for coal power in the Tabas mining
area in eastern Iran.
Electricity generation growth was exceptionally rapid following the
Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), with a compound average growth rate of
7.6%, driven by economic reconstruction, fast population growth, the
extension of the grid to more remote locations and low, subsidised prices.
Annual growth slowed to 3.5% from 2010 to 2018, as most population centres had been connected to power, population growth slowed,
the economy suffered two intense phases of sanctions, and subsidies
were sharply reduced in late 2010. Nevertheless, keeping up with such
fast growth without major nationwide power shortages was a significant
achievement. 1
Iran’s complex and factionalised political system features a number
of loosely organised groupings, which compete for power and financial resources under the supervision of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei. Apart from material and social interests, ideological differences