11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
329
33. IRENA, Renewable Energy Market Analysis: GCC, 14.
34. Government of Saudi Arabia, The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Under the UNFCCC, Riyadh,
November 2015, 1.
35. Al-Sarihi, Climate Change and Economic Diversification, 1.
36. MEED, ‘Riyadh Forms Renewable Energy Body’, 9 April 2020.
37. Partly from: IRENA, Renewable Energy Market Analysis: GCC, 59; AlSarihi, Climate Change and Economic Diversification, 14; DNA of Saudi
Arabia, First BUR, 47–52.
38. Jan Hanrath and Wael Abdul-Shafi, Environmental Challenges in a
Conflictive Environment: Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Risks of
Climate Change and Ecological Deterioration, Brief 8, CARPO and East
West Institute, 2017, 5.
39. MEIM/Saudi Arabia, ‘KSA Climate’ portal, accessed in July 2019 when
the website’s content was focused on COP 24, https://ksa-climate.com/.
40. A similar argument has been made by Al-Sarihi, Climate Change and
Economic Diversification, 17.
41. DNA of Saudi Arabia, First BUR, 20.
42. Based on author’s communications at COP 22 and North Africa Post,
‘King Mohamed VI to Pay for Travel Expenses of Tropical Islands
Delegations Attending COP 22’, 10 October 2016, http://northafricap
ost.com/14507-king-mohammed-vi-pay-travel-expenses-tropical-islandsdelegations-attending-cop22.html.
43. On pledges, see, e.g., World Resources Institute’s Twitter campaign
#stepup2020 @wriclimate #sb50bonn, accessed in August 2019. Few Arab
countries have signed onto the HAC, Morocco representing one of the
few exceptions.
44. Permanent Mission of France to the UN in New York, ‘The
Group of Friends of Climate: 2019 Is a Pivotal Year’, press release,
22 April 2019, https://onu.delegfrance.org/The-Group-of-Friends-ofClimate-2019-is-a-pivotal-year.
45. Climate Vulnerable Forum, ‘Climate Vulnerable Forum Commit to
Stronger Climate Action at COP22’, press release, 18 November 2016,
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cvf_declaration_release_en.pdf.
46. V20, ‘Vulnerable Countries and Partners to Climate-Proof Economic
Growth’, press release, 11 April 2019, https://www.v-20.org/vulnerablecountries-and-partners-to-climate%C2%AD-proof-economic-growth/.
47. MASEN, website, accessed in August 2019, http://www.masen.ma/en/.
48. Climate Action Tracker, ‘Morocco’, accessed in August 2019, https://cli
mateactiontracker.org/countries/morocco/.
49. Meriem Houzir, Mustapha Mokass and Liane Schalatek, Climate Governance and the Role of Climate Finance in Morocco, Heinrich Böll Stiftung,
2016, 82–83.
329
33. IRENA, Renewable Energy Market Analysis: GCC, 14.
34. Government of Saudi Arabia, The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Under the UNFCCC, Riyadh,
November 2015, 1.
35. Al-Sarihi, Climate Change and Economic Diversification, 1.
36. MEED, ‘Riyadh Forms Renewable Energy Body’, 9 April 2020.
37. Partly from: IRENA, Renewable Energy Market Analysis: GCC, 59; AlSarihi, Climate Change and Economic Diversification, 14; DNA of Saudi
Arabia, First BUR, 47–52.
38. Jan Hanrath and Wael Abdul-Shafi, Environmental Challenges in a
Conflictive Environment: Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Risks of
Climate Change and Ecological Deterioration, Brief 8, CARPO and East
West Institute, 2017, 5.
39. MEIM/Saudi Arabia, ‘KSA Climate’ portal, accessed in July 2019 when
the website’s content was focused on COP 24, https://ksa-climate.com/.
40. A similar argument has been made by Al-Sarihi, Climate Change and
Economic Diversification, 17.
41. DNA of Saudi Arabia, First BUR, 20.
42. Based on author’s communications at COP 22 and North Africa Post,
‘King Mohamed VI to Pay for Travel Expenses of Tropical Islands
Delegations Attending COP 22’, 10 October 2016, http://northafricap
ost.com/14507-king-mohammed-vi-pay-travel-expenses-tropical-islandsdelegations-attending-cop22.html.
43. On pledges, see, e.g., World Resources Institute’s Twitter campaign
#stepup2020 @wriclimate #sb50bonn, accessed in August 2019. Few Arab
countries have signed onto the HAC, Morocco representing one of the
few exceptions.
44. Permanent Mission of France to the UN in New York, ‘The
Group of Friends of Climate: 2019 Is a Pivotal Year’, press release,
22 April 2019, https://onu.delegfrance.org/The-Group-of-Friends-ofClimate-2019-is-a-pivotal-year.
45. Climate Vulnerable Forum, ‘Climate Vulnerable Forum Commit to
Stronger Climate Action at COP22’, press release, 18 November 2016,
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cvf_declaration_release_en.pdf.
46. V20, ‘Vulnerable Countries and Partners to Climate-Proof Economic
Growth’, press release, 11 April 2019, https://www.v-20.org/vulnerablecountries-and-partners-to-climate%C2%AD-proof-economic-growth/.
47. MASEN, website, accessed in August 2019, http://www.masen.ma/en/.
48. Climate Action Tracker, ‘Morocco’, accessed in August 2019, https://cli
mateactiontracker.org/countries/morocco/.
49. Meriem Houzir, Mustapha Mokass and Liane Schalatek, Climate Governance and the Role of Climate Finance in Morocco, Heinrich Böll Stiftung,
2016, 82–83.